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Abstract
This year’s edition of Latin America and the Caribbean
in the World Economy is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter I contains an analysis of recent trends in
the economies of the United States, the European
Union and Japan as well as a number of emerging
Asian economies. The determinants of the imbalances
existing among these economies are examined, and the
role of these disequilibria as the principal risk factor in
what nonetheless remains a positive global environment
is considered. Factors influencing the trade performance
of Latin America and the Caribbean are discussed, as
are the region’s trade results and outlook in 2006 and
2007. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the
difficult negotiation process being pursued in the
Doha Round and how it has been affected by changes
in United States trade policy. 
Chapter II offers an overview of the world
economy’s recent restructuring around the Asia–Pacific
region, especially China, and the regional integration
process that has been taking place in the wake of the
Asian crisis. This region has become not only the
world’s most dynamic market, but also a major source
of financing which is paving the way for the achievement
of international financial equilibrium. This analysis
shows that, in practice, the deepening of the regional
integration process revolves around China, which is
playing an increasingly central role as an extraregional
export platform for its neighbours.
In chapter III, the strategic role of business services
and the main trends to be observed in this sector are
explored, and comparisons are drawn between the
Latin American and Caribbean region and selected
Asian countries. The success achieved by some Latin
American firms in this niche is examined, together
with the factors underlying their export performance,
such as the regulatory framework, human capital
endowments and the adaptation of advanced technology.
Consideration is also given to the liberalization of
trade in services under the various trade agreements in
force in the region.
Chapter IV looks at the current status of regional
integration efforts and of bilateral and plurilateral
negotiations with countries outside the region that are
having an impact on the progress made in this area. An
overview is provided of milestone events in the
integration processes of the various subregions
(MERCOSUR), the Andean Community, the Central
American Common Market (CACM), the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) and the South American
Community of Nations) as they seek out complemen-
tarities and opportunities for the convergence of
trade rules. 
The Asia–Pacific region’s integration process,
which until recently consisted primarily of a de facto
form of integration in the sphere of production, is
examined in Chapter V. This process is now being
complemented by de jure integration under the terms
of both intraregional and extraregional trade agreements.
In the light of these trends, the Latin American and
Caribbean region should work to strengthen its trade
and investment links with Asia and the Pacific, heighten
its production complementarities with that region and
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promote business and investment alliances that will
provide it with broader access to those markets and
help it position itself within Asian production and
export chains. Trade agreements that move the region
in this direction can serve as valuable tools for the
application of such a strategy. 
Chapter VI explores the various ways in which
export development and innovation are linked and how
these links are reflected in institutional strategies and
institution–building. The cases of Australia, Finland,
Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of
Korea, Singapore and Sweden —countries that attach
importance to innovation and are better–placed
than others to compete in the global economy— are
studied within this framework. On the basis of
this comparative analysis, a number of policy
recommendations are formulated.
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The world economy has been growing at annual rates
of over 4% since 2003, making 2006 the fourth
consecutive year of growth at this pace. The outlook
for 2007 and 2008 remains promising, although both
economic and trade growth are expected to slow
somewhat throughout the world, with global growth
projected to drop slightly from its 2006 level to about
5.2% in 2007 and 2008. This slowdown is particularly
evident in the United States economy but will be
partially offset by buoyancy in Europe, Japan and other
Asian countries. Commodity prices remain high,
especially in the case of energy and minerals, thanks
largely to the continuing strength of Asian demand. In
the past few months, grain and cereal prices have been
pushed up sharply by the rising demand associated
with biofuel investment. The economic boom in Latin
America and the Caribbean that has been triggered by
these favourable international conditions represents an
opportunity for the region to lay the foundations for
sustained medium–term growth by making invest-
ments in infrastructure, innovation and human capital
that can add greater value and knowledge to exports
and help create more stable conditions for growth and
progress towards greater equity.
There are latent risks, however, that could affect
this positive global situation. The first such risk is the
possibility of a sharper slowdown in the United States
as a consequence of problems in the country’s housing
sector. If this were to occur, Japan, the European Union
and the developing countries of Asia would be
called upon to play an even more important role in
maintaining the momentum of global growth. Second,
there are a number of risks that have persisted over
time, such as greater volatility on financial markets,
inflationary surges that could lead to interest rate hikes,
new threats in the oil market and, lastly, the likelihood
of a disorderly adjustment in external imbalances
worldwide. Given their current account surpluses,
large international reserves, lower levels of external
indebtedness, sounder fiscal positions and more
flexible exchange–rate policies, the countries of the
region are less vulnerable in all of these areas than they
Summary
Developments in the international economy and their
consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean
Developments in the international economy
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were in the past. The fact that the multilateral World
Trade Organization negotiations have stalled is a
further cause for concern, however, since this situation
may generate support for protectionist measures and
lead to a proliferation of trade agreements that are not
necessarily consistent with the multilateral framework.
Slower growth in the United States will probably
have a greater effect on the trade of Latin America and
the Caribbean than any other feature of the international
environment. The country’s economic growth rate is
projected to drop from 3.3% in 2006 to 2.1% in 2007,
which could signal a decline of nearly 2% (1.8%) in
real terms in the volume of exports from the region to
the United States, as compared with the 4.6% increase
seen in 2006. Estimates suggest that Central America
and the Caribbean may be the subregions that are most
seriously affected.
The developing Asian countries are playing a key
role in the current economic situation for a number
of reasons. The first is that the Asia–Pacific region
continues to drive the world economy’s growth,
accounting for almost half of the expansion of the
global economy as measured in terms of purchasing
power parity. China and India have been leading
the way, with growth rates of 11.1% and 9.7%,
respectively, in 2006. The other emerging economies
of Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand, have been expanding more slowly
than in the decade leading up to the 1997–1998 crisis,
partly because investment rates are much lower.
Second, Asia increasingly dominates international
financial flows and is a vital source of financing for the
United States trade deficit (the world’s largest). In
2005–2006, the developing countries of Asia absorbed
some 70% of gross world investment flows to other
developing countries. China also stands out in this
respect, since in 2006 it was the world’s largest net
exporter of capital, partly because of the increase in
global reserves. Asia’s economic, commercial and
financial importance and its robust growth projections
make it a market of great potential for Latin American
and Caribbean trade and investment.
The external deficit of the United States deepened
slightly (6.5% of GDP in 2006 compared to 6.4% in
2005) but is expected to narrow a little in 2007 thanks
to lower oil prices in the second half of 2006 and first
half of 2007. This country’s trade balance with China
and, to a lesser extent, with the rest of Asia worsened
again in 2006, however. By the end of the year, Asia
accounted for half the total external deficit of the
United States and for two thirds of the deterioration
seen between 2005 and 2006. The United States’
external deficit is not expected to shrink much over
the next five years, either. Furthermore, the ways
in which the United States deficit is financed and the
willingness of Asian countries to fund it are changing,
and this could lead to a disorderly adjustment of the
dollar at some point.
Despite some adjustments and increased volatility,
financial markets have continued to strengthen in both
emerging and industrial economies. In developing
economies, this tendency is partly due to very positive
financial results, thanks to which some stock market
price indices have surpassed the record levels seen
during the technology boom in the early part of the
decade. The dollar fell continuously against the most
widely traded currencies in 2006, with the exception of
the renminbi and yen. In the first six months of 2007,
the dollar’s slide was gradual, but some adjustments
in the currency market are still to be expected,
particularly because of the large trade imbalance
between the United States and some of its main trading
partners and increased pessimism about growth
prospects in the United States economy.
In August 2007, world stock indices fell sharply
amid investors’ fears of the possibility of contagion
from the insolvent situation in the United States
subprime mortgage market. The losses were so heavy
that the gains of the entire year were wiped out in just
a few days. It remains to be seen whether this drop is
simply a price adjustment or if it marks the advent of a
much higher–risk environment for the world economy
that could trigger a credit crunch and have serious
implications for production.
The rate of growth in the value of Latin American
and Caribbean goods exports fell slightly to 20%
from an average of 22% in 2004 and 2005. This was
primarily due to the slower expansion of export
volumes, as prices remained strong. In 2006, the
increase in the volume of the region’s exports (6%)
was not only lower than the global growth rate (8%),
but was also lower than it had been the year before.
Meanwhile, China’s exports climbed by more than
20%, while growth in the rest of the world, other than
Africa and the Middle East, ranged from 7% to 11%. In
the region, Mexico and the Central American countries
were the best performers while South America
experienced a sharp slowdown. After three and a half
years of sharp increases, commodity prices began to
drift downward in the second half of 2006, although
the rate of decline varied considerably from one
subgroup to another. After moderating in the second
half of 2006, oil prices began to rise again in 2007;
analysts attribute this development not so much to
geopolitical circumstances as to underlying factors of
supply and demand.
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The region’s exports were up by just 9% in
value in the first half of 2007, a far cry from the 22%
increase recorded for the same period in 2006. This
was mainly due to a loss of dynamism in Bolivia, the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador, with
the latter two seeing declines of 7% and 10%,
respectively, in the value of their exports. Taken as a
group, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
witnessed a slowdown in trading activity, and this
was reflected in lower import growth. In contrast, the
countries of South America, whether oil producers
or not, have continued to see strong import growth (see
figure 1). For the year as a whole, the region’s goods
exports and imports are expected to rise by some 13%
and 17%, respectively, in value terms, which should
translate into a US$ 56 billion trade surplus. In volume
terms, exports are expected to grow by 6% and imports
by 11%, from which it can be inferred that the unit
values of exports are still being heavily influenced by
high commodity prices, especially for metals and fuels.
confirmed their commitment to achieving positive results
before the end of 2007. Nonetheless, negotiations are
no further forward than they were a year ago.
The chairs of the negotiating groups are drawing
up new proposals on the various issues covered by
the talks in an effort to move the process forward.
However, failure to agree on negotiating modalities,
which providing the basic parameters to guide new
The Doha Round trade negotiations, which are being
conducted under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), were resumed in February 2007
after the WTO Director–General had proposed that
they be suspended in July 2006 to give members
time to reflect and to review the situation. During
this “time–out” and when negotiations recommenced,
the world’s most influential countries repeatedly
Figure 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH RATES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS, 2003–2007
(Percentages)
Exports Imports
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the countries’ national statistics offices, customs
services and central banks.
a The oil–producing countries are the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador; non–oil–producing South America consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
b Total of 37 countries.
The difficulties of the Doha Round and a new trade policy
in the United States
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liberalization commitments in the areas of agriculture,
industrial products and trade in services, is still
blocking the progress of the negotiations as a whole.
Following signs of possible progress in the
negotiations undertaken by the United States, the
European Union, Brazil and India (Group of 4), the
talks suffered a new setback on 21 June 2007 when
participants in the meeting held in Potsdam, Germany,
failed to bring their positions closer together. The
United States indicated it was willing to improve
its position on domestic support for agriculture by
reducing its proposed level from US$ 22.5 billion to
US$ 17 billion, but Brazil and India were looking for
amounts in the region of US$ 12 billion and regarded
this new proposal as insufficient.1
Meanwhile, Brazil and India rejected the United
States proposal for cuts in tariffs on non–agricultural
products that would have allowed maximum tariffs of
25% for developing countries and of 10% for developed
nations. The two countries believe they can accept
tariffs of up to 35%.
Under these circumstances, and in response to
the WTO Director–General’s efforts to bring the
negotiations back within the WTO framework, the
chairs of the Agricultural Committee and the Market
Access Negotiating Group submitted new proposals on
17 July 2007. Given the time limits imposed by the
forthcoming 2008 presidential elections in the United
States and the expiration of Trade Promotion Authority
on 30 June, the Doha negotiations have a precarious
basis on which to proceed.
In 2007, the highlights of the United States trade
agenda have been the Doha Round negotiations, the
ongoing negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia,
the possible scrutiny in Congress of the legislation
applicable to Colombia, Panama, Peru and the Republic
of Korea, and the possibility of renewing Trade
Promotion Authority (formerly known as fast–track
negotiating authority), which expired on 1 July 2007.
In the case of trade policy, the increasing
inequality observed over the last 30 years and the
prolonged stagnation of average wages have aroused
concern about the possible effects on the well–being
of United States workers. As a number of empirical
studies have shown, trade has reduced the demand for
labour in a number of areas of activity where large
numbers of lower–skilled workers are employed. The
political platform of the Democratic Party includes
the adoption of a “new trade policy for America” to
raise workers’ living standards and create new trade
opportunities for United States goods. The suggestion
is that in future agreements countries should make a
commitment to adopt, maintain and enforce basic
international labour standards rather than merely
“enforcing their own laws”; promote sustainable
development and combat global warming; and achieve
a better balance between promoting access to
medicines and protecting pharmaceutical innovation.
In May, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Nancy Pelosi, and the Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee, Charles Rangel, announced a
framework agreement with the United States Trade
Representative, Susan Schwab, on the measures to be
taken for this purpose. As it relates to accords awaiting
approval by Congress, the agreement calls upon
countries to incorporate the obligations set forth in
the International Labour Organization (ILO) 1998
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work into their legislation and practices. In relation to
the environment, it would ask them to undertake to
sign seven agreements on the environment that are not
regarded as running counter to the provisions of the
free trade agreements or to the commitment to comply
with the multilateral agreements each country has
signed. Both issues, employment and the environment,
are to be subject to the same dispute settlement
mechanism as is used for all other provisions of free
trade agreements. This agreement also covers issues
relating to access to medicines in developing countries
and the protection of drug trial data. The above has led
to amendments in the texts previously agreed upon
with Panama and Peru; the cases of Colombia and the
Republic of Korea are still pending.
The United States Congress is expected to pass
a new farm bill at some point in 2007, since most of
the provisions of the 2002 Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act expire this year. The debate on this
legislation has very direct implications for the
negotiating leeway available in the Doha Round and
for the level of ambition that may be feasible, as well
as for the ongoing debate regarding the government’s
budget deficit. The likelihood is that the new
legislation will be very similar to what exists now.
1 Inside U.S. Trade, vol. 25, No. 19, 22 June 2007, and Puentes Quincenal, vol. 4, No. 12, 26 June 2007.
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Until recently, Asian regional integration was
characterized by growing intraregional trade based
on progressively greater production and trade
complementarities in the countries’ manufacturing
sectors. There were substantial increases in intra–
industry trade, and the different advantages of
production and marketing chains were being more
fully utilized. This de facto market–led integration
process is now being accompanied by de jure
government–led integration process whereby close
production and trade links are being supplemented by
free trade agreements of various kinds. Asia–Pacific
has become not just the world’s “factory”, but also a
battleground for vying preferential trade agreements.
A decade after the 1997 Asian crisis, East and
South–East Asia have fully recovered and indeed
greatly strengthened their already prominent position
in the world economy.2 Their dynamism can be seen
in the figures for growth, international trade, FDI,
technological innovation and inputs of financial
resources to maintain international equilibria.
The central role being played by the Asian
countries is apparent not just in world production
and trade, but also in the global financial arena. The
region is playing a more and more important part in
preserving global economic balances, since its ample
supply of low–cost goods is helping to keep demand
high and inflation low in the developed countries;
it supplies inexpensive credit to the United States,
keeping interest rates down; and it is building up
reserves3 by purchasing United States Treasury bonds
and helping to finance the current–account deficit of
the United States, which remains the world’s largest
consumer nation. Indeed, the Asia–Pacific region has
become one of the world’s leading suppliers of both
goods and international finance. 
Two of the key factors behind developments
in Asia over the last decade have been technological
progress and the opportunity to “slice up” production
chains, giving rise to a large increase in Asian
intraregional trade. The intraregional trade ratio is
higher than for the North American Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) countries and is rapidly approaching that of
the European Union. Trade among ASEAN members
has increased and now exceeds the 18% recorded
by MERCOSUR in 2005. These indicators confirm
the high degree of production and thus trade
complementarities existing in Asia.
This increase in intra–Asian trade is partly the
result of the robust expansion of intra–firm and intra–
industry trade being driven by the development of a
complex transnational network of vertical supply
chains, with China playing a central role as both a
point of origin and a destination market. The high level
of intraregional trade in Asia is both a cause and an
effect of the countries’ growing trade complementarities,
which is manifested in high indices of intra–industry
trade (i.e., cases where a country both imports and
exports similar but different products).
The high degree of complementarity in production
activities and trade is a clear sign of the profound
changes going on in Asia’s regional integration as the
production process is “sliced up”. The entire trade
creation process in the region took place outside the
scope of regional agreements, and the move to take
advantage of the opportunities offered by the division
of the production process is reflected in the behaviour
of United States and European transnational enterprises
in Asia, which differs markedly from their pattern
of operation in Latin America and the Caribbean
(where they have not created interlocking networks of
production chains, except in Mexico and, to a lesser
Integration and dynamism in the Asia–Pacific region
2 In this section, East Asia is taken to consist of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, plus Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of
China) and Taiwan Province of China; South–East Asia of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam; South Asia of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; and Oceania of Australia
and New Zealand.
3 In December 2006, China held United States Treasury bonds worth US$ 350 billion, more than half the amount held by Japan (US$ 644
billion). At that time, China’s reserves exceeded US$ 1.06 trillion, a figure much higher than Japan’s US$ 875 billion. China’s reserves are
equivalent to over 40% of its GDP.
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extent, Costa Rica). To attract more investment to
the region, the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean should promote the development of such
networks of production and marketing chains at both
the regional and extraregional levels.
An important element in Asia’s trade dynamism
has been the rapid emergence of China as a leading
actor around which a major restructuring of trade has
taken place. This process is illustrated in figure 2,
which highlights the importance of export and, most
particularly, import flows in China generated by
foreign firms based in other Asian countries. All this
reflects the key role played by China in the production
chains of Asian firms.
Given the size of Asia’s economy and population
and the level of its trading activity, as well as the high
growth rates expected for the region, it offers an export
market of great potential for the countries of Latin
America and the Caribbean, along with tremendous
opportunities for various sorts of trade and business
alliances and for bi–regional free trade agreements.
The negotiation of trade agreements in Asia could
give a further impetus to de facto economic and trade
integration, which has been carried forward without
the support of intergovernmental trade agreements.
Trade agreements would provide another major
incentive to deepen the integration of various industrial
sectors, such as the machinery, automotive, electronics
and pharmaceutical industries. Greater progress with
financial and monetary cooperation would provide
practical support for this process.
Figure 2
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF FOREIGN–OWNED
FIRMS IN CHINA, 2005
(Percentages)
Source:Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, Invest in
China [online] www.fdi.gov.cn.
a The 10 Asian economies are: Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of
China), Indonesia, Japan, Macao (Special Administrative Region of China),
Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of
China and Thailand.
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This chapter compares the dynamism of the Latin
American and Caribbean region’s services trade with
that of a number of Asian countries and evaluates the
determinants of these trade flows before going on to
propose measures for improving the region’s global
trading position in this area. Modern service inputs
play an increasingly vital role in determining many
businesses’ levels of competitiveness and make a key
contribution to faster economic growth and higher
productivity by improving financial intermediation,
infrastructure, logistics, the use of information and
communication technologies (ICTs) and education.
Services are accounting for a larger and larger share
of the economy, employment, trade and foreign
investment all over the world. Since 1990, cross–
border trade in services has tripled, and the stock of
FDI in services has quadrupled, while developing
countries have increased their service exports more
rapidly than the advanced countries.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, however,
these exports grew by less than the world and Asian
averages between 1985 and 2005. In those two decades
they expanded by a factor of 4.5 in Latin America and
the Caribbean, 6.2 in the world, 8 in the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Hong Kong
(Special Administrative Region of China), 14 in
India and 24 in China. As a result, the share of Latin
America and the Caribbean in the world’s services
trade has diminished, although the situation varies
greatly between regions. The countries with the highest
rates of growth in services are Chile, Costa Rica and
Guatemala, while those with the lowest rates are the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia and
Ecuador. Mexico remains the region’s largest service
exporter, although its share has shrunk considerably.
The buoyancy of the three major categories of
services differs markedly. First, trade in “other
services” (including communications, financial and
information technology services and business services,
among others) has grown more quickly than transport
and travel (tourism) in both the Latin American and
Caribbean and the Asia–Pacific regions as well as
worldwide over the last two decades. In Latin America
and the Caribbean, the share of general services
classified as “other services” has remained much lower
than in Asia and the rest of the world. Within the
region, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Honduras are
the countries where this category has expanded the
most. In 1985, Mexico and the Andean Community
were the region’s largest exporters, but by 2005 a
profound shift had taken place, with the first three
places being taken by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
(see figure 3).
The analysis presented in this chapter centres
on “other services”, which is a category of crucial
importance, especially for businesses, in an increasingly
globalized world. These services allow companies to
concentrate their resources on their core business and
to outsource ancillary services to outside companies
that are more and more frequently located in developing
countries. Outsourcing affords access to higher–quality
inputs than those that a company could produce itself.
These inputs take on strategic importance inasmuch
as they pave the way for the successful development of
the other sectors (industrial, primary and tertiary alike).
The region’s share of world trade in “other
services” fell from 2.1% to 1.8% between 1995 and
2005. In Asia, different tendencies were seen: the
shares of the ASEAN countries and Hong Kong SAR
shrank, while those of China and India expanded.
Trade in services in Latin America and the Caribbean:
an analysis of its recent dynamism
The dynamism of business services in the region
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There is also great heterogeneity across subsectors; in
the communications and insurance markets, the share
of Latin America and the Caribbean fell dramatically
but still outweighed that of the Asian countries. The
only category in which its share rose slightly was
“other business services”. The case of India is particularly
striking, as its share of the world information
technology services market increased to 14% in 2005
and was the main factor underlying the upswing in
that country’s stake in the “other services” category of
trade. The Latin American and Caribbean region’s lack
of dynamism relative to that of China and India is
reflected in the figures for the region’s share of United
States and European Union imports.
To understand why the region’s growth in this area has
been relatively sluggish, three key determinants are
analysed: national regulatory systems, human capital,
and information and communication technologies
(ICTs). Although the countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean tend to be less heavily regulated than
Asia, the latter is more dynamic when it comes to
service exports, which is the opposite of what might
be expected. Because this sector was less closely
regulated, Latin America and the Caribbean received
larger inflows of such foreign as a share of GDP in
1995–2004 in the financial services, telecommunications
and construction industries. Another factor was that
State enterprises in these sectors were privatized on a
larger scale.
Other important determinants of trade in services
are the quality and cost of human capital and ICTs. In
human capital terms, China and India have the edge
over Latin America and the Caribbean and the ASEAN
countries because they have a large number of highly
skilled workers (including information technology
experts) who are paid very competitive salaries. China
and India have such a large critical economic mass that
they are able to create niches of excellence, even
though the educational level of the population is below
the Latin American average. An added advantage for
Figure 3
COMPOSITION OF “OTHER SERVICES” EXPORTS, BY COUNTRY,a 1985 AND 2005
(Percentages)
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP) database” [online] http://www.imfstatistics.org/bop/.
a The “other services” category includes construction, financial, information technology and business services, among others.
Policies needed to promote service exports
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India is that its population speaks the same language
as one of its main trading partners, the United States.
On a smaller scale, some countries in the region,
such as Brazil, have also managed to create cores of
excellence, especially in large cities. According to a
study by A.T. Kearney of a subgroup of countries in the
region, the availability of skilled labour is adequate in
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, intermediate in Chile
and Costa Rica, and inadequate in Colombia. Another
factor favouring the Asian countries is that workers
have a good grasp of mathematics, an area where the
region lags far behind.
Another variable affecting the performance of
service exporters is the quality and cost of
telecommunications and of access to the Internet and
other information technologies. Different rankings
suggest that the quality of infrastructure in Latin
America and the Caribbean is similar to what it is
in the Asian countries, although costs seem to be
somewhat higher in the former. One factor that raises
the cost of access to ICTs in Latin America and the
Caribbean is that, by contrast with Asia, only a few
countries (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama) are
signatories to the WTO Information Technology
Agreement (ITA), although some countries in the
region, such as Chile and Mexico, do apply a zero
tariff to these products in any event.
In sum, although Latin America and the Caribbean
have been less successful than India and China in
capturing segments of the growing international
demand for high–quality services, the region does have
great potential to reverse that trend. Its advantages
include an ever–larger pool of skilled labour
with fairly competitive pay levels, a good–quality
technological infrastructure and cultural similarities
with the Western countries. The region is also in the
same time zone as its largest importer of such services,
the United States, and benefits from geographical
proximity.
In order for the region to derive greater advantage
from the opportunities offered by trade in services, its
public and private sectors need to make a determined
effort to produce better–quality, competitively priced
services. These efforts should target the main obstacles
to the sector’s development. Greater liberalization of
services trade would seem to be a necessary first
step, combined with increased mutual recognition and
gradual convergence of different countries’ regulatory
frameworks. Liberalization of services trade under the
trade agreements signed in the region has been rather
slow compared to the pace of domestic reform.
Services were put on the region’s trade agenda in the
1990s because NAFTA and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) came into force and the
region’s countries decided to start negotiations on
the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) in 1998, although these talks were broken
off in 2003. The different subregional blocs (the
Andean Community, MERCOSUR and CARICOM)
reached agreements on further liberalization of trade
in services between member countries, and these
instruments have come into force in the last few years
(2005 and 2006). Bilateral agreements signed by the
region’s countries with the United States, Japan and the
European Union have also covered services based on
either the NAFTA or the GATS model.
The approach taken to liberalization in WTO,
subregional agreements such as NAFTA and the
above–mentioned bilateral agreements has done no
more than maintain the regulatory status quo without
achieving any genuine liberalization of trade in services.
None of the agreements that has been negotiated
makes any substantive progress in reducing the costs
of compliance with regulations governing service
provision. Nor do they clearly identify the conditions
under which domestic regulations would be considered
“unnecessary barriers to trade”, an issue that is at
the heart of the debate on trade in services and trade
agreements. The main obstacles to liberalizing trade in
services are the regulatory changes that would be
required, the economics involved and the possible
practical implications for the operation of economic
and development policies. Both GATS and the
other agreements referred to above, including those
negotiated by the United States, contain mechanisms
that allow countries to determine the freedom of
policymaking action that they wish to maintain in
advance. The important thing is for countries to be
clear about their policy goals and the instruments for
attaining them.
Second, upgrading human capital is probably the
most important task for Latin America and the
Caribbean in this sphere. Since many services require
highly skilled personnel, the public and private sectors
should work together to establish ICT university
courses and training programmes, especially for small
and medium–sized enterprises. Governments could
also conduct accreditation exercises on a regular basis
in order to ensure the quality of technical education. It
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is also important to encourage students to learn English,
since it is the dominant language in international trade,
as well as to improve instruction in mathematics and
information technologies in secondary schools.
Third, an important step in opening up access to
modern technologies such as telecommunications is
to improve regulatory and competition policy with a
view to stimulating investment and ensuring that
high–quality services are provided at the lowest
possible cost. Greater broadband Internet penetration
makes it easier to sell more complex electronic
services internationally. Broadband access can also
boost companies’ competitiveness and productivity.
Another measure to encourage service exports is
quality certification based, inter alia, on ISO 9000.
Such certification enhances international credibility for
service delivery and facilitates access to international
business opportunities.
Intraregional trade in Latin America and the Caribbean
continued to expand in 2006, although more slowly
than in previous years. The share represented by
intra–subregional exports increased slightly in
MERCOSUR and the countries of the Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA) and fell somewhat in
the Andean Community and the Central American
Common Market (CACM).
Integration efforts in Latin America and the
Caribbean are evolving. In Central America, the
Dominican Republic–Central America–United States
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA–DR) has come
into force in all member countries except Costa Rica,
where it is at the ratification stage. This treaty has
helped to reactivate the Central American integration
scheme. Meanwhile, the Caribbean Common Market
has come into force with a membership of 12 English–
and Dutch–speaking countries, while in mid–2007 the
subgroup of eastern Caribbean countries also agreed
to set up an economic union. All this stands in contrast
to developments in the other subregional integration
processes. The conclusion of negotiations on a free
trade agreement between two members of the Andean
Community and the United States led the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela to withdraw from that
integration scheme and apply for full membership in
MERCOSUR, which was granted. The conditions
and time limits for the country’s adoption of the
MERCOSUR common external tariff and trade rules
should be agreed upon during 2007. The authorities
who have recently assumed office in Ecuador have
stated that they are not seeking any change in their
trade relationship with the United States, and
negotiations on a free trade agreement have thus been
suspended indefinitely.
The year 2006 was a very special one in the recent
history of MERCOSUR. First, it has been argued that
with the creation of the MERCOSUR Parliament at the
end of the year and the holding of the Social Summit,
the organization is no longer just a governmental
initiative but has expanded its links with civil society.
Second, there is an increasing willingness to give
Economic integration in Latin America and the
Caribbean: the quest for complementarity
and convergence
Progress in regional integration
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differential treatment to smaller partners and weaker
economic agents. Enlargement has also led to new
questions about the implications for the internal
dynamic of MERCOSUR decision–making. There are
some signs of strain among members, as well, because
of the restrictions applied in the common market
and problems deriving from the asymmetries existing
among some countries and the way they have been
addressed.
In the area of trade, intra–subregional exports
grew by over 20%, producing a rise of half a point in
the intra–subregional export ratio in 2006 (from 13%
to 13.5%). The trend continued during the first half of
2007, with this category of exports increasing its share
in the group’s total by another percentage point.
Much of the recovery of intra–subregional trade within
MERCOSUR is attributable to expanding bilateral
trade in industrial manufactures between Argentina
and Brazil, the main items involved being vehicle
parts, common metals and chemicals.
The Andean Community has been going through
a process of adjustment and decision–making
following the withdrawal of the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, the invitation extended to Chile to
join as an associate member, and the signing of
bilateral agreements by Colombia and Peru with
the United States. Exports have remained buoyant
despite the withdrawal of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, rising by more than US$ 12.7 billion. If the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is removed from the
calculations, the rate of growth in intra–group trade
falls from 23% to 10% and the intra–subregional export
ratio from 10% to 8%. The Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela thus remains a vital partner for the other
Andean countries, providing a major market for a
number of important regional products such as
vegetable oils, medicines, motor vehicles, textiles and
apparel, and fishery products. In return, the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela will continue to supply the rest
of the region with such goods as petroleum products
(especially diesel fuels, liquid hydrocarbons and crude
oils), iron, steel, transportation equipment, chemicals
and cosmetics. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
and the other Andean countries have exhibited a
high degree of complementarity in respect of all of
these products.
For all its undoubted achievements as a subregional
integration mechanism, especially with the major
effort of adaptation made by its member countries over
the last few years, the Andean Community has now
reached a stage at which a number of issues need to
be defined. The association has a solid structure of
institutions and rules to regulate its members’ trade, the
most recent being the rules governing trade in services.
The development of these rules began in June 1998
and, although full implementation was delayed a
number of times, they ultimately entered into force in
December 2006.
The Andean Community and its members are now
preparing to begin negotiations on an association
agreement with the European Union. On 19 April
2007, at the thirteenth Ministerial Meeting between
the Andean Community and the European Union, the
parties reaffirmed their intention to commence talks on
the subject, and on 14 June 2007, those negotiations
were launched at the Seventeenth Regular Meeting of
the Andean Council of Presidents in Tarija, Bolivia.
On 17 July, 14 committees were set up to deal
with the different aspects of the negotiations, and
it was agreed that the first round would take place
in Colombia between 17 and 21 September. In
preparation for the negotiations, on 13 July the Andean
Commission approved Decision 670 (unified customs
document) and Decision 671 (harmonization of
customs regimes), along with other customs rules.
These two decisions were of vital importance in paving
the way for these talks.
In Central America, regional integration has been
given a new impetus. One milestone in this process
was the Plan of Action for Central American Economic
Integration, signed in 2002 by the governments of the
subregion as a mechanism for transitioning from
CACM to the customs union, along with a number
of concrete measures designed to achieve this aim
quickly. These measures included a convention on
information–sharing and mutual assistance, the
Standard Central American Tariff Code, a transit
regime and a convention to reconcile tax systems.
Other very important measures have included the
creation of a regional dispute settlement mechanism
and the establishment of integrated customs houses
in border areas, which is expected to speed up the
movement of merchandise. Major progress has also
been made in eliminating barriers to trade, since of the
100 or so obstacles identified by the Secretariat for
Central American Economic Integration in the early
2000s, only five remained by the end of 2006.
All these efforts have resulted in a steady rise in
intra–subregional trade flows. In 2006 and thus far
in 2007, sharp increases have been seen in intra–
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subregional trade flows moving in practically all
directions. In the case of Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua, growth has been strongest in the first half
of 2007. If this trend continues, the intra–subregional
trade ratio will soon exceed 18%, its highest level ever.
For some countries in the region, 2007 has been
a landmark year in their trade relationship with the
United States and the entry into force of free trade
agreements with that country. In the cases of Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, the most important event
in this area has been the renewal of the Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA),
which forms part of the broader debate on extending
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) for the President of
the United States.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s Bolivarian
Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ALBA) has also remained active. This initiative was
devised as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), and the first step in its promotion
was an agreement with the Government of Cuba in
December 2004, followed by an accord with Bolivia in
2006. Nicaragua also joined the initiative at the group’s
fourth summit in January 2007, thus becoming the first
country to do so that had a free trade agreement in
force with the United States. The fifth summit, in late
April, was attended not only by the Presidents of the
four member countries but also by the President of
Haiti and representatives of Dominica, Ecuador, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Uruguay.
At the first summit of the South American Community
of Nations, held in Brasilia on 29 and 30 September
2005, the member countries instructed the secretariats
of MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and LAIA to
prepare studies on the convergence of the economic
complementarity agreements existing among the
countries of South America.
To facilitate convergence among these agreements,
the texts being drafted for this purpose have included
proposals regarding trade issues covered by the
integration schemes, such as: the elimination of tariffs,
rules of origin, customs valuation and special customs
regimes, trade defence mechanisms, non–tariff
measures, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property, competition policies, public–
sector procurement and dispute settlement.
In the view of ECLAC, there is an urgent need for
consensus–seeking efforts and increased political and
economic cooperation to preserve the achievements of
the South American integration process, especially if
these advances can serve to reduce transaction costs
and prevent regional fragmentation. In the last few
months, unfortunately, the amount of attention
being devoted by the region’s governments to this
undertaking, which they themselves had requested the
secretariats of integration schemes to pursue, appears
to have waned.
The quest for convergence
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The analysis in this chapter of the “noodle bowl”
proliferation of trade agreements indicates that East
and South–East Asia are in a second phase of economic
integration that involves a search for greater synergies
between de facto and de jure integration. Other regions
of the world are looking to benefit from this favourable
situation while protecting their interests in the region.
However, the current economic integration process
in East Asia, based on ever–closer de facto trade and
investment ties that are now underpinned by de jure
agreements, would seem to place Latin America
and the Caribbean at a disadvantage. It is therefore
urgent for the region’s countries to adopt a strategy
for engagement in Asia–Pacific. This may or may not
include trade agreements between the two regions,
but it should certainly embody a shared strategic
vision among the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean which has as yet to take solid shape.
Abandoning their traditional reluctance to sign
preferential trade agreements and join trading blocs,
some large Asian economies such as China, Japan, the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China have
agreed to sign bilateral or multilateral trade agreements
with other economies in Asia–Pacific and beyond. As a
result of this proliferation, a number of Pacific Basin
countries (comprising the Latin American countries
that are members of APEC and North America,
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) conduct a very large
proportion of their trade within the framework of trade
agreements.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, both regional
integration subgroups and those countries of the region
that do not belong to subregional blocs (Chile and
Mexico) have carried out activities with the aim of
negotiating extraregional agreements, some of them
with the countries of Asia–Pacific. Until recently, these
agreements have had little impact on the growth and
direction of trade flows in the region, but by late 2005
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean
had signed or negotiated more than 60 agreements
covering some 60% of the region’s total exports. In
1990, by contrast, there were just four trade preference
schemes accounting for some 6% of the region’s
exports. To sum up, the recent wave of free trade
agreements presents two novel features in the Asia–
Pacific region: their trans–Pacific scope and the
participation of the leading economies of north–eastern
Asia (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) and the
United States.
Two far–reaching proposals for the creation of
large–scale economic communities in Asia are now on
the table. The first is for the creation of a Free
Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) within the
framework of APEC, while the second is for the
establishment of an ASEAN + 3 economic community,
consisting of the 10 members of ASEAN plus China,
Japan and the Republic of Korea, or an ASEAN + 6,
which would additionally include Australia, India and
New Zealand. While the first option is backed by
the United States and those members countries that
are well along the road to trade liberalization, such
as Australia, Canada, Japan and Mexico, the second is
advocated by the member countries of ASEAN and the
leading countries of North–East Asia. The countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean should conduct, as a
matter of urgency, a thorough analysis of the possible
consequences of each proposal and should adopt joint
measures in response to this situation.
Economic restructuring in the Asia–Pacific region and
its implications for Latin America and the Caribbean
The “noodle bowl” and “domino effect” in the
Asia–Pacific region
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Trade between Latin America and the Caribbean
and Asia–Pacific has recovered since the two years
(1998–1999) of stagnation that followed the Asian
crisis and continues to expand. More importantly still,
Asia–Pacific has become one of the Latin American
and Caribbean region’s main trading partners,
especially where imports are concerned. The Asia–
Pacific region is of much greater importance for the
region in terms of imports than exports, and this has
resulted in a growing trade deficit since 1992 (US$ 48
billion in 2005). Unsurprisingly, given Asia–Pacific’s
large and growing role as a trading partner for a
great many Latin American and Caribbean countries, a
number of these nations have signed or are currently
negotiating free trade agreements (see figure 4).
Asia–Pacific as one of the Latin American and Caribbean
region’s principal trading partners
Figure 4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE STRUCTURE OF TRADE WITH SELECTED ASIAN MARKETS, 2005a
(Percentages)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a The following countries are included: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and member countries of ASEAN 5 (Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand).
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The robust level of trading activity taking place
between the two regions is largely due to the growing
role of China as both an exporter and an importer. In
the early years of the present decade, China displaced
Japan as the Latin American and Caribbean region’s
largest trading partner in Asia. Meanwhile, the ASEAN
5 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand) have displaced the Republic of Korea as
a source of Latin American and Caribbean imports and
as a destination for the region’s exports.
Latin American and Caribbean exports to the
Asia–Pacific countries are concentrated in natural
resources and natural resource–based manufactures.
This is clearly the case in the region’s exports to Japan
and India and, to a lesser extent, China, the ASEAN
(10) nations and the Republic of Korea. The pattern
of Latin American and Caribbean imports from Asia–
Pacific, in contrast, is the mirror image, in reverse, of
the region’s exports, albeit with substantial variations
across countries and subregions. In the case of Japan
and, to a lesser extent, China, the Republic of Korea
and the ASEAN countries, it is high– and medium–
technology–intensive manufactures that are the most
important component, while in the case of India it is
natural resource–based manufactures. The ASEAN
countries have the highest ratio of high–technology
manufactures, while commodities predominate in the
export basket of the countries of Oceania.
Intra–industry trade is an increasingly important
factor in trade links between the economies of East
and South–East Asia. Bi–regional trade flows, in
contrast, are mainly of an inter–industry nature, with
the countries of the region exporting commodities
and commodity–based manufactures and importing
manufactures of various types. This situation may
change, however, as a result of the trade agreements
now operating or being negotiated within Asia–Pacific
and between that region and Latin America and the
Caribbean. The challenge is twofold: to capture Asian
investment in any value chains that might develop
around natural resources and to stimulate intra–
industry trade with that region.
The high level of intra–industry trade within Asia
contrasts strongly with the very low level of such trade
between Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia.
When the intra–industry trade ratios of Latin America
and the Caribbean are compared with those of different
regions around the world (the European Union, the
United States and, indeed, East Asia), the level of
such trade with Asia is seen to be particularly low.
Latin America and the Caribbean has a high index of
intra–industry trade with the MERCOSUR countries
(with or without Brazil) and, to a much lesser extent,
with the Andean Community and Chile. Mexico has
also seen a substantial rise in this type of trade,
particularly with the United States, owing to the large
volume of its trade in maquila products. With the
exception of Mexico, intra–industry trade with Asia is
almost non–existent, which is one of the main reasons
for the relative lack of dynamism in bi–regional trade.
In view of this situation, Latin America and the
Caribbean need to strengthen their links with Asian
countries, seek greater complementarity with them
in production activities and establish not just trade
agreements but trade and investment alliances as well,
as this would provide them with additional access to
these markets and help them to gain entry into Asian
production and export chains. Latin America and the
Caribbean has a number of advantages, such as skilled
labour, proximity to cheaper energy sources and an
abundance of natural resources, which, combined with
appropriate industrial development and innovation
policies, can enable them to participate more fully in
production chains in Asia. All these challenges, however,
require faster progress with export diversification,
product and process innovation and incentives for
intra–industry trade between the two regions.
Again, given the large scale of intraregional trade
in natural resources within Asia–Pacific, Latin America
and the Caribbean ought to be trying to compete not
only in that region, in areas where they possess
comparative advantages, but also in other major
markets such as the European Union and the United
States. The competitiveness of some countries in Asia
and Oceania will be further enhanced once the
different preferential agreements currently being
negotiated come into force.
The disadvantage suffered by Latin America and
the Caribbean in competing with the ASEAN countries
to sell natural resources in Asian markets would be
lessened if the countries of the region were to sign
free trade agreements with the economies concerned. If
there was no progress with trade negotiations, the most
severe disadvantages facing the Latin American and
Caribbean countries would be heightened in the
commodity and commodity–based manufacturing
sectors, where the ASEAN countries maintain
comparative production advantages and tariffs remain
high. Specifically, the tariffs applied by the ASEAN
countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea to
agricultural products, textiles and apparel and to some
machinery sectors are still set at high levels, so that
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reducing these under trade agreements would give the
ASEAN countries an advantage over the countries of
the region, leading to trade diversion that would also
make it harder for Latin American firms to participate
in Asian value chains.
The above indicates that Latin America and the
Caribbean need to adopt a two–pronged approach
that will allow them to make more efficient and
coordinated use of the comparative advantages
deriving from natural resources while at the same
time intensifying their efforts to stimulate industrial
development by improving international competitiveness
in manufacturing sectors. For full advantage to be
taken of the opportunities that trade agreements could
open up, of course, stronger progress would have to
be made domestically in meeting the challenges of
competitiveness, technological innovation and export
diversification. Otherwise, whatever efforts might be
made to diversify markets and improve the conditions
of access to the Asian market would yield nothing
more than the consolidation of a commodity–based
pattern of export specialization that is vulnerable to the
business cycle and low in technology content.
Chapter VI reviews the experience of a number of
countries that have shown it is possible to diversify
exports and incorporate technology and knowledge
with the help of changes in the production sector and
economic growth. Australia, Finland, Ireland, Malaysia,
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and
Sweden have demonstrated the value of proactive,
forward–looking national and sectoral policies inspired
by long–term adaptive strategies for competing in the
world marketplace. As figure 5 shows, the period
1990–2005 was one of strong export growth for all
these countries, while per capita income growth ranged
from 2% to 4.5% a year.
These examples show that strategies are more
likely to succeed when they involve a strong alliance
between the public and private sectors that withstands
changes in government administrations and thus makes
it possible to implement those strategies on the basis of
a long–term time horizon. Clearly, however, the
continuous and rapid change generated by globalization
and the competitive world of today makes it necessary
for different actors to join forces and coordinate their
efforts in pursuit of a common vision, a long–term
strategy and policies to sustain that vision.
Companies are, without a doubt, the actors “on
the ground” that know how the market works. Owing
to the existence of market failures, however, the
private sector‘s perspective on new opportunities is
fragmented and incomplete. Collaboration or alliances
between the public and private sectors can help to
remedy this failing while at the same time developing
a micro– and macro–institutional framework that
can help the private sector to overcome a variety of
obstacles.
In the countries dealt with in this chapter,
innovation tends to be seen as part of the export
Innovation and export development
in emerging economies
Innovation as a key factor
in export diversification
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diversification and development strategy. This can be
explained by the fact that countries on the technology
frontier and those close to it are threatened by
competition that is made all the more intense by the
For all the diversity of the institutional mechanisms
discussed above, the different ministries and agencies
are all taking the same approach to their work in this
area, thus ensuring their coordination and the increased
effectiveness of policies structured around a strategy
which lays down targets, deadlines and priorities and
includes ongoing performance evaluations.
To avoid overlaps or duplication, the agencies
involved should institute an ongoing dialogue or
should create arrangements to facilitate an effort
to move in this direction, such as a committee of
ministers. The focus is on guiding and coordinating the
decisions and policies of the different agencies, the
participation of key officials in the management
structure of other bodies and the creation of an agency
specializing in policy coordination. Arrangements of
this type are to be found in all the countries studied.
In view of the scale of the resources involved, and
in order to ensure policy transparency, governments
are developing a range of indicators to gauge the
effectiveness and efficiency of innovation programmes
and instruments. It is therefore hoped that the
policy recommendations made in this report may serve
to enhance the region’s agenda for innovation,
competitiveness and export diversification.
ICT revolution, trade liberalization and falling
transport costs, in particular. 
This has led governments to delineate interactive
policies on competitiveness, export development and
innovation to provide seamless governmental support.
In some cases, strategy planning has been led by
the main social actors and supported by governments
through policies, instruments and financing. This has
usually occurred at the national level, but sometimes at
the regional or sectoral levels, as well. It is not simply
a matter of increasing research and development
(R&D) spending while maintaining current policies as
they are, however; these policies need to be reshaped
so that they are consistent with the requirements of the
new strategy, which means that it is very important
to decide which sectors or business areas are to be
given priority.
These cases also demonstrate how some
governments have sought to turn scientific and
technological research and educational capacity into a
pillar for high–technology industries and exports.
To this end, development strategies and the national
innovation systems underpinning them are being
adapted to cope with these new challenges.
Figure 5
GROWTH IN PER CAPITA INCOME AND IN GOODS
AND SERVICE EXPORTS, 1990–2005
(Percentages)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
on the basis of official information from the World Bank and United
Nations.
Public policies and an appropriate institutional structure
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As ECLAC has been pointing out for some years,
these good economic conditions in the region represent
an opportunity for Latin America and the Caribbean to
lay the foundations for sustained growth in the medium
term. With greater public–sector resources and access
to low–cost financial markets, the region’s countries
could enhance their integration into the international
economy by increasing infrastructure and human
capital investment, encouraging efforts to add value,
know–how and innovation to exports and pursuing key
initiatives that can contribute to regional integration.
2006 was a good year for growth in the world economy, and for international trade and
financing as well. Most analysts likewise view the prospects for 2007 and 2008 as
encouraging, although a moderate slowdown is expected in the global economy and trade.
The consequences of this slowdown, which is largely confined to the United States economy
at present, will be offset to some degree by the dynamism of Asia, Europe and Japan. In any
event, the five years from 2003 to 2007 will have been one of the best periods for the
world economy in the last 40 years. Where commodity prices are concerned, the trend has
so far been favourable for the main items in the region’s export basket, particularly energy
and mineral commodities, largely because of higher demand from Asia.
These considerations are particularly vital at the
present time, since there are some latent risks that
could affect this positive global situation. One of them
is the risk of a sharper slowdown in the United States
economy, which would give Japan, the European
Union and the developing countries of Asia an even
more important role in maintaining the dynamic of
global growth. There are other risks too, such as
increased financial market volatility, outbreaks of
inflation pointing to higher interest rates, and a
disorderly adjustment in external imbalances around
Developments in the international
economy and their consequences
for Latin America and the Caribbean
Chapter I
Introduction
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the world (United Nations, 2007). In any event, the
region should prove less vulnerable than formerly,
given its current–account surpluses, large reserves and
lower levels of external debt (ECLAC, 2007c).
Any progress with the stalled multilateral trade
negotiations will be another positive factor for the
region in 2007. As of mid–year, the prospects for
the Doha Round are not encouraging; the direct
negotiations between Brazil, the European Union, India
and the United States have not yielded results, largely
owing to a failure to agree on trade liberalization in the
agricultural and industrial sectors. The developed
countries and the leading developing–country actors
need to reach a baseline agreement on liberalization
procedures. In a number of the region’s countries,
meanwhile, those in charge of trade policy are
concluding bilateral agreements.1
The world economy is still growing rapidly, although a
modest slowdown is expected in 2007 and 2008. In
2006, the world experienced record economic growth
of more than 5% in purchasing power parity (PPP)
terms, or almost 4% in nominal terms (see figure I.1).2
This was the fourth year running in which global
growth exceeded 4%. This positive result was largely
driven by the vigorous performance of China and
India, which grew by 11% and 9%, respectively.
Positive growth rates in Europe, Japan and the United
States also contributed to this favourable outcome.
The financial markets likewise performed very
satisfactorily, in some cases hitting record highs.
Because of their dynamism and their increasing
weight in the world economy, the developing countries
of Asia continue to be the engine of world economic
growth. In fact, Asia accounts for almost half the
growth of the world economy. China is playing the
largest role, with investment and exports continuing
to expand at high rates. In the last seven years, Asia
has contributed more than twice as much to global
economic growth in PPP terms as the European Union,
Japan and the United States combined. Latin America
and the Caribbean, meanwhile, contributed between
7% and 8% of global output in the period concerned
(see figure I.1). In absolute terms, of course, Europe,
Japan and the United States still account for almost
half the world economy in PPP terms, while China and
the rest of Asia account for a quarter.
In 2006 and 2007, macroeconomic divergence
between the United States, on the one hand, and Japan
and the European Union, on the other, slightly
narrowed the external gaps and imbalances that have
been a feature of the past few years (see figure I.2).
Economic growth in the United States has slowed
since the last quarter of 2006, while the European
Union and Japan have continued to perform well.
1 Some countries in the region have recently sought to strengthen bilateral trade links with developing countries in Asia (see chapter V).
2 Two types of GDP weighting can be used to calculate countries’ contribution to global economic growth: (i) each country’s share of global
GDP is calculated in terms of a common currency, usually the dollar, by converting its GDP at a nominal exchange rate, or (ii) this share
is calculated by converting the country’s GDP at an exchange rate adjusted for purchasing power parity. To analyse economic growth at the
continental or global level, it is recommended that weightings be based on GDP calculated at purchasing power parity (Callen, 2007).
A. The global context is still positive for the region
1. Asia as the engine of global growth
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Figure I.1




CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD GDP GROWTH 
(Percentages and relative weight in the
world economy in 2006a)
Figure I.2
ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE WORLD’S FOUR LEADING ECONOMIES
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database,
April 2007.
a Preliminary figures.
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database,
April 2007.
a Calculated in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.
2005 2006 Weight
in 2006
United States 13 12 0.20
European Union 8 12 0.21
Japan 2 3 0.06
China 31 30 0.15
Other Asia 18 17 0.12
Latin America and
the Caribbean 7 0.08 0.08
Rest of world 20 18 0.19
Total 100 100 1.00
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There are major differences among the three
largest economies in terms of what drives their growth
(see figure I.2e, f and g). In the United States, private
consumption is still the main driver of the economy.
Despite a very jittery property market, United States
consumption has remained vigorous thanks to strong
jobs growth and a substantial drop in unemployment
and energy prices, in both cases to their lowest levels
since August 2006. However, residential and non–
residential private investment began to slow sharply
in the fourth quarter of 2006, with a drop of 19% at an
annualized rate in the second half of the year. The drop
in corporate investment was surprising, given that
companies are making large profits and borrowing
costs remain low. Higher inventories also had a
negative effect on growth. A new phenomenon is the
positive contribution of net exports to growth since the
fourth quarter of 2006, chiefly owing to a decline in
the rate of import growth (see figure I.2e). These
discouraging tendencies have adversely affected the
export dynamism of Latin America and the Caribbean
in general and Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean countries in particular, since the United
States is their main market.
In the European Union, higher than expected
GDP growth in 2006 and early 2007 was driven by
domestic demand from both consumption and private
investment. Private consumption was buoyed by the
lowest unemployment rate in 15 years.3 The most
dynamic economy in the European Union was
Germany’s, owing to a number of reforms that have
helped to improve competitiveness and export
performance over recent years plus the boost to
consumption from the 2006 soccer World Cup. France
and Italy grew less than expected, while the United
Kingdom performed more solidly.
Japan’s economy remains vigorous despite a
temporary slowdown in the third quarter of 2006
(chiefly in consumption). The main drivers of the
economy have been exports and investment, while
consumption also seemed to be picking up in
early 2007. Japanese companies are still investing
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United
States Department of Commerce, the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT), the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, the Economist
Intelligence Unit and the Organisation for Economic Co–operation and Development (OECD).
3 Strong job creation in the European Union brought the unemployment rate down to 7%.
Figure I.2 (concluded)
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vigorously thanks to strong profits and balance sheets.
All this has resulted in a rise in new lending to the
corporate sector and increased economic activity
that is reacting favourably on exports. Companies are
also recruiting again, and this has helped to reduce
unemployment to its lowest level in nine years. This
tendency should also put upward pressure on wages
and consumption.
Other variables in the leading economies that
deserve attention are inflation and the trade balance
(see figure II.2c and d). Inflation as measured by the
consumer price index fell in mid–2006, mainly as a
consequence of lower oil prices. In Japan, inflation
fell to zero in early 2007. Underlying inflationary
pressures have been a cause for concern for the central
banks of the United States and the euro area, however.
Where trade balances are concerned, there are still
worries about the United States balance of payments,
principally because of the country’s large trade deficit,
especially in the consumer goods sector. By contrast,
China’s trade surplus with the European Union is
growing at a restrained pace.
Barring upsets in global financial markets with
adverse repercussions for the world economy, the
international environment should remain favourable to
Latin America and the Caribbean in 2007 and 2008,
although it must be stressed again that slower growth
in the United States will hold back imports there.
For all the dynamism of the German economy, growth
in the European Union is expected to slow somewhat
as a consequence of higher interest rates and lower
government spending. There are other latent risks
that could also affect the region. First, there is the
likelihood that financial markets will remain volatile
as investors shun risky securities. Second, greater
inflationary pressures may emerge, especially if the
oil price increases, forcing central banks to raise
interest rates and thereby affecting the growth outlook
of the region’s countries. Third, there is still the
possibility of a disorderly adjustment in external
disequilibria worldwide.
The loss of dynamism in the United States will
probably affect the trade of Latin America and the
Caribbean more than any other international factor.
Slower growth in the country in 2006 and 2007 has
been due to a large drop in corporate and residential
investment (owing to a downturn in the property
market). Since early 2006, both the number of new
residential building permits and the number of
buildings under construction have dropped (see figure
I.3a), and in mid–2007 there were signs of worsening
instability in these two indicators. The rate of house
price growth also fell in 2006. This could cause the
greatest problems in the subprime mortgage segment,
where arrears and default rates could increase
substantially and squeeze future lending. Thus far, the
consequences for the wider financial system have been
limited.4 There is still the possibility, however, that the
problems in the subprime mortgage segment may
restrict consumer lending and as such have undesirable
consequences for consumption and economic growth.
2. The impact of lower United States growth on
Latin America and the Caribbean
4 In August 2007, financial markets were, however, hurt somewhat by the worsening situation in the subprime market.
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Another major medium–term concern is the large
current–account deficit, which worsened by less in
2006 than in previous years. It is expected to improve
slightly in 2007 and stabilize in 2008 (see figure I.3b).
This relative improvement reflects two tendencies:
first, a smaller trade deficit because of the dollar’s
depreciation, a lower oil price and dynamic demand
from trading partners and, second, a worsening in the
investment income account balance. To correct this
large imbalance it is essential for domestic saving in
the United States to increase. In this context, it is
encouraging that the federal government deficit fell to
the equivalent of 2.5% of GDP in 2006.
The slowdown in economic growth in the United
States is projected to have a moderate impact on Latin
American and Caribbean exports to the country.
ECLAC is predicting economic growth of 2% in the
United States for 2007, compared to 3.4% in 2006. To
ascertain the impact of this slowdown, the elasticities
of Latin American export volumes were estimated in
relation to real import demand in the United States.5
The 2007 projection suggests negative real growth
in the region’s exports to the United States of -1.8%,
compared with 4.6% in 2006. According to the
estimates, South America, the Caribbean and Central
America will be the worst–affected areas. Indeed, the
signs of this slowdown were already there to see in the
first half of 2007 and are projected to continue in the
second half of the year (see figure I.4).
Figure I.3
UNITED STATES: THE PROPERTY MARKET AND TWIN DEFICITS, 2000–2008
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United States Census Bureau and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
a International Monetary Fund projections for 2007 and 2008.
5 GDP was used as a proxy for real demand, after controlling for relative prices with the real exchange rate as a proxy. Given the data available,
an autoregressive model with distributed lags was estimated.
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Asia (and particularly its developing countries) is playing
a key role in the current economic environment for a
number of reasons. First, as already mentioned, it is to
a great extent the engine of global economic growth.
Second, Asia has the largest trade surplus of any region
in the world and is the main counterbalance to the
large United States deficit, accounting for more than a
quarter of world trade (see figure I.5). Third, Asia
occupies a strategic place in the financing of the
United States deficit and is a key player in the financial
markets in general. These three points will be analysed
in more detail below, with particular emphasis on
recent trends and the prospects they raise.
With respect to global economic growth, Asia has
been the most dynamic region since 2001, despite its
heterogeneity. In purchasing power parity terms, the
Asia region has been contributing half of world
growth, with China and India leading the way (growth
of 11.1% and 9.7% in 2006, respectively). India has
grown faster than it was expected to a year ago. It is
important to realize that the Chinese economy is driven
by investment, which accounts for half its growth,
and to a lesser extent by exports, while in India
private consumption is the key factor in demand. On
the supply side, growth in China is dominated by
manufacturing, whereas in India it is services that
have been most dynamic. The other main emerging
countries in Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand) are growing more slowly than they did in the
decade prior to the 1997–1998 crisis. This lower
growth is partly due to sharply reduced investment
rates (see box I.1). The Asian Development Bank has
argued that investment rates before the crisis were too
high, by contrast with today’s levels which, other
than in the Republic of Korea, are among the lowest
(ADB, 2007).
Figure I.4
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES (1997–2007) AND IMPACT OF THE SLOWDOWN
IN UNITED STATES GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GROWTH (2007)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the United States Department of Commerce.
a Actual figures.
b Estimates.
3. Asia as a key region in the current economic conjuncture6
6 See chapter IV, which gives a more detailed account of Asia’s role in the global economy and the consequences of this for Latin America and
the Caribbean.
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Figure I.5
SHARE OF GOODS AND SERVICES EXPORTS IN WORLD TRADE, BY REGION, 1984–1985 AND 2005–2006
(Percentages of the total)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), and
World Trade Organization (WTO) data.
a Mainly Africa.
b Eastern and western Europe.
From 1997 to 1999, numerous developing
countries were badly affected by a
financial crisis that broke out in Asia.
Ten years ago, the world was caught
unawares by a financial and currency
crisis originating in Thailand, mainly
because of a precipitous and unforeseen
drop in confidence among foreign
investors following a massive influx of
foreign capital and a rapid build–up of
foreign debt in the 1990–1996 period.
The pressure on the Thai baht led to a
large devaluation in July 1997 that not
only had severe financial consequences
in other countries of the region
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and
Republic of Korea) but also spread to
the Russian Federation (August
1998), Brazil (early 1999) and several
other emerging economies. The crisis
in these countries resulted in large
currency depreciations, a number of
bank failures, higher borrowing, a drop
in GDP and rising unemployment and
poverty.
All these countries have recovered
from the crisis; the recovery was faster
in the worst–affected Asian countries,
however, than in the leading economies
of Latin America, as analysis of a set
of indicators reveals (see figure I.6).
The decline in per capita GDP was
similar in both regions, but was shorter
and sharper in Asia, while in Latin
America it was protracted over five
years. Pre–crisis levels of per capita
GDP were regained in 2000 in the
Asian countries, but not until 2004 in
the Latin American ones. Furthermore,
the Asian countries succeeded in
reducing poverty levels, while the
Latin American countries only began
to see progress in this area in 2004.
A number of factors account
for the rapid recovery of the Asian
countries. First, the value of their
currencies fell in real terms across the
board, strongly boosting exports and
restraining imports. Before long, the
current–account balances of these
countries were in surplus and they
began to accumulate large quantities
of reserves, which helped to make
them more resilient to further turbulence,
as the ratio of reserves to short–term
external debt shows. Their economic
growth was not interrupted by a
large drop in exports in 2001 or by
the moderate capital outflows that
resulted from a crisis in the global
information technology industry. There
was a decline in gross capital
formation as a share of GDP after the
crisis, although a degree of dynamism
was maintained and the recovery
continued to be supported. Lastly, an
important indicator of the strength
of the recovery has been a new
influx of foreign capital, plus growing
investment abroad.
The recovery in Latin America
was slower for several reasons; since
2004, however, the leading Latin
American countries have displayed
strengths similar to those of their
Asian peers. First, the Latin American
countries delayed the relaxation of
their overvalued exchange rates; in
the extreme case of Argentina, this
did not happen until early 2002.
Consequently, it was not until 2003
that the external sector gained
momentum and supported economic
growth. Reserves remained at fairly
low levels, although the region did
manage to reduce its vulnerability to
international shocks by reducing
its short–term external debt. Since
2003, gross capital formation has
strengthened to some degree in the
region, while net exports have risen,
reserves have been built up and both
capital inflows and investment abroad
have increased. In a number of ways,
the Latin American countries are
approaching the level of dynamism
seen in the developing countries
of Asia.
Box I.1
ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA: A DECADE AFTER THE CRISIS
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006–2007 (LC/G.2338–P),
Santiago, Chile, 2007, forthcoming; World Bank, East Asia and Pacific Update, Washington, D.C., April 2007; Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian
Development Outlook, 2007, Manila.
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Figure I.6
COMPARATIVE INDICATORS FOR ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1990–2006
Source:World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance databases, and Bank for International Settlements for real effective exchange
rate data.
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Asian growth is expected to remain high in the
coming years, although slightly lower than in 2006.
Nonetheless, some countries in the region are expected
to struggle to maintain their dynamism in the medium
term. The impact on Asia of the slowdown in United
States growth has been fairly slight so far since the
property crisis has yet to be reflected in demand for
Asian electronic goods and, other than for China, the
United States is a much less important trading partner
now than it was in 2000. Furthermore, inflation is
under control in all the countries except India (where
there are price pressures), which means they have
scope to apply expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies of a countercyclical nature (IMF, 2007a). A
somewhat more pronounced slowdown is expected
in India, given the recent rise in inflation and the
subsequent monetary squeeze, a large fiscal deficit (6%
of GDP in the 2006–2007 period) and a considerable
public debt. Furthermore, the current–account deficit
has risen to 2.5% of GDP. The region’s other countries
will carry on expanding by 4% to 6% a year in 2007
and 2008.
China and India, the largest of the emerging
economies in the Asia region, need to address a
number of issues that could hold back growth in the
medium term. China needs to resolve the structural
problems deriving from its rapid industrialization and
growth, such as income inequality between urban and
rural areas and the most pressing environmental issues.
Another dilemma is how quickly to revalue the
currency, given China’s growing trade surplus (see box
I.2) and the level of unproductive investment by
semi–public firms. For India, fiscal consolidation is
an important issue at a time when a great deal of public
investment is needed in electricity network infrastructure
and highways to sustain growth (Kuwayama and
Rosales, 2007).
Although there has been much debate
about the need to adjust the exchange
rate of the Chinese currency against
the dollar, there has been less discussion
of the reasons behind the obvious
reluctance of the Government of China
to carry out a significant revaluation
of its currency. This attitude is not
motivated only by trade considerations,
but is influenced by a number of
factors. The clearest of these is that
a revaluation of 15% to 40% (which
some analysts see as the minimum
needed to rectify the current–account
imbalances between the United States
and China) would result in a large
decline in China’s reserves.
There are other structural reasons
of even greater importance, however.
As an integral part of its growth
strategy, China maintains restrictions
on domestic savings to ensure they
are placed at the service of the
country’s economic growth. If China
were to agree to a substantial revaluation
of its exchange rate (as the United
States wishes), it would be difficult to
maintain restrictions on local savings.
By some estimates, a quarter of all the
country’s savings would go abroad in
search of better returns. This would
bring to an end the low interest rate
policy that has hitherto sustained
investment and growth.
A second concern is the huge
divide between the country’s rural and
urban areas since the implementation
of economic reforms in the early
1980s. The Government of China
fears that competition from cheaper
imported foodstuffs, combined with a
substantial revaluation of the currency,
might drive agricultural commodity
prices down, thereby triggering even
faster migration to urban areas from
what is already a very weak and
inefficient rural economy. This could
intensify social pressures, disturbances
and the risks to the country’s growth.
The concern of the Chinese
authorities about the risks of a rapid
revaluation also seems to reflect the
view that the Plaza and Louvre
agreements of the 1980s caused the
rise of the yen against the dollar and
contributed to the serious recession in
the Japanese economy in the 1990s.
This makes it easier to understand
why the Government of China
should adopt a policy of gradual
currency revaluation.
Box I.2
WHY IS THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA SO RELUCTANT TO REVALUE THE YUAN?
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of W. Hutton, The Writing on the Wall. China and the West in the 21st
Century, London, Little Brown, 2006; and A. Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed, Oxford University Press, 2006.
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Asia increasingly dominates international financial
flows and is an essential source of financing for the
United States deficit. In the 2005–2006 period, the
developing countries of Asia absorbed about 70% of
gross global equity investment flows to developing
countries (United Nations, 2007). China was the
world’s largest net capital exporter in 2006 (IMF,
2007b), partly because it possesses the world’s largest
reserves; by 2006 it had built up over a trillion dollars,
reflecting a current–account surplus of 9% of GDP that
year. China holds 21% of global reserves (in 2000 it
had just 9%), while Japan has 17% and Asia as a
whole 45%. Changes in the way Asia (and particularly
China) invests its reserves could have marked effects
on the world’s financial and macroeconomic stability.
Although trade surpluses and growing reserves have
made the Asian countries less vulnerable to external
shocks, they could produce certain undesirable effects.
Reserves become harder to sterilize as they grow, and
if the money supply increases because sterilization is
incomplete then bubbles could inflate in equity and
property markets, inflation could accelerate and the
interest rate drop below its equilibrium level (leading
to overinvestment), and pressures on the exchange
rate could develop. Also, these countries are chiefly
accumulating low–yielding assets (in the United
States) and are exposed to major losses in future. In
short, it has to be asked whether these tendencies
will be sustainable.
Asia and Oceania have received more FDI than
developing countries anywhere else (57% and 60%
of the FDI stock in 2005 and flows between 2003
and 2006, respectively, as against the 34% and 32%
received by the subregions of Latin America and the
Caribbean, respectively); China has been the largest
developing–country recipient in recent years (UNCTAD,
2006). The relative stability of FDI flows into Latin
America and the Caribbean contrasts with their growth
in other regions; the result has been a decline in the
region’s share of FDI flows to developing countries
and global flows generally. However, the Latin
America and Caribbean region continues to receive
more FDI as a share of GDP than Asia and Oceania
(excluding the main financial centres), although this
ratio has declined in the last two years (ECLAC,
2007a). Furthermore, over two thirds of developing
countries’ outward FDI in recent years has come from
firms in emerging countries of Asia and Oceania.
Asia’s growing weight in the world economy and
its dynamic trade and finance make it a market of
great potential importance for Latin American and
Caribbean trade and investment. The Latin America
and Caribbean region could make more efficient and
coordinated use of the comparative advantages its
derives from its natural resources and intensify efforts
to boost industrial trade by improving its international
competitiveness. The region could also attract more
Asia–Pacific firms as a source of investment, particularly
in infrastructure and energy. The region needs to
identify which initiatives are most urgent and offer the
highest returns and then speed up their implementation.
This not only would strengthen trade and investment
links with Asia–Pacific but would also generate
externalities for the Latin American regional integration
process (see chapter IV).
The United States external deficit widened again
in 2006, although not by much, rising from 6.4% of
GDP in 2005 to 6.5% in 2006.7 In 2007 the deficit is
expected to shrink slightly (United Nations, 2007).
This stabilization of the country’s deficit with the rest
of the world is largely due to a small reversal of the
negative trend in the trade deficit thanks to slightly
cheaper oil imports from the second half of 2006.
However, the trade balance with China and, to a lesser
extent, the rest of Asia worsened again in 2006. By
4. The growing imbalance between the United States and Asia
7 The United States external deficit increased from 4.8% of GDP in 2003 to 5.7% in 2004 and 6.4% in 2005.
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late 2006 the trade deficit with Asia accounted for
half the total external deficit of the United States and
two thirds of the deterioration between 2005 and 2006
(see figure I.7).
One worrisome trend is that the international
investment revenue balance of the United States turned
negative for the first time in 2006 as higher interest
rates made it more expensive to fund the external debt.
In consequence, the net international investment
position also continued to worsen.8
The United States external deficit is not expected
to decrease much over the next five years, owing to
two conflicting trends in the current account (IMF,
2007a). First, certain adjustments could reduce the
trade deficit to some extent. These include slower
GDP growth in the United States, the real effective
depreciation of the dollar against the euro, the pound
sterling and, to a lesser extent, the yuan (but not
necessarily against the yen in the short term), slightly
greater currency flexibility in the Asian economies
running surpluses (see table I.2) and a lower oil price.
Second, the cost of external liabilities is expected to
increase, resulting in a rapid deterioration in the net
international investment revenue balance that would
neutralize the positive trend of the trade balance.
Asia not only accounts for the largest share of the
United States trade deficit, exporting large quantities
of low–priced products to the country and thereby
helping to support consumption and contain inflation,
but is also one of the leading sources of financing for
this imbalance. Asia supplies the country with
low–cost credit, helping to keep interest rates relatively
low. China and Japan hold almost half of all United
States Treasury bonds and Asia as a whole held over
60% as of June 2007.
However, financing rates for the United States
deficit and the willingness of Asian countries to fund
it are changing, and this could lead at some point to
a disorderly adjustment in the dollar. Fixed–income
securities have displaced variable–income ones
(IMF, 2007a) and, among fixed–income instruments,
Treasury bonds have given ground to riskier
instruments. These shifts have increased potential
exposure to market movements, especially if United
States instruments yield less than other countries’. For
a number of years, central banks and other agents in
Asia invested in United States financial instruments
because they were perceived as being more secure.
However, yields have been low and the recent
depreciation of the dollar makes future returns
unattractive. Indeed, some investors who formerly
invested in the United States are reorienting their
investments towards the Asia–Pacific region (Australia
and New Zealand) and Europe. There is still the risk
that this process may be chaotic if there is a shift in
Asian hedge fund portfolios and the Japanese yen carry
Figure I.7
UNITED STATES: CURRENT–ACCOUNT DEFICIT
AND NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
on the basis of information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the
United States Department of Commerce. 
8 The net international investment position is the overall difference between an economy’s external financial assets and liabilities. It represents
the resources owned and owed by a country, making it very similar to the general balance sheet of a company.
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trade.9 In addition, China is implementing a system to
facilitate investment abroad with a view to obtaining
higher returns on its reserves. In this it is following the
lead of Temasek Holdings, operated by the Government
of Singapore (New York Times, 21 May 2007).
What is required for a gradual adjustment are
saving and investment changes plus adjustments in the
real exchange rates of borrowing and lending
countries. In the United States, private consumption
growth is expected to slow and saving to increase. In
China and the other Asian countries, consumption
could increase as incomes rise and credit becomes
more readily available. Another vital mechanism for
adjusting imbalances are changes in real effective
exchange rates, particularly a further depreciation of
the dollar against leading currencies and an appreciation
of the yen, combined with a greater revaluation of
the yuan and other Asian currencies. The question of
whether to revalue the Chinese currency is a great
dilemma for the authorities, since it would entail major
costs and risks in addition to certain advantages (see
box I.2). Without faster revaluation of the yuan and
other Asian currencies, the United States deficit with
China will continue to worsen and could trigger
stronger protectionist measures to contain the flow of
imports from China (Mussa, 2007).
A chaotic correction in external imbalances
worldwide would have a number of negative
repercussions for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Not only would the region’s exports suffer (volumes
and prices), but access to financial markets would
become much more expensive as spreads on the
Emerging Market Bonds Index (EMBI+) widened.
9 The carry trade is a process whereby investors sell low–yielding currencies such as the yen and buy high–yielding assets elsewhere.
B. Financial markets
1. Increased financial market volatility
Broadly speaking, despite some adjustments during
the preceding 12 months, financial markets in both
emerging economies and industrial nations continued
to trend upward until late July 2007, thanks to positive
financial balances and an upsurge in mergers and
acquisitions. In the stock market, some price indices
actually rose beyond the highs registered during the
technology boom of the late 1990s.
In August 2007, however, world stock markets
slumped sharply amid fears of contagion from the cri-
sis situation in the subprime mortgage market in the
United States. Losses were so great that the gains of
the entire year were wiped out in just a few days. It
remains to be seen whether the downturn is simply a
price adjustment or whether it may give rise to a much
higher–risk situation for the world economy that will
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trigger a credit crunch and hurt productive sectors
of the economy. As this publication went to press,
the outlook was not very encouraging, since market
contagion had occurred so swiftly.
Previously, there have been other signs of the
greater integration of world financial markets. In late
February, for example, the Shanghai index slid by
nearly 9% when investors feared that Chinese authorities
might step in to curb the surge in share prices. This, in
turn, led to temporary downswings in stock prices
on European and United States exchanges of between
2% and 3%, as well as a drop of almost 4% in the
NASDAQ index. What set these indications of
increased financial–market integration apart from
earlier signals was the fact that, in this case, the
reaction was triggered by a developing economy (see
figure I.8).
Clearly, during economic booms, market integration
can be a positive factor, since it helps to channel funds
towards markets that offer the greatest potential gains,
albeit at higher levels of risk. During times of greater
volatility and uncertainty such as the present, however,
deeper integration may intensify the transmission of
adverse impacts. Under such conditions, the prospects
for emerging markets take a turn for the worse, as
demonstrated by the recent behaviour of Latin
American stock markets. By the same token, the need
for caution in the management of macroeconomic
policy and financial variables becomes a matter of
urgency is always present in the age of globalization.
Although the situation is changing rapidly as
new events unfold in the financial markets, monetary
policy remains quite expansionary in both emerging
markets and developed countries. Although interest
rates have risen recently, in real terms they are still low
by historical standards (see figure I.9). In the United
States, as in some other markets (Spain), there is some
concern that this rise in interest rates might lead to a
slowdown in the property market that could weigh
down on consumption.
Figure I.8
STOCK MARKET INDICES IN DEVELOPED




Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, 2007,
Washington, D.C., April.
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, 2007,
Washington, D.C., April.
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In 2006 the dollar fell steadily against the most traded
currencies (other than the yen). It continued to drift
down in the first six months of 2007; however, some
adjustments in the currency market can still be
expected, especially given the large imbalances
between the United States and some of its main trading
partners and increased pessimism about the growth
prospects of the United States economy.
In addition to the uncertainty about the value of
the dollar, the yen has been quite volatile against that
currency over recent months. A policy of gradually
increasing interest rates could produce a sharp
revaluation of the yen against the dollar, and this would
be heightened if incentives for the hitherto lucrative
carry trade were reduced. The trend of the Chinese
currency is harder to predict, but there are grounds
for thinking that the revaluation of the yuan will be
more gradual than that of the yen (see figure I.10 and
box I.2). The decision by the Chinese authorities in
mid–May to widen the daily trading band of the yuan
from 0.3% to 0.5% was a step towards somewhat
faster revaluation, allowing the currency to strengthen
or weaken against the dollar.
The experience of recent years shows that
emerging–market currencies are still quite vulnerable.
One example of this is the increased volatility of the
Thai baht following the temporary introduction of
capital controls in December 2006 to prevent the
currency rising further. This caused its value to fall
sharply on the Thai stock market, leading the authorities
to reverse the measure.
2. Limited exchange–rate adjustments
Figure I.10
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE: DOLLARS PER UNIT
OF NATIONAL CURRENCY, 2000–2007
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
C. International trade
1. Latin America and the Caribbean from
an international perspective
The nominal growth rate of merchandise exports in
Latin America and the Caribbean dropped slightly to
20% in 2006, from an average of 22% in 2004 and
2005, which was mainly owing to in increase in export
prices and only a small expansion in volume. This
nominal rate was higher than the world average for
2006 (15%), but still lower than China’s export growth
of 27%. Within the region, CARICOM posted the
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fastest growth rate. Imports slowed noticeably,
especially in South America. The region’s surplus
continued to swell in 2006, although more slowly than
China’s did, while the trade deficit of the countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co–operation and
Development (OECD) continued to worsen (see
figure I.11a).
In terms of volume, the region’s exports expanded
at a slower rate than the world average for 2006 (6%
compared to 8%) (WTO, 2007), although more rapidly
than those of the African and Middle Eastern countries.
The region’s export volumes also increased less in
2006 than they did in 2005. In 2006, China’s exports
expanded at real rates of over 20%, while those of the
rest of the world (except for Africa and the Middle
East) registered rates of between 7% and 11%. Within
the region, Mexico and Central America recorded
the highest rates, while South America saw a steep
slowdown (see tables I.1 and I.2).
Figure I.11a
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS BY REGION, 2004–2006
(Annual growth rates and balances at current prices)
Table I.2
BREAKDOWN OF MERCHANDISE EXPORT GROWTH, 2005 AND 2006
(Growth rates in percentages)
Source:World Trade Organization (WTO).
2005 2006
Price Volume Value Price Volume Value
Latin Americaa 12.6 7.8 20.4 12.6 6.4 19.0
South America 16.9 8.9 25.8 18.3 3.3 21.6
MERCOSUR 10.1 10.8 20.9 11.1 5.3 16.3
Andean Community 28.1 6.9 35.0 22.9 -0.4 22.5
Chile 22.9 4.1 27.0 38.8 2.0 40.7
Central America 3.2 6.4 9.5 2.3 10.2 12.5
Mexico 9.0 4.9 14.0 6.8 10.0 16.8
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information.
a Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
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China was the fastest–growing exporter in servic-
es too, followed by South America (see chapter III for
greater detail). The Latin American and Caribbean
region’s services exports slowed heavily in 2006,
particularly Mexico’s. The same occurred in the more
developed OECD countries. Services trade balances
posted the opposite sign to goods trade balances,
especially in OECD (see figure I.11b).
In terms of main export destinations, a number of
countries saw their exports to the United States slow in
nominal terms, owing to the slacker rate of economic
growth in that market. Among the subregions, Central
American exports to the United States fell in 2006,
with a negative figure of -1%. Chile was the only
South American country to maintain a high rate of
expansion (34.1%), which was mainly thanks to rising
prices for copper, since the MERCOSUR and Andean
countries saw momentum in their exports to the United
States slacken, with rates equivalent to one half and
one third, respectively, of those registered in 2005. 
Unlike what happened in the United States,
exports of merchandise to the European Union
countries climbed strongly. Goods exports to the Asia
and Pacific region showed a more mixed pattern,
with a spectacular rise in the exports of the Andean
Community, a more modest increase in those from the
MERCOSUR countries and a slowdown in those
from some Central American countries, especially
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (see table I.3).
Panama, Costa Rica and Mexico recorded the highest
real growth rates in exports in 2006. The smallest
expansions in real terms took place in the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, Peru and Haiti.
Table I.3
BREAKDOWN OF MERCHANDISE IMPORT GROWTH, 2005 AND 2006
(Growth rates in percentages)
2005 2006
Price Volume Value Price Volume Value
Latin Americaa 9.2 15.9 25.1 6.6 17.2 23.8
South America 9.6 10.5 20.1 6.6 17.1 23.7
MERCOSUR 7.9 22.5 30.4 6.2 20.6 26.8
Andean Community 11.0 22.0 33.0 7.3 10.5 17.7
Chile 5.6 7.2 12.8 2.7 12.6 15.4
Central America 6.8 7.6 14.4 5.8 9.2 15.0
Mexico 5.4 7.3 12.7 2.3 13.2 15.5
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information.
a Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
Figure I.11b
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SERVICES BY REGION, 2004–2006
(Annual growth rates and balances)
Source:World Trade Organization (WTO).
a Data for 2006 taken from Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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Unlike what happened in the 1990s, the region’s
exceptional trade growth of the last few years has
been driven more by good prices than by rising export
volumes. During the four–year period 2003–2006, the
unit value (prices) of the region’s exports increased
by 12.3% per year and their volume by 8.3% per year.
In contrast, in the 1990s, export volumes climbed at a
faster rate than prices, which rose by modest 0.6%
per year (see figure I.12). After a heavy drop in 2001
and 2002, when export volumes dropped by 6.0% and
prices by 1.3%, and thanks to the emergence of China
and India as large buyers of commodities, the prices
of certain types of merchandise began to rise steadily,
especially those for copper, petroleum, tin and precious
metals, as well as agricultural goods such as soybean,
bananas, meat and fruit. Other products, such as sugar,
cereals and grains have recently joined this positive
price cycle in response both to developments in their
own particular markets and to the demand exerted by
biofuel projects.
After three and a half years of steep rises,
commodity prices began to decrease slightly in the
second half of 2006, though very unevenly across the
different subgroups (see figure I.13). In the case of
agricultural goods, price rises have become steadier
and are fluctuating less, while the prices of mining and
energy products show diverging trends. The prices of
mining products remain high, but are decreasingly
fractionally owing to a slight slackening in Chinese
demand for certain commodities, especially steel, iron
and copper. Overall demand from Asian continues to
be high, however, which has impacted very positively
Table I.4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NOMINAL GROWTH IN GOODS EXPORTS, 2005 AND 2006
(Annual rates of variation)
Latin America and the Caribbean United States European Union Asia and the Pacific
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Latin America and the
Caribbean (37 countries) 26.2 22.1 15.1 13.4 15.3 29.7 35.6 27.1
Andean Community
(including Bolivarian
Rep. of Venezuela ) 28.6 20.2 36.0 12.7 23.3 48.7 29.6 70.0
Bolivia 34.3 38.4 22.8 1.0 5.9 50.6 36.6 93.5
Colombia 26.4 6.3 20.4 13.8 20.5 18.3 29.5 30.9
Ecuador 15.8 7.9 53.1 32.2 22.8 13.0 -43.3 138.4
Peru 48.5 33.7 46.0 4.6 -5.6 57.3 32.1 47.9
Venezuela
(Bolivarian Rep. of) 27.7 24.9 36.9 10.8 64.2 75.7 49.0 124.1
MERCOSUR 24.9 20.6 11.3 5.5 8.7 15.6 42.4 12.3
Argentina 15.7 23.1 12.9 -5.0 9.4 20.3 20.4 13.9
Brazil 31.8 19.7 10.5 8.7 9.7 14.6 50.5 12.0
Paraguay 13.9 2.5 -10.1 22.6 -69.1 -51.7 6.5 -46.3
Uruguay 11.1 27.4 31.9 -31.6 9.2 4.7 17.0 32.7
Central American
Common Market (CACM) 16.3 13.8 0.7 -1.3 20.0 12.2 15.1 11.5
Costa Rica 14.8 17.4 1.1 12.4 7.4 12.2 71.8 37.7
El Salvador 11.3 21.4 -4.9 -8.8 48.2 0.2 85.0 40.4
Guatemala 19.8 8.0 1.0 13.9 40.6 -24.2 160.7 -70.7
Honduras 18.5 2.7 -2.1 -25.9 46.3 44.9 64.2 -23.9
Nicaragua 16.1 24.0 22.9 10.3 14.2 -7.4 85.1 -58.3
Chile 21.4 40.4 33.7 34.1 16.6 59.3 33.1 24.6
Mexico 40.2 30.0 11.3 15.8 34.7 23.2 23.4 14.4
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the relevant countries.
2. Commodity prices and terms of trade
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on several Latin American countries’ terms of trade.
After slowing in the second semester of 2006, petroleum
prices began to rise again. Analysts say that this rise
reflects underlying supply and demand factors rather
than geopolitical considerations. 
With only a few exceptions, a slight drop in
commodity prices would have a relatively limited
impact on Latin American and Caribbean trade
balances and economies. An exercise in which exports
and imports are calculated using the terms of trade for
the 1990s turns the region’s current account surplus
into a deficit equivalent to 2.7% of Latin America’s
GDP for 2005 and its trade surplus into a deficit
equivalent to 0.7% that GDP figure. The number of
Figure I.12
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPOSITION
OF GROWTH IN MERCHANDISE EXPORTS,
1990–2000 AND 2003–2006
(Annual growth rates in percentages)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
on the basis of official figures from each country’s balance of payments. 
Figure I.13
COMMODITY PRICES AND VARIATION
IN TERMS OF TRADE
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
Latin America and the Caribbean Statistics (CEPALSTAT).
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countries that would register a surplus would be
similar to reality and deficits of the oil–importing
countries of Central America and the Caribbean would
become surpluses. Conversely, the natural–resource–
exporting countries would return a deficit (Chile and,
to a lesser extent, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
and Mexico). The MERCOSUR countries show little
variation from the terms of trade for the 1990s
(ECLAC, 2006). The region’s economies are also much
less vulnerable to external shocks now, thanks
to more voluminous international reserves and lower
levels of external borrowing.
The region is likely to post a smaller surplus on the
goods balance in 2007. Exports will slow slightly,
owing partly to moderate price trends for a number of
commodities and partly to slower growth in the exports
of Mexican maquila industries. All in all, the region’s
exports could increase by around 12%, a rather lower
rate than the 19.5% recorded in 2006. Merchandise
imports could expand at a similar rate to 2006,
however, which would have the effect of shrinking the
surplus on the merchandise balance.
3. Outlook
Table I.5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXTERNAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES
(Real growth rates)
2006 2007a
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Argentina 7.4 15.2 8.3 18.0
Bolivia 9.6 4.2 8.6 10.0
Brazil 4.6 18.2 6.6 16.0
Chile 4.2 9.4 8.5 13.6
Colombia 7.8 21.3 6.0 18.0
Costa Rica 12.6 13.6 9.0 9.0
Ecuador 2.9 5.7 -1.5 6.1
El Salvador 7.0 9.3 5.0 8.0
Guatemala 2.5 2.3 2.7 3.5
Haiti 2.2 3.1 3.5 4.8
Honduras 4.8 13.5 4.6 9.4
Mexico 11.1 12.2 4.6 8.0
Nicaragua 10.5 6.1 8.9 8.0
Panama 12.0 15.0 10.0 12.0
Paraguay 10.0 17.0 9.5 16.1
Peru 1.0 12.4 3.8 13.7
Dominican Rep. 5.2 6.5 4.0 8.0
Uruguay 7.6 16.0 6.0 10.3
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) -4.2 31.4 -2.6 21.0
Latin America 7.5 14.6 5.4 12.1
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Economic Projections Centre of the Statistics and
Economic Projections Division.
a Preliminary estimates.
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Generally speaking, the outlook continues to be
encouraging for Latin America and the Caribbean and
for the world at large. Thus far, the boom cycle is
continuing, with all the regions —including Africa—
experiencing robust economic growth and, particularly,
strong expansion in trade. Risks are moderate and
unlikely to materialize in the short term. Commodity
prices remain high. Most of the developing countries
are running current account surpluses and have built up
large reserves, which has made them less vulnerable to
external shocks. However, the window of opportunity
to address major challenges and lengthen the period of
prosperity is closing. These challenges include the
need to engage in coordination efforts in order to narrow
the great external disequilibria and to reach some kind
of accommodation in the multilateral negotiations
taking place in the Doha round of trade talks. This
subject is examined in greater detail below.
In February 2007 trade negotiations were resumed in
the framework of the Doha Round, under the auspices
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), some time
after the Director–General of WTO recommended
they be suspended (July 2006) to allow some serious
reflection by the members. But although the main
world leaders have repeatedly restated their
commitment to achieving positive results before the
end of 2007, the negotiations are no further forward. 
The chairs of the Negotiating Groups are preparing
fresh proposals in the respective areas in an effort to
carry the process forward, but agreement has yet to
be reached on modalities for negotiation, which are
the basic parameters by which new liberalization
commitments on agriculture and industrial goods are to
be agreed. On 17 July, the Chairs of the Committee on
Agriculture and the Negotiating Group on Market
Access (NGMA) circulated among the WTO members
revised blueprints on the main points under discussion
(see table I.5 and box I.3).10
On 30 April 2007, the Chairperson of the Committee
on Agriculture circulated a document containing
suggestions about where the members’ views might
converge towards a consensus on the three pillars of
negotiation: (i) domestic support; (ii) export competition;
and (iii) market access.11 The impasse on domestic
support had originally occurred because the reduction
in support measures proposed by the United States
would have enabled the country to maintain a higher
level of domestic support than it currently has.
This would run counter to an unwritten rule in the
multilateral negotiations, under which liberalization
D. The Doha round in trouble
1. The balance on agriculture
10 The proposals are contained in http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/ag_draft_modalities_july07_e.htm.
11 See Communication from the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, special session [online] http://www.agtradepolicy.org/
output/resource/agchairtxt_30apr07_e.pdf.
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commitments must reflect the countries’ current
situation and “lock in” gains already made. The
Chairperson of the Agriculture Committee recognizes
in his paper that any new commitment on agriculture
must bring the United States’ multilateral commitment
nearer to its existing policy on domestic support. This
is in addition to the commitment to cut de minimis
domestic support by at least half, while taking into
account blue box agreements and the aggregate
measure of support (AMS). 
For the overall bound level of support, which
includes all programmes of production subsidies
(amber box, blue box and de minimis combined), the
Chairperson argued that the additional effort needed on
the part of the United States, Japan and the European
Union consisted of agreeing to larger cuts in total
domestic support than had hitherto been proposed.12
One unresolved issue —specific to the United States—
is the type of product–specific cap that would be
feasible. The negotiations on this point have yet to
proceed beyond working hypotheses. Disagreement
hinges on the base period for such caps, since the
United States prefers 1999–2001, which would allow
higher levels of support than the proposal corresponding
to 1995–2000, as the rest of the countries have
considered. The Chairperson’s document ultimately
proposed the second of these two periods.
The Chairperson’s proposal of 17 July could mean
a final bound level of somewhere between US$ 13
billion and US$ 16.4 billion for the United States,
which would represent a larger reduction than both the
level of US$ 22 billion offered by the country in
October 2005 and its latest proposal of US$ 17 billion
made at the Potsdam meeting of 21 June. In the case of
the European Union, the 17 July proposal would mean
a cut in bound levels from € 100.3 billion to € 16.5
billion and € 27.6 billion. 
With regard to subsidies covered by the amber
box commitments, the Chairperson’s proposal would
imply a cut from US$ 19 billion to US$ 7.6 billion for
the United States. In the case of the European Union,
the reduction could be as much as from € 67 billion to
€ 20 billion.13
It appears to be agreed in principle that blue box
programmes —which are less trade–distorting as they
are not linked to levels of production or prices— should
not exceed 5% of the value of production and should
be reduced to 2.5% by the end of the implementation
period of the Doha Development Agenda outcomes.
The members are now analysing whether it is necessary
to establish additional rules for achieving this and, if
so, what kind. The Chairperson’s document appears to
favour simple disciplines and the setting of operational
caps for specific products (see table I.5). 
With a view to this, consideration is being given
to a combination of disciplines covering domestic
support (amber box) and blue box programmes, in
order to control reallocations from one box to another. 
To all this must be added specific and more
ambitious commitments on cotton, which is a crucial
sector for a number of least developed countries
(LDCs). In this respect, the Chairperson has noted
that, whatever general formula is agreed for domestic
support and blue box programmes should include
broader commitments on cotton. The United States’
initial responses to such proposals have been negative,
however.14
The Chairperson’s analysis gives an assessment of
the different components of export competition and, in
particular, the aspiration to maintain the target date of
2013 for the elimination of export subsidies and
the commitment to make substantial progress by the
mid–point towards that date (see table I.5).
With respect to food aid, the Chairperson noted
that: “There should be some general provisions which
would apply to all food aid in all circumstances.
It should be: needs driven; untied from commercial
exports of goods or services; and should not be linked
to market development objectives of the donor
Member”. He concludes that: “the only general
position that will now run is that food aid is to be in
fully grant form”. A key aspect of the Chairperson’s
proposal is that WTO should not be involved in the
technical aspects of defining a food emergency and
food aid needs, but should leave this responsibility
to agencies with recognized experience, such as
the United Nations, the International Committee of
the Red Cross or other humanitarian organizations.
The proposal of 17 July suggests some disciplines
in this respect.
12 Some experts note that the United States has shown a willingness to step up its commitments to reduce total domestic support from the
current amount of US$ 22 billion to somewhere between US$ 15 billion and US$ 17 billion, subject to significant improvements in market
access on the parts of Brazil and India and a 54% reduction in tariff barriers by the European Union. Some issues are also pending in relation
to sensitive and special products (Josling (2007) and Inside U.S. Trade (2007a)).  
13 See Inside U.S. Trade, vol. 25, No. 29, July 20, 2007.
14 Ibid.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t1= a x t0; 
a + t0
a= 8 - 9













b + 3 in the
formula. 
Elements
Product coverage shall be comprehensive without a priori exclusions.
Tariff reductions or elimination shall commence from the bound rates after full implementation
of current concessions; however, for unbound tariff lines, a constant non–linear mark–up of 20
percentage points to the most–favoured nation (MFN) rate applied in the base year will be
adopted to establish base rates for commencing tariff reductions.
The base year for MFN applied tariff rates shall be 2001 (applicable rates on 14 November).
All non–ad valorem duties shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents (TN/MA/20) and bound
in ad valorem terms.
The reference period for import data shall be 1999–2001.
The tariff reductions for developed members shall be implemented in five equal rate reductions
and for developing members in nine equal rate reductions. The first reduction shall be
implemented on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the Doha Development
Agenda results and each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of
the following years.
Main flexibilities
Developing members may apply less than formula cuts for up to 10% of non–agricultural
national tariff lines provided that the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts and that these
tariff lines do not exceed 10% of the total value of a member’s non–agricultural imports; or
They may keep, as an exception, tariff lines unbound, or not apply formula cuts for up to 5%
of non–agricultural national tariff lines provided they do not exceed 5% of the total value of a
member’s non–agricultural imports.
Developing members with a binding coverage of non–agricultural tariff lines of less than 35%
will be exempt from making tariff reductions through the formula. Instead, they shall bind 90%
of non–agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed 28.5%.
Members having a share of less than 0.1% of world NAMA trade for the reference period
of 1999 to 2001 or best available data may apply the following modality of tariff reduction:
Members with a bound tariff average of non–agricultural tariff lines (i) at or above 50% shall bind
all their non–agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average
of 22%; (ii) at or above 30% but below 50% shall bind all their non–agricultural tariff lines at an
average level that does not exceed an overall average of 18%; and (iii) below 30% shall bind
all their non–agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average
of 14%. In addition, 95% of all non–agricultural tariff lines shall be subject to a minimum cut
of 10%.
Least developed countries shall be exempt from participating in the formula for tariff reduction
and the sectoral approach. However, as part of their contribution to the Doha Development
Agenda, those countries are expected to substantially increase their level of tariff binding
commitments. 
Box I.3
TARIFF REDUCTION PROPOSED BY NEGOTIATING GROUP ON NON–AGRICULTURAL
MARKET ACCESS (NAMA)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Communication from the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture,
30 April 2007 [online] http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/namachairtxt_17july07_e.doc.
Nota: t1= final bound rate of duty; t0= base rate of duty; a = [8–9] = coefficient for developed members; b = [19–23] = coefficient for developing members.
The mandate for the negotiations on export credits
is to ensure the elimination, by end–2013, of export
credits, export credit guarantees and insurance
programmes with repayment periods of more than 180
days and those not in accordance with disciplines
agreed upon. In the 17 July proposal, the disciplines
are meant to cover payment of interest, minimum
interest rates, minimum premium requirements, and
other elements which can constitute subsidies or
otherwise distort trade. In addition such programmes
should be self–financing, reflecting market consistency;
and, “the period should be of a sufficiently short
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duration so as not to effectively circumvent real
commercially–oriented discipline”.15
Market access is crucial to progress in three areas.
The United States has openly stated that its offers in
terms of domestic support are subject to an improvement
in its products’ access to European Union markets
and even developing country markets. This has been a
policy objective in its bilateral negotiations with Latin
American and Caribbean countries as well. The
Chairperson of the Committee on Agriculture bases the
analysis in his proposal on the hypothesis that there are
four bands of tariff cuts for developed countries and
that the thresholds for those bands are those contained
in the proposal of the Group of Twenty (G–20)
developing countries, led by Brazil. The Chairperson is
of the view that the negotiations deliver an overall cut
above 50% in developed country tariffs and of two
thirds of that figure for developing countries. 
Sensitive products are subject to smaller tariff
cuts than those contained in the general rules. The
Chairperson proposed that the number of tariff lines
covering such products be somewhere between 4%
and 6% of all agricultural tariff lines in the case of
developed countries and a third more in the case of
developing countries. In addition, the developed
countries will be able to lower bound tariffs by
between a third and two thirds of the reduction that
would otherwise be required under the tiered formula.
Developing countries will be able to lower bound
tariffs on sensitive products by no less than two thirds
of the reduction that would otherwise have operated
under the tired formula.
In the Chairperson’s view, there could be a
trade–off between the depth of the tariff cuts on
sensitive products and access commitments in the form
of tariff quotas. The proposal was that, in the case of
developed countries, tariff quotas must represent new
access opportunities equivalent to not less than 4% or
6% —to be determined— of domestic consumption
expressed in physical units for the full two–thirds
deviation. For the “minimum one–third deviation”,
new access opportunities would have to equal not less
than 3% or 5%, to be determined. In the case of
developing countries, quotas would have to equal two
thirds of whatever is agreed for developed nations.
It has yet to be determined how many products
developing countries may include in the category of
special products; the Chairperson estimated between
5% and 8% of tariff lines. It is also necessary to agree
upon the criteria for the designation of special products
and their treatment. The Chairperson reasons that
such products should also be subject to tariff cuts, but
minimum reductions of 10% to 20% of the general
cuts.16 The 17 July proposal does not include this
element although it discusses product selection criteria. 
No proposals were advanced on special safeguards
for agricultural products, the final item in the negotiations. 
The Chairperson’s analysis of 30 April was met by
a reception that reflected the difficulties involved in the
negotiations (Bridges, 2007). Among other things,
the proposal to reduce the number of sensitive products
to between 1% and 5% of tariff lines would pose
considerable problems for Japan17 and for the net–
agricultural–importing developing countries of the
G–10.18 Private circles in the United States qualified
the analysis as “unbalanced”, on the basis that it
omitted to mention that the domestic support
modifications would in practice broaden market access
in the United States. The European Union and Japan
are keen for the United States to bind domestic support
(amber box) measures at US$ 15 billion, which would
be equivalent to a total reduction in subsidies from
close to US$ 22 billion today to around US$ 17.6
billion. This has apparently been cited as a possibility,
provided that market access is expanded.19
The G–20 argued that the document presented by
the Chairperson on 30 April lacked balance, because it
failed to take on board the concerns of developing
countries.20 For a balance to be struck, the Group said,
effective cuts were needed in domestic support, along
with disciplines to limit transfers between programmes
or products. Balance in market access would have to
be reflected in a combination of shallower cuts and
greater flexibility for developing countries. The G–33
15 Communication from the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, op. cit.
16 See April document: http://www.agtradepolicy.org/output/resource/agchairtxt_30apr07_e.pdf.
17 Japan would have 140 lines in the category of sensitive products, including rice, wheat, sugar and dairy products. The proposed 5% would
reduce this number to 66 lines (Bridges, 2007).
18 See Inside U.S. Trade (2007b).
19 Some estimates place the United States’ total spending on domestic support at about US$ 19 billion or less (Inside U.S. Trade, 2007a). 
20 See declaration by the G–20 [online] http://www.tradeobservatory.org/.
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also alleged an imbalance in the Chairperson’s
analysis. The 17 July document did refrain from
addressing a number of issues that are important
for developing countries, such as special safeguards,
special products, the liberalization of tropical goods
and preference erosion. As well, the Chairperson of
the Negotiating Group on Non–Agricultural Market
Access tabled proposals on the liberalization of
non–agricultural products that would have a further
impact on a number of developing countries (see
box I.2). At meetings held in the last week of July in
Geneva, the developing countries’ criticisms centred
on this document, which they argued was much more
ambitious than the proposal on agriculture. 
The Director–General of WTO, Pascal Lamy,
proposed that the negotiations be resumed on 3
September 2007. The talks must now proceed under
two additional conditions. First, the absence of the
Trade Promotion Authority and, second, the presidential
elections due to be held in the United States in 2008.
The substantive contents of the Doha Work Programme
revolve around three main areas of negotiation:
(i) trade in goods and services; (ii) development; and
(iii) strengthening the multilateral trade system. 
The first of these categories constitutes the core,
“traditional”, activity of WTO as a forum for trade
negotiation. The current negotiations cover trade in
services and industrial and agricultural goods, including
issues relating to tariff and policy constraints that distort
trade, basically domestic support and export subsidies. 
The negotiations are also aimed at achieving a
reduction in the significant barriers still present in
world trade in non–agricultural industrial goods,
especially as regards textiles, clothing and footwear.
The constraints on South–South trade are a particularly
relevant issue. The Latin American and Caribbean
region’s intraregional trade faces fewer restrictions than
its trade with other regions, especially Asia and Africa.
The second focus of attention in the Doha talks
today is development and, in particular, its link with
trade. There are a vast number of matters of interest,
which may be grouped into three subcategories:
(i) implementation–related issues; (ii) special and
differential treatment; and (iii) the specific problems
faced by least developed countries (LDCs).
The first of these is about the problems that some
developing countries have in dealing with institutional
requirements, carrying out legal reforms and taking
advantage of the opportunities offered by their
participation in WTO. The second refers to the way
the obligations contained in the agreements and the
commitments undertaken by the developed countries
respond to the special needs of developing countries
and the particular traits that prevent those countries
from engaging fully in the system. Lastly, the third
aspect refers to the particular problems and needs
of LDCs (those with a per capita income of less than
US$ 1,000).21
Much work has gone into implementation–related
issues, especially in the form of technical assistance
aimed at improving knowledge of the agreements and
institution–building activities. When the negotiations of
the Doha Round began, the WTO members created the
Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund, which
has received contributions estimated at US$ 9 million.
As regards special and differential treatment, worked
has focused on analysing the extent to which provisions
on such treatment in the WTO agreements really meet
the purpose, seeking to strengthen them and make them
more precise and effective. With regard to LDCs, the
work is aimed at improving the integration of
such countries into the multilateral trade system by
broadening market access, providing support for
diversification of production and exports and devising
technical assistance for institutional capacity–building. 
Lastly, a number of issues relating to the World
Trade Organization’s other traditional core activity,
strengthening of the multilateral trade system, also
remain to be considered. International institutions
and those within individual countries must adapt to stay
2. The scope of Doha
21 For greater detail, see ECLAC (2006).
The Uruguay Round strengthened in the multilateral
system from the institutional and legal point of view
and helped to reinstate the agricultural liberalization
process that had been suspended since the end of the
Second World War. The current talks in the framework
of the Doha Round may represent valuable progress in
the liberalization of world trade as well as large strides
for developing countries. Latin America and the
Caribbean is no exception. The econometric models
agree that the main benefits would come from the
liberalization of agricultural trade, even if those
benefits would be unevenly distributed, with South
America standing to gain the most. Exception
mechanisms will be needed to allow for the developing
countries’ shortfalls in production capacity, in order to
fairly balance costs and benefits. This needs to be based
on objective criteria, in the framework of proportional
policies that do not undermine trade, especially the
fastest growing trade of recent years: South–South trade.
It is essential to bear in mind that, although trade
in agricultural products represents a considerable
proportion of Latin America’s exports, exports of
manufactures are also significant and notable barriers
to trade in these remain, especially in South–South trade.
The Doha negotiations of 2007 will also be
conditioned by a new factor: the authorization of the
Government of the United States to negotiate trade
agreements expired on 1 July 2007 and the country’s
Congress, with its changed composition, has a packed
trade agenda to address.22
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relevant and fulfil the purpose for which they were
created, and to adequately represent the new situations
of their members. In this regard, the Organization must
engage continuously in three tasks: (i) reviewing
provisions in order to improve them; (ii) updating the
substantive contents of the agreements, incorporating
other dimensions that impact on trade or are related to
it; and (iii) reducing the erosion of its relevance caused
by the proliferation of regional trade agreements.
In the current negotiations, the first of these
tasks has been addressed by means of a review of
antidumping measures. It has been particularly
important to develop provisions that are better suited to
the regulation of fishing subsidies. Studies show that
such subsidies represented as much as US$ 30 billion to
US$ 34 billion in 2006, of which US$ 20 billion was
heavily implicated in the over–exploitation of marine
resources (Bridges, 2007). The review of dispute
settlement procedures might also be considered under
this category, although it does not form part of the final
package of negotiations.
With respect to the second point, negotiations on
trade facilitation are of particular interest because of the
savings they could generate in commercial transactions
(McLinden, 2006).
Regarding the third aspect, in the last few years a
significant and growing number of regional agreements
have been signed. Until recently, the multilateral trade
system and regional agreements were considered to
be mutually beneficial, since the multilateral system
tended to build in part of the liberalization that had
been negotiated in such agreements. This link appears
to have weakened in recent years, however. It is
necessary to ensure, therefore that provisions contained
in regional agreements and obligations contracted in the
framework of WTO are consistent. On 14 December
2006, the General Council of WTO provisionally
adopted a new Transparency Mechanism for Regional
Trade Agreements (TN/RL/18, 13 July 2006). Taking
an approach similar to the trade policy reviews that
WTO conducts today, the Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements will examine agreements falling
under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1994 and Article V of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
The Committee on Trade and Development will review
regional agreements falling under the Enabling Clause
for developing countries. 
22 Evenett and Meier (2006) provide an analysis of this point.
3. Looking to the future
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The trade agenda of the United States in 2007 is
marked by the Doha Round negotiations, negotiations
under way with Malaysia and Thailand, possible
Congressional consideration of legislation applicable to
Colombia, Panama, Peru and the Republic of Korea,
and the possible renewal of the Trade Promotion
Authority, previously known as the fast–track
negotiation mechanism, which expired on 1 July 2007. 
The outcomes of these processes will depend to a great
extent on how the relationship between Congress and
the Executive branch develops, especially in light of
the growing concerns about globalization and, in
particular, the ways in which trade policy is updated.
The purpose is to calm the debate which hinges on the
question of whether global economic integration
and the rules on international trade will favour the
majority or the minority. 
Growing economic inequality has contributed to
ever–greater insecurity in that area and to pressure
to change the related policies. In the case of trade
policy, the increasing inequity of the past 30 years
and the prolonged stagnation of average wages have
awakened concern as to the various effects of world
trade on the well–being of workers in the United
States. Certain empirical studies have shown that trade
has led to falling demand for labour in various sectors
which employ large numbers of relatively unskilled
workers. Apparently, subcontracting has tended to lower
the wages of local unskilled workers in comparison
with the rest of the work force. This has worsened fears
that the labour force may become polarized, leading to
demands for better sharing of the benefits of globalization
(Bernanke, 2007). The debate is inconclusive, since
recent studies have noted that subcontracting has had
only a marginal effect on the labour markets of the
United States and of the other industrialized economies
(Funk Kirkegaard, 2007). 
The platform of the Democratic Party includes a
new trade policy for the United States, aimed at raising
standards of living and creating new markets for the
country’s goods.23 This would require trading partners
who enter into agreements with the United States to
commit themselves to adopt, maintain and enforce
basic international labour standards, not merely to
enforce their own laws. Those countries will also
be required to promote sustainable development,
combat global warming and promote a fair balance
between promoting access to medicines and protecting
pharmaceutical innovation. 
The new policy aims to protect and increase
opportunities for the country’s workers, farmers and
businesses through the implementation of trade
agreements and to expand the role of Congress. As for
workers’ protection, a “strategic workers’ assistance
and training initiative” has been proposed. Lastly, the
policy proposes to expand the diplomacy of the United
States and strengthen national security through an
expanded programme of trade and aid.
The treatment of labour standards is essential in
enabling the executive power and the Congress
to agree on and, as a result, move forward with the
development of the trade agenda for 2007, especially
in relation to the Trade Promotion Authority.
Achieving agreement in this area will depend to a
great extent on the way in which labour laws are
incorporated into trade agreements and on the extent to
E. The new trade policy of the United States
1. Renewal of the Trade Promotion Authority
23 See the document produced by the staff of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives: [online] http://waysan
dmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/NewTradePolicy.pdf.
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which they are binding, so that there is no conflict with
United States law.
In May, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Nancy Pelosi, and the Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee, Charles Rangel, announced that
they had reached a conceptual agreement with Susan
Schwab, the United States Trade Representative, as
to how the above goals should be achieved. The
agreement, applicable to trade accords whose approval
by Congress is pending, requires signatory countries
to incorporate into their legislation and practices the
provisions of the 1998 ILO Declaration on the
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.24
Paragraph 2 of the Declaration states that “all
Members, even if they have not ratified the
Conventions in question, have an obligation arising
from the very fact of membership in the Organization
to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and
in accordance with the Constitution, the principles
concerning the fundamental rights which are the
subject of those Conventions, namely:
(a) freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation.”25
Under the conceptual agreement, parties must
agree to the principles set out, although there is no
indication of the role of ILO jurisprudence in case of
any dispute on their interpretation. Only governments
will be able to raise complaints for non–compliance,
and only federal laws, not state laws, may be the object
of disputes; these must relate to issues concerning
trade or investment (Inside U.S. Trade, 2007a). 
In the environmental field, parties are obliged to
subscribe to seven agreements.26 These are thought
to be compatible with the provisions of free–trade
agreements or with the commitment to implement the
multilateral agreements to which each country is
a party (Inside U.S. Trade, 2007a). Labour and
environmental standards will be subject to the dispute
settlement mechanism just as the other provisions of
the free–trade agreements. 
The consensus between the administration and the
Democratic leaders in the House of Representatives
also deals with issues related to access to medicine
in developing countries and the protection of test
data, but it does not mention the way in which these
provisions would be included in free trade agreements.27
Above all, steps would be taken to ensure that
protection of test data did not impede the adoption of
health policies, and the requirement to certify that
no patent is in force before permission to market a
generic medicine can be granted would be abolished.
Lastly, consideration is being given to ending the
possibility of extending the duration of a patent
because of delays in the approval process, and that
process is being strengthened and streamlined.
Consideration is also being given to making
government procurement contracts conditional on
compliance with the five main labour standards
mentioned above. In the area of investment, the
principle contained in the current Trade Promotion
Authority, whereby foreign investors are not to be
granted rights superior to those provided for in United
States law, is reiterated. Lastly, as explained in the
document on a new trade policy, it has been agreed
that a workers’ assistance and training programme will
be developed. 
24 See the text of the Declaration at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename
=DECLARATIONTEXT.
25 The Conventions referred to are those which the Declaration itself describes as having been recognized as fundamental both inside and
outside the Organization.
26 The seven agreements are the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; the resolutions of the Inter–American Tropical Tuna Commission; the Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention); the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;
and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?refid=98593).
27 Information on the content of the agreement can be found at www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?refid=98593.
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In 2007, Congress is expected to adopt a new Food
and Agriculture Act (the “2007 Farm Bill”), since
most of the provisions of the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 will expire during the current
year.28 As in the case of the previous legislation on
agriculture, the main areas of disagreement will be
commodity prices and the policy on income support,
that is, the level of support to be provided by the
United States Government to agricultural producers,
and the methods used for that purpose. The limits
on spending charged to federal funds, the distributive
effect of agricultural aid, the influence of the Doha
Round negotiations and procedures for the settlement
of disputes with trade partners in the framework of
WTO, as well as considerable political interest groups,
will contribute to determining whether or not agricultural
aid is to be radically modified.29 It is therefore difficult
to forecast the contents of the new legislation.30
The current legislation constituted a backward step
in the country's agricultural reforms, begun in the 1980s
and reflected in the position of the United States at the
Uruguay Round and in the agricultural legislation of
1996 (Thompson, 2005). As a result, the new legislation
will indicate the country's agricultural policy and set
the limits on what can be achieved at the Doha talks. 
The current situation differs in a number of
ways from that which prevailed when the previous
legislation was debated. First, the Doha negotiations
involve further liberalization of agricultural trade,
including the abolition or reduction of the distortions
which affect it. Second, the persistent fiscal deficit of
the United States has resulted in pressure in favour of
spending cuts. The sharp price increases for certain
agricultural commodities makes it hard to justify
allocating additional resources to support programmes
which mainly concern the production of wheat, rice,
grains, cotton, soybean, milk products and sugar (Nair
and others, 2007) and which include compensatory,
direct and countercyclical payments (the latter
introduced by the 2002 legislation), tariff barriers and,
in the case of milk products and sugar, non–tariff
barriers. Third, the composition of the United States
Congress has changed in relation to 2001. Fourth,
there is a perceived lack of equity in the distribution of
the programme benefits, according to some authors
(Josling, 2007) and biofuels are booming, changing the
agenda of the agricultural sector. 
Nonetheless, some experts believe that the
legislation to be adopted in 2007 will be very similar
to the current law in relation to support for commodities,
perhaps with some adjustments resulting from the
country's fiscal situation and the outcomes of WTO
dispute settlement proceedings (Thompson, 2005 and
Josling, 2007). This would restrict the United States
negotiators' ability to make more concessions in the
framework of Doha. 
These factors —particularly the uncertainty as to
the possible outcomes of Doha— are likely to lead to a
trade policy based on bilateral agreements which leave
aside difficult issues including agriculture. A consensus
between the executive branch and the Democratic
majority in Congress may give a new boost to this
policy of bilateral agreements, which already includes
11 Latin American and Caribbean countries and has
spread to Asia and the Middle East. That aspect is
discussed in chapters IV and V of this document. 
2. Food and Agriculture Act
28 An analysis of the legislation can be found in the report of the Congressional Research Service [online] http://fpc.state.gov/documents/orga
nization/78546.pdf. The proposal by the executive power, which serves as the basis for preparing the legislation, is available at
www.usda.gov/farmbill. 
29 Dispute settlement proceedings in the framework of WTO include those relating to cotton, successfully brought by Brazil, and to wheat,
initiated by Canada, as well as a possible dispute concerning rice (Josling, 2007). Thompson (2005) provides an analysis of the political
significance of legislation in this sector.
30 The agricultural legislation is extremely complex, including not only domestic support for certain crops, but also provisions relating to
conservation, agricultural trade, programmes in the areas of nutrition, rural development, research, forests and energy. Although some aspects
can mostly be debated separately, decisions adopted in one area may also influence the others (Thompson, 2005). 
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Asia's dynamism and its new ties with the Chinese
economy have elicited separate strategic initiatives by
the United States and the European Union to enhance
their positioning in that part of the world (see chapter
V). A restructuring of the East Asian economies around
China could offer Latin America and the Caribbean
new production and export outlets. Nonetheless, there
is also growing concern at the presumption that the
benefits of Asia's buoyancy may not be fully exploited
by non–Asian countries, owing to the formation of
an informal (de facto) trade bloc, supported by formal
(de jure) integration in Asia. The latter entails an
increasingly broad and complementary group in which
development is disseminated in concentric circles,
thanks to intra–regional foreign direct investment
(FDI). In view of these trends, Latin American and
Integration and dynamism in the
Asia–Pacific region
Chapter II
Until recently, Asian regional integration consisted of burgeoning intra–regional trade,
based on the increasingly complementary production and trade components of the different
countries' manufacturing sectors. Intra–industry trade (IIT) expanded significantly as the
specific advantages of productive and marketing chains were exploited more effectively.
This process of de facto (market–led) integration in Asia is new being supported by de
jure (government–led) integration; and strong productive and trade relations are being
complemented by free–trade agreements of various types that aim to consolidate those links.
Nonetheless, the current wave of draft trade agreements, and the varied economic and
political interests of countries both within and outside the Asia–Pacific region, have given
rise to two phenomena: a proliferation of agreements (known as the “spaghetti bowl”) and a
chain or “domino” effect, which cause serious problems of convergence and coordination.
The Asia–Pacific region has become not only “Factory Asia” for the rest of the world, but
also a battleground of preferential trade agreements.
Introduction
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Caribbean countries need to strengthen their trade
links to make their production more complementary
with that of Asia, and establish trade and investment
partnerships, in addition to trade agreements, which
would provide new access to these markets and
help them integrate into Asian production and
export chains.
Ten years on from the Asian crisis of 1997,
the East and South–East Asian regions have fully
recovered and are greatly strengthening their already
key position in the world economy.1 This dynamism
can be seen in terms of growth, international trade,
FDI, technological innovation and financial resources
to maintain international balances. Given the forecast
high growth rates (ADB, 2007), the region is likely to
remain the key source of the world boom over the next
few years, and will provide an export market of major
potential for Latin American and Caribbean countries,
for both goods and services. This possibility has
hardly been exploited thus far, except for a few
commodity sectors (ECLAC, 2006). Paradoxically,
at the present time Asian countries are showing
unprecedented interest in forging strategic relations
with Latin America and the Caribbean; but, for
now, the interest and practical measures of
approximation are all coming from the Asian rather
than Latin American side.
One of the most conspicuous features of Asia's
emergence as a lynchpin of world economy has been
China's dramatic entry on to the stage as a leading
player, around which a large–scale restructuring
economies and trade is unfolding. In fact in every year
since 2001 the developing Asian countries, along with
Japan and China, have contributed almost 50% of
world GDP growth, in purchasing power parity (PPP)
terms, surpassing the contribution of United States and
European Union (ECLAC, 2006).
Developing Asian countries, especially China,
have gained a considerably larger stake in the world
economy over the last few years. In GDP terms, the
economies of the 10 member countries of ASEAN,
plus those of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan
(the group known as ASEAN+3) represented 20% of
world GDP in 2006 measured at current prices, and
31% in purchasing–power–parity (PPP) terms (see
table II.1) The equivalent percentages for the broader
grouping (ASEAN+6), which includes Australia, India
and New Zealand, were 24% and 38%, respectively.
Measured in PPP terms, the GDP of ASEAN+3 easily
surpassed that of United States or the European Union
(25 countries). For comparison, APEC, which consists
of 21 countries of various sizes, accounted for about
60% of total world GDP measured by both indicators.
The relative weight of ASEAN (10), alone, also
according to both indicators, was very small at 2.3%
and 4.9%. In view of this, ASEAN is attempting to
establish strategic partnerships with various country
groupings, and thus increase the possibility of
becoming an Asian regional centre, alongside the other
three hubs (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea)
that are currently in the process of formation. It should
be noted that in output terms, Latin America and
the Caribbean outweighs ASEAN (10), although it is
1 In this section, the term “East Asia” means China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, plus Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
(SAR) and Taiwan province of China; South–East Asia consists of Brunei Darussalam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam; South Asia refers to India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; and Oceania consists
of Australia and New Zealand. 
A. Asia and the Pacific and Asia–Pacific economic
cooperation (APEC) In the world economy
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similar in terms of population size and smaller in terms
of export presence. 
ASEAN+3 absorbed 23% and 19% of world exports
and imports in 2005, respectively (see table II.1). The
European Union (25 countries) accounted for nearly
40% of world exports and imports alike, whereas the
United States' shares were smaller, at 9% and 16%
respectively. APEC as a grouping represented about
half of total world trade. In demographic terms,
ASEAN+3 is the largest grouping, accounting for 32%
of the world's population, while China and India
between them represented 37%, followed by ASEAN
(10), which has a total of 570 million inhabitants (9%
of the world total). 
The 21 APEC countries are large exporters and
importers of commercial services. In 2005, they
exported US$ 428 billion and imported US$ 918
billion, corresponding to 18% and 39% of the world
total, respectively. Despite the heavy weight of the
United States in the overall performance of the APEC
grouping, the figures for exports and imports of
services from ASEAN (10) countries amounted to
US$ 104 billion and US$ 132 billion. These are
sizeable amounts in comparison to their external
merchandise trade (WTO, 2006) and they easily
surpass the figures for both Mexico (US$ 16 billion
and US$ 20.9 billion, respectively) and MERCOSUR
(US$ 23 million and US$ 31 billion).
Table II.1
PARTICIPATION OF SELECTED ASIA–PACIFIC GROUPINGS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
(Percentages)
Countries/groups Area, Population, GDP, 2006 GDP, 2006 Exports, Imports, 
2006 2006 (Current (PPP) 2005 2005
prices)
Australia 5.7 0.3 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.1
Brunei Darussalam 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Canada 7.4 0.5 2.9 1.9 3.6 3.0
Chile 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 00.4 00.3
China 7.1 20.3 5.8 17.2 7.5 6.3
United States 7.0 4.6 29.9 21.2 9.0 16.0
Russian Federation 12.7 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.4 0.9
Philippines 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.4
Hong Kong SAR 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 2.9 2.9
Indonesia 1.4 3.4 0.8 1.7 0.8 0.6
Japan 0.3 2.0 10.1 6.7 5.9 4.9
Malaysia 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.1
Mexico 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1
New Zealand 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Papua New Guinea 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Peru 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
Republic of Korea 0.1 0.8 2.0 1.7 2.8 2.5
Singapore 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 2.3 1.9
Thailand 0.4 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.1
Taiwan province of China 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.1 1.9 1.7
Viet Nam 0.2 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
APEC 46.5 41.1 60.5 61.4 46.2 47.6
India 2.5 17.0 1.9 6.5 0.9 1.3
ASEAN (10)a 3.3 8.9 2.3 4.9 6.4 5.5
ASEAN+3 10.8 31.9 20.1 30.5 22.6 19.2
ASEAN+6 19.2 49.3 23.9 38.2 24.8 21.9
European Union (25) 3.0 7.1 32.0 21.2 39.4 39.3
Latin America and the Caribbean 15.7 8.5 5.1 7.4 5.6 5.0
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:World Bank, World Economic Indicators Database [online]; Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, Key Economic Indicators [online]; World Trade Organization
(WTO); Trade Profiles 2006, Geneva, 2006.
a ASEAN (10) includes the following countries: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Lao People's Democratic Republic,
Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. ASEAN+3 includes the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. ASEAN+6 includes the 13
aforementioned countries plus Australia, India and New Zealand.
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The Asian countries also play a major role as
investors or recipients of FDI. The figures show that
East and South–East Asia captured 16% of worldwide
FDI flows in 2005, with China alone receiving US$ 79
billion, almost half of the total FDI inflows to Asia
(JETRO, 2006a). This figure compares favourably
with those of the United States, which captured 11.4%
of the world total, and Latin America and the Caribbean
which recorded 7%, in clear contrast to the European
Union, which accounted for 51% of the global figure.
As an investor, East Asia was responsible for 14%
of world flows abroad, compared to 2% in the case of
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The leading role being played by the Asian
countries can be seen not only in the world output and
trade, but also in the global financial sector. The region
plays an increasingly key part in maintaining global
economic balances because, with its abundant and
cheap supply of goods, it helps to keep demand high
but inflation low in developed countries; it provides
low–cost credit to the United States, thereby helping to
keep interest rates down; and it accumulates reserves
by buying treasury bonds and thus helps to finance
that country's current account deficit (Rosales and
Kuwayama, 2007).2 The United States remains the
leading consumer, but the Asian region has become
one of the world's major producers both of products
and international financing. 
Trade imbalances across the world continue to
widen. The current account deficit in the United States
reached a level of US$ 856 billion in late 2006,
equivalent to 6.5% of GDP, and US$ 65.2 billion more
than the 2005 figure. As much as 63% of the increase
in the deficit reflects larger imports from China, and
the deficit with that country widened from US$ 220.1
billion to US$ 261.7 billion. The counterpart of the
huge current account deficit being maintained by the
United States can bee seen in the growing surpluses
recorded by emerging Asian countries, particular
China; the oil exporting countries; and also Latin
America and the Caribbean, which accounted for
almost 14% of the United States deficit in 2005 (Rosales
and Kuwayama, 2007).
As will be analysed in greater depth in chapter V
despite the recent growth recovery particularly in
South America, the Asia–Pacific region remains an
underexploited export market. Latin American and
Caribbean sales to that destination accounted for 9.0%
of their total exports in 2005, compared to 11.4% in
1991; whereas its imports from Asia and Pacific were
equivalent to 20.5% and 10.9%, respectively. Thus,
the role of Asia Pacific as a trade partner for Latin
America and the Caribbean is more important for the
region's imports than its exports. As is the case with
inter–regional trade, the Asian region is a relatively
important source of investments for Latin America
and the Caribbean (between 8% and 9%), but the
phenomenon is not reciprocal. 
In short, given its economic, trade and demographic
size, and in view of the high growth rates forecast
for the region, Asia could offer Latin American and
Caribbean countries a market of great potential for
their export products, and major possibilities for
establishing trade and business partnerships of various
types, in addition to opportunities for the signing of
free–trade agreements.
2 In December 2006 China was holding US$ 350 billion worth of United States Treasury bonds, more than half of the amount held by
Japan (US$ 644 billion). China's reserves at that time exceeded US$ 1.06 billion, a figure way above that of Japan, which amounted to
US$ 875 billion. China's reserves are equivalent to over 40% of its GDP.
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A key element in the structuring of Asia over the last
decade relates to technological development and the
possible fragmentation of the production chain, which
triggered a sharp increase in Asian intra–regional trade.
The intra–Asian trade coefficient for the countries of
ASEAN+3 plus Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China (SAR) and Taiwan province of China,
has grown from 43% in the early 1990s to 56% in 2005
(see table II.2). This indicator surpasses the level of
intra–regional trade attained by NAFTA, and is rapidly
approaching that displayed by the European Union.
Trade between members of ASEAN (10) has increased
and surpasses the 18% attained by MERCOSUR in
that year. In addition, indices of the intensity of
intra–regional trade, which take into account the size
of the markets of each grouping, show that intensity in
Asia, exceeds the European indices and is similar to
that of NAFTA (see table II.3). These indicators
confirm the high degree of productive and hence trade
complementarity that exists in Asia.
B. High and rising level of Asian
intra–regional trade
Table II.2
INTRA–REGIONAL TRADE, BY GEOGRAPHIC GROUPINGa
(Percentages of the region's total trade)
Region 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Within ASEAN (10) 17.9 20.3 18.8 24.0 24.7 28.1
Within ASEAN+3 30.2 30.2 29.4 37.6 37.3 39.2
Within ASEAN+3+Hong Kong SAR+
Taiwan province of China 34.1 37.1 43.1 51.9 52.1 55.6
European Union (25) 61.3 59.8 67.0 67.4 66.8 66.2
NAFTA 33.8 38.7 37.9 43.1 48.8 45.0
Source:World Trade Organization (WTO), International Trade Statistics 2006, Geneva 2006; Pradumna B. Rana, “Economic integration in East Asia: trends, prospects,
and a possible roadmap”, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 2, July 2006; and Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Asian Regional Integration Center [online] http://www.aric.adb.org/indicator.php.
a The share in intra–regional trade is defined as the percentage of intra–regional trade with respect to total trade of the region in question, based on export data. It
is calculated as follows: Xii /{(Xiw + Xwi)/2}, where Xii refers to exports from region 1 to the same region, Xiw represent exports from region i to the world, and Xwi
represents world exports to region i. A higher percentage indicates a higher level of dependency on intra–regional trade.
Table II.3
INTENSITY INDEX OF INTRA–REGIONAL TRADE, 1990–2005, BY REGIONa
Country/grouping 1990 1995 2000 2005
ASEAN (10) 4.4 3.7 4.0 5.0
ASEAN+3 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
East Asia (15) 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.3
Asia (47) 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1
European Union (25) 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7
NAFTA 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.6
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Asian Regional Integration Center [online]
http://www.aric.adb.org/indicator.php; European Union; and Pradumna B. Rana, “Economic integration in East Asia: trends, prospects, and a possible roadmap”,
ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 2, July 2006.
a The intensity index for intra–regional trade is the ratio of the share of intra–regional trade and the share of world trade in that region, based on export data. It is
calculated as follows: [Xii /{(Xiw + Xwi)/2} ] / [ {(Xiw + Xwi)/2}/Xww ], where Xii are exports from region i to the same region, Xiw are exports from region i to the world, and
Xwi our world exports to region i. A higher coefficient indicates greater dependency on intra–regional trade.
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This expansion of intra–Asian trade has been
driven partly by the robust growth of intra–enterprise
and intra–industry trade, thanks to the construction of
a complex network of vertical supply chains by
transnational corporations, in which China plays a
fundamental role as both origin and destination. 
At the global level, and for certain Asian
groupings, the four machinery sectors in the two–digit
Harmonized System (HS 84, 85, 86–89 and 90–91) all
display high growth rates. These sectors have been
highly dynamic, particularly in China; but, in general,
export growth in all East and South–East Asian
groupings far outpaced that of world trade in these
products. Moreover, exports of products in HS
category 84 (non–electric machinery) have accelerated
sharply not only between the countries of ASEAN (5),
but also between all countries of East and South–
East Asia excluding Japan (ADB, 2007 and World
Bank, 2007).
A detailed analysis of trade patterns among the
members of ASEAN (10), especially in the case of the
most important products in the grouping's trade basket,
shows a heavy concentration on three product groups
(at the two–digit level), both in relation to total trade
and in relation to trade within or outside ASEAN. In
2005, 10 product groups represented 74% of total
ASEAN trade and 80% of trade between its members.3
The buoyancy of the machinery chapters (HS 84,
85 and 87) to some extent sustains the momentum
of trade in manufactured products and, hence, trade
within or outside ASEAN. The importance of the
products in Chapter 85 (electronic equipment, parts
and components) seems to confirm the hypothesis
that “Factory Asia” has developed a manufacturing
network for electronic products based on the
fragmentation of the production chain.
3 Those product groups are: electrical machinery; fuels; non–electrical machinery; plastics; vehicles; organic chemicals; precision machinery,
optical goods and medicines; iron and steel articles; iron and steel; and rubber and rubber products.
C. Intra–industry trade and the emergence
of China as the hub of the asian
export platform
The highly complementary nature of production and
trade is clearly indicative of the profound changes
affecting regional integration in Asia, as a result of the
dismantling of the production process. East Asia can be
viewed as a highly integrated “factory”, in which
the previous national production processes have been
dismantled and dispersed to the lowest–cost locations
across the region (Baldwin, 2006). Thailand and China
received labour–intensive processes, while Japan and
the Republic of Korea were left with the engineering–
intensive components. It is notable that this entire
regional trade creation occurred outside the ambit of
regional trade agreements. 
The “Asia Factory” was established through
unilateral liberalization of trade in parts and components,
which are the key elements of East Asia's intra–
regional trade. Although the tariff reductions were
non–discriminatory, their effect was regional because
of the networks of multinational enterprises from
Korea, Japan and Taiwan province of China, and the
very nature of the products concerned. This represented
a major change in the Asian development model before
China arose as an economic power. An important
element of the fragmentation of manufacturing
processes in the region was Japan’s loss of comparative
advantages in manufacturing production, which led
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Japanese firms to slice their productive processes
and outsource more labour–intensive stages to the
neighbouring countries of East Asia. This “hollowing
out” of the Japanese economy was replicated in Taiwan
province of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore
and Hong Kong SAR, thereby deepening the process
of creating the “Asia Factory.” Lastly, China’s entry
on to the international economic stage further eroded
the industrial comparative advantages enjoyed by the
higher–income East Asian countries, making offshore
production more attractive.
1. Growth of intra–industry trade, concentrated
in the machinery sector
The high level of intra–regional trade in Asia is
simultaneously a cause and effect of the increasingly
complementary trade between the countries, as revealed
in high indices of inter–industry trade, that is, cases
where a country simultaneously both imports and
exports similar but differentiated products.
East Asia, especially the ASEAN+3 economies
and Taiwan province of China, form one of the most
important IIT hubs worldwide. According to the most
recent calculations made by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB, 2007), the last decade has witnessed high
and rising coefficients of IIT in natural–resource–
related sectors and also among technology– and
human–capital–intensive manufactures. Roughly half
of the growth in IIT seen in East Asia between 1990
and 2003 is attributable to an expansion of trade in the
components and machine parts sector (Ando and
Kimura, 2005), which has registered the fastest
growth. East and South–East Asia thus jointly assume
the mantle of "Factory Asia.”
It should be noted that enterprises in the United
States firms and, to a lesser extent, European ones,
which have a presence in the machinery sectors of East
and South–East Asia are increasingly participating in
the network of production chains and taking better
advantage of the synergy generated in the Asian
region, where numerous small and medium–sized
enterprises (SMEs) participate as providers of inputs
and parts (Kimura and Ando, 2004). This pattern
contrasts with the behaviour of such firms in Latin
America and the Caribbean, where one does not see the
creation of production networks or value chains
with participation by United States and European
transnationals, except in Mexico and, to some extent,
Costa Rica. To attract greater investments into the re-
gion itself, Latin American and Caribbean countries
need to implement policies that stimulate the creation
of these production and marketing chains both at the
regional level and outside. Without globally competitive
chains of this type, it will be very hard to attract more
technology–intensive FDI into the region.
2. Intra–regional FDI, key to intra–regional and
intra–industry trade
(a) The case of Japan
Japan's external trade grew significantly in 2006 in
relation to the previous year's levels, with exports
expanding by 8.2% and imports by 11.7%. Japan's
neighbours are crucial as both destinations and origins
for its foreign trade. East Asian countries supply over
40% of Japan's imports, and absorb an even larger
proportion (nearly 46%) of its exports. Among
neighbouring Asian countries, China is a key trade
partner, especially in terms of imports from Japan and
ASEAN (10) —almost twice as large an import source
as the United States or the European Union, considered
separately.4 Japan's imports from ASEAN (10) already
surpass those originating from the United States or the
European Union. Latin America and the Caribbean
plays a relatively minor role, with barely a 5% share
(JETRO, 2006a).
A large proportion of the goods that Japan trades
with its Asian neighbours, both exports and imports,
consists of electronic machinery, transport equipment
and other manufactured products of general use. This
characteristic is clearly visible not only in trade with
China and the recently industrialized countries of Asia
(Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan province
of China), but also with the members of ASEAN. Thus,
Japan's productive complementarity with the rest of
Asia in the manufacturing sector is increasing and is
reflected in a higher degree of IIT. 
Japan's role as investor and recipient of worldwide
FDI is quite small: Japanese FDI abroad represented
6% of total world FDI in 2005 (US$ 45.5 billion),
while its inward FDI amounted to just 0.3% (US$ 3.2
billion). Nonetheless, East and South–East Asia are
very important as destinations for this type of Japanese
investment. In 2005, over 35.6% of Japan's outward
FDI went to Asia, as a whole, with the following
breakdown: China (14.5%), Thailand (9.4%), Indonesia
(2.6%), Hong Kong SAR (3.9%), Republic of Korea
(3.8%) and India (0.6%).5 The proportion of investment
corresponding to Asia outweighs that destined for the
United States (26.7%) or the European Union (17.3%).
Latin America and the Caribbean received US$ 6.4
billion of Japanese investment, a significant proportion
of the total, which was concentrated in countries
offering financial tax exemptions (JETRO, 2006a).
Considering investment by individual sectors, the
electronics machinery (9.6%), transport equipment
(18.9%), precision machines (3.1%), and chemicals
and pharmaceuticals (7.4%) were the most favoured in
the manufacturing sector. The predominant position
of Asia as a destination, on the one hand, and the
importance of the manufacturing sectors, on the other,
confirmed the role played by that sector as the key
economic integration hub for Japan.
Buoyant intra–regional investments provide a
counterpart to high levels of intra–regional and intra–
industry trade. In the case of Japan, its outward FDI
was concentrated in the ASEAN countries in the 1990s
but is now shifting towards China. As shown in table
II.4, the centre of gravity of Japanese FDI is focusing
on three regions in China: Bohai Bay (Beijing, Hebei,
Sandong and Liaoning), the Yanzi river delta (Jiangsu,
Zhehing and Shanghai), and the Pearl river delta (Hong
Kong SAR and Guangdong). Recently, Viet Nam has
been seen as an increasingly viable alternative to FDI
in Guangdong, given the rise in wages in China.
In the ASEAN subregion, the number of Japanese
subsidiaries has not increased much in Indonesia and
the Philippines, and has actually declined in Malaysia.
This stands in stark contrast to Thailand which continues
to attract Japanese FDI, thanks especially to the
buoyancy of the Thai motor industry. Penetration
by Japanese firms in India is still very modest,
but the Government is showing great interest in
counterbalancing the growing presence of China in
East and South–East Asia through diplomatic
arrangements with India. As will be discussed below,
the two countries have agreed to conduct feasibility
studies with a view to signing an economic partnership
agreement (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2006).
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4 In 2006, exports to China expanded by 15.6% in relation to the previous year's level (8.8%). This dynamism originates in the electronic
machine, automobile and parts and materials sector, which are exported to the United States and European markets (JETRO, 2007b).
5 Preliminary figures for 2006 also confirm the importance of this zone, which received 34.1% (US$ 17.2 billion) of the total, which amounted
to US$ 50.3 billion (JETRO, 2006a). In this year, the joint weight of ASEAN member countries as a destination was the same as that of China.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2006 • 2007 Trends 71
On the other hand, transnational firms consider
investments in Japan itself to be fundamental for
increasing their technological and innovation capacity
and preventing the flight of their key technologies.
Although South–East Asia has been seen to be under
the shadow of rapidly growing China for the past
years, their strategic geographical position between
China and India may present new opportunities. In that
case, it will be necessary for ASEAN to make further
progress toward economic integration and to promote
specialization in each country. Furthermore, the
Japanese government will be able to contribute to the
deepening of East Asian integration by supporting
intra–ASEAN and ASEAN–India integration (Fujita
and Hamaguchi, 2006). 
(b) The case of China 
The FDI received by China from the three leading
sources —Japan, ASEAN and the Republic of Korea
(see table II.5)— increased significantly especially
following China's accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001. Those three sources
represent about 22% of total FDI entering in 2005, a
non–negligible figure given that: (i) the shares of
United States and the European Union accounted for
about 6% and 7%, respectively, of the total invested in
recent years; (ii) the percentage corresponding to
Taiwan province of China was between 4% and 5%;
and (iii) almost 60% of FDI entering China comes
from Hong Kong SAR in the form of triangulation. In
Table II.4
NUMBER OF SUBSIDIARIES OF JAPANESE FIRMS IN ASIA, 1990–2004
(Number of cases)
Country/locality 1990 1994 2000 2004
China 315 1 061 2 432 4 041
Bohai Bay 141 404 815 1 039
Yanzi River Delta 77 384 1 060 2 139
Pearl River Delta 47 152 310 525
Other 50 121 247 290
Philippines 171 234 426 453
Hong Kong SAR 793 1 022 1 112 1 121
Taiwan province of China 727 812 891 909
Republic of Korea 399 404 496 640
Singapore 743 961 1 129 1 067
Malaysia 509 709 881 805
Thailand 766 983 1 342 1 512
Indonesia 292 439 676 698
Viet Nam 1 21 174 220
India 71 81 168 193
Source:Masahisa Fujita and Nobuaki Hamaguchi, “The coming of China–plus–one: the Japanese perspective of East Asian production networks”, World–Bank–IPS
research project on the rise of China and India, February 2006, unpublished.
Table II.5
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA BY JAPAN, ASEAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1995 AND 2000–2005
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Japan ASEAN (7)a Republic of Korea
Amount Percentage of total Amount Percentage of total Amount Percentage of total
1995 3 109 8.3 2 644 7.0 1 032 2.8
2000 2 916 7.2 2 837 7.0 1 490 3.7
2001 4 348 9.3 2 971 6.3 2 152 4.6
2002 4 190 7.9 3 220 6.1 2 721 5.2
2003 5 054 9.4 2 909 6.1 4 489 8.4
2004 5 452 9.0 3 010 3.0 6 248 10.3
2005 6 530 10.8 2 932 2.9 5 168 8.6
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from China.
a For 1995–2003, the figures refer to the following countries: Brunei Darussalam, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. For 2004 and 2005,
they refer to Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.
other words, the ASEAN countries are an important
source of FDI to China even though most of their FDI
to China originates in Singapore (over US$ 20 billion
per year). In short, China has become one of the large
FDI recipients worldwide and occupies third place as a
recipient of this type of investment after the United
Kingdom and United States. 
Foreign–owned firms operating in China are major
promoters of that country's external trade. In 2005,
such firms exported US$ 444 billion, equivalent to
58% of total exports, and imported US$ 388 billion
(Ministry of Commerce of China (n/d)). These include
goods of Asian origin which account for 46% of its
total exports (see table II.6). In contrast, those of the
United States or European origin accounted for 25%
and 18% of China's total exports. Sales abroad by firms
of Japanese origin established in China exceeded
US$ 56 billion, and these were followed by US$ 19
billion from the Republic of Korea and US$ 11 billion
from Taiwan province of China. Firms originating in
the five countries of ASEAN (Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) were responsible
for US$ 28 billion and equivalent to 13% of the total
exported by China. The export orientation of the
United States or European firms seems quite small
compared to that of their Asian competitors. 
At the same time, the presence of Asian firms is
decisive for China's import orientation. Firms from the
10 selected Asian countries imported US$ 248 billion
in 2005, accounting for 64% of China's total imports
(see table II.6). Firms from the United States and
European representing just 7% and 9% respectively.
The predominant firms in China's imports are
Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, Malaysian,
Singaporean, Philippine and Thai. These firms import
large volumes of components and inputs from their
parent companies in their countries of origin, thereby
reaffirming the importance of the high level of intra–
industry trade as mentioned above. 
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Table II.6
CHINESE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY FOREIGN–OWNED FIRMS, 2005
(US$ million and percentages)
Exports Imports
Amount Percentage share Amount Percentage share
10 selected Asian countries 205.3 46.2 248.0 64.0
Hong Kong SAR 90.5 20.4 7.4 1.9
Japan 55.9 12.6 73.2 18.9
Republic of Korea 19.4 4.4 58.7 15.2
Singapore 11.3 2.5 11.4 2.9
Taiwan province of China 10.9 2.5 58.7 15.1
Malaysia 6.9 1.6 14.7 3.8
Thailand 3.9 0.9 9.1 2.3
Indonesia 3.2 0.7 3.7 1.0
Philippines 2.9 0.6 11.0 2.9
Macao SAR 8.7 0.2 0.1 0.0
European Union 78.8 17.7 36.4 9.4
United States 109.2 24.6 25.9 6.7
Other 51.0 11.5 77.2 20.0
Total 444.2 100.0 387.5 100.0
Source:Ministry of Commerce of China (n/d), Invest in China [online] http://www.fdi.gov.
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(c) The case of the Republic of Korea 
Among destinations for outward FDI from the
Republic of Korea, China occupies a predominant
place both in terms of the number of projects and in
terms of the volume of investments carried out. Official
data for the country show that by late 2006 China had
absorbed roughly 16,000 projects (48% of the total),
and that investment undertaken amounted to US$ 17
billion, 24% of the global amount invested (see table
II.7). Given the problems with statistical data on
Korean firms operating in China, these figures are
thought to underestimate the large scale of operations
undertaken by Korean firms in its neighbouring
country (Okuda, 2006). The fact that the amount of
Korean investment in China per firm is relatively small
is a good indicator of the large share of Korean SMEs
as investors in China. 
In the 1990s, the main motivation for large Korean
firms was to take advantage of the large size of the
Chinese market and save on labour costs, which were
beginning to rise in the Republic of Korea. In the
current decade, SMEs are accompanying large firms in
seeking to exploit the potential offered by the Chinese
market. The manufacturing sector is the largest
recipient of Korean FDI, followed by construction.
Given the current idle capacity in Korean industry, the
suspicion is that the boom in FDI to China may be
generating an industrial vacuum in the origin country,
as is happening in Japan.
Korean and Japanese firms in China display quite
similar sales patterns. Surveys show (Okuda, 2006)
that Korean firms are increasingly supplying themselves
from local Chinese markets where almost half of the
inputs they need are available. As the supply sources
present in the country include foreign firms of various
origins, China is increasingly in a position to offer
large machine assembly operators a wide variety of
cheap but high–quality inputs. 
Sales by Korean and Japanese firms in China have
also grown considerably, and in 2003 56.3% of their
products were sold within the country (Okuda, 2006).
In contrast, re–exports to the country of origin and
those destined for third countries have both decreased.
Japanese firms are more export–oriented then their
counterparts in China.
Table II.7
STOCK OF OUTWARD FDI FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1980–2006
(US$ and percentages)
Country/grouping Number of Share of total Value of FDI Share of
projects (percentage) undertaken total
North America 7 408 22.2 17 879 857 25.7
Europe 1 257 3.8 10 270 051 14.8
Asia 22 769 68.3 32 562 025 46.9
China 15 909 47.7 16 980 814 24.4
India 245 0.7 1 010 566 1.5
Japan 1 097 3.3 1 437 438 2.1
ASEAN (10) 3 920 110.8 8 506 784 12.2
Philippines 827 2.5 816.403 1.2
Indonesia 859 2.6 2 392 445 3.4
Malaysia 360 1.1 578.564 0.8
Singapore 237 0.7 1 467 553 2.1
Thailand 422 1.3 815.184 1.2
Viet Nam 1 023 3.1 2 176 377 3.1
Taiwan province of China 159 0.5 255.175 0.4
Oceania 884 2.7 1 459 868 2.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 669 2.0 4 740 437 6.8
Africa 199 0.6 1 159 240 1.7
Middle East 160 0.5 1 390 316 2.0
Total 33 346 100.0 69 461 794 100.0
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Export–Import Bank of Korea [online] http://www.
koreaexim.go.kr.
(d) The case of ASEAN
Total trade among ASEAN members in 2005
—combined imports and exports of US$ 305 billion—
was almost double that of its most important trading
partners, the United States (US$ 154 billion) and Japan
(US$ 154 billion), who shared second place because
their total trade with ASEAN represents 12.6% of the
total. There is an asymmetry, however, because the
United States is actually the second destination market
for the exports of ASEAN countries, while the second
supply source for this grouping is Japan. The same
applies to the other trade partners, because while
ASEAN exports to the European Union make it its
third most important import market, China occupies
third place as a supplier to ASEAN countries. It is
also interesting to note the predominance and
concentration of trade flows from ASEAN among
the 10 leading trade partners, which account for over
82% of total trade. 
The fourth main FDI source for ASEAN (in flow
terms) are the other countries within the grouping,
which even approach Japanese flows. The cumulative
stock of FDI entering the grouping in 2001–2005 was
US$ 118 billion, of which 27% came from the
European Union, 14% from the United States, and
10% from Japan, the latter figure being surpassed
by the 11% of FDI obtained from the ASEAN region
itself. Apart from these countries, the Republic of
Korea, Taiwan province of China, and China,
represented 3.6%, 1.4%, and 1.3%, in that order, of the
total amount invested during the period. It should be
noted that the Cayman Islands (6.2%), Bermuda
(2.7%) and other unidentified countries of Central
America and America South America (2.9%) appear
among the 10 leading foreign investors in ASEAN. In
addition, Australia and India recorded an appreciable
volume of FDI during this period, with amounts of
US$ 972 million and US$ 642 million respectively. As
was seen in the case of China, FDI obtained both from
its neighbours (among ASEAN members) and from
Japan, China and the Republic of Korea is a major
source of financing for business projects (see the
ASEAN website). About a quarter of the Association's
FDI comes from within ASEAN+3. 
Singapore and Malaysia are the leading countries
in terms of FDI flows among ASEAN members,
followed some way behind by Indonesia and Thailand.
The first two of these countries account for about 50%
of the total investment among ASEAN members in
the period 1990–2003. By sector, communications
equipment (23%), food and beverages (18%), and
paper and paper products have been the main FDI
targets among ASEAN members (Hiratsuka, 2006b).
These are also sectors in which Latin American and
Caribbean have some potential for investment in the
ASEAN market: e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
and the Central American countries in the food and
beverages sector; while Mexico and Costa Rica could
forge trade and investment links in the electronics
sectors; and Chile, Argentina and Brazil could do the
same in the paper and pulp sector.
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3. China as an Asian export platform
As mentioned above, a major feature of intra–
Asian trade dynamism as one of the hubs of the world
economy is China's dramatic appearance as a key
player, around which a major trade reorganization is
unfolding in Asia. As indicated in table II.8, for many
neighbouring countries in Asia, China is becoming a
staging post for exports to the United States and
European markets.
For example, the countries of ASEAN+2, excluding
China, on average supplied 39% of China's imports in
2003 and 2005. When two–way transactions between
Guangdong Province and Hong Kong SAR for
processing subject to tax incentives, are added, in the
percentage rises to 46% since the Chinese authorities
count them as Chinese imports. China's trade with
these countries (Republic of Korea, Japan and
ASEAN) is in deficit, because they are its main
suppliers of capital goods and intermediate inputs for
its manufacturing production. This is subsequently
exported to other trade partners, particularly the United
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States and European Union, with which it invariably
has the largest trade surpluses in both low– and
high–technology manufactures. China has a deficit in
medium–technology products. The ASEAN countries
have a major influence as suppliers and compete
shoulder to shoulder with other hubs such as Japan, the
Republic of Korea and Taiwan province of China.6
6 China has a trade deficit with Latin American and the Caribbean, since it imports large quantities of commodities and natural–resource–
based manufactures.
Table II.8
CHINA: FOREIGN TRADE MATRIX AND DEFICIT/SURPLUS BREAKDOWN, ACCORDING TO THE TECHNOLOGY–INTENSITY
OF TRADE, AVERAGE FOR THE PERIOD 2003–2005
(US$ million, at current prices)
Breakdown of the trade balance by technology–intensity
Exports Imports Balance Products Manufactures Other
Totals Totals Trade Primary
Natural Low Medium High
resource– technology technology technology
based
ASEAN+ 3 143 037 251 755 -108 718 3 980 -8 895 16 992 -42 881 -77 571 -343
ASEAN 43 064 61 763 -18 699 -4 672 -3 772 5 811 1 104 -17 172 2
Chinaa - 39 637 -39 637 -14 -1 628 -3 984 -7 077 -26 870 -65
Japan 72 301 89 628 -17 326 5 131 529 15 167 -25 000 -13 047 -107
Republic of Korea 27 671 60 728 -33 056 3 535 -4 025 -3 -11 909 -20 482 -172
United States 126 985 42 478 84 507 -4 888 420 46 645 13 556 28 711 63
Canada 8 482 6 413 2 069 -1 448 -978 3 644 139 716 -4
European Union
(27 countries) 111 103 66 475 44 628 1 408 56 29 592 -10 683 24 257 -2
Latin America and the
Caribbean (33 countries) 17 596 21 061 -3 465 -11 046 -2 805 5 251 3 375 1 756 4
India 6 071 7 232 -1 161 -4 014 601 291 340 1 618 2
Australia + New Zealand 9 799 12 936 -3 137 -9 123 -2 417 3 949 1 264 1 958 -116
Others 174 762 136 298 38 464 -572 -381 476 116 184 0
World 597 836 544 647 53 188 -32 121 -2 037 43 291 6 555 22 191 586
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database
(COMTRADE).
a Refers to two–way transactions between Guangdong Province and Hong Kong SAR. 
De facto economic and trade integration, which has
moved forward without support from intergovernmental
accords, could be encouraged yet more by the negotiation
of various trade agreements. Such instruments would
constitute a significant additional incentive for increased
integration in a number of industrial sectors such
as machinery, the auto industry, electronics and
pharmaceuticals. The process would also derive
tangible benefits from improved progress in the area of
financial and monetary cooperation.
The countries of East and South–East Asia should
continue their efforts to negotiate trade agreements and
should implement the existing accords. That is not
helped by the presence of tariff and non–tariff barriers
D. Conclusions
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and the “noodle bowl” phenomenon because they
increase transaction costs within and outside Asia
(see chapter V). The complex negotiations for such
agreements should include discussion of matters
such as sanitary and phytosanitary certification,
harmonization and simplification of rules of origin,
and better enforcement of intellectual property and
customs procedures.
Efforts must be made to ensure that the regional
process of de facto productive integration in Asia
extends to Latin America and the Caribbean, as is
increasingly being seen in some of the region’s
productive sectors. With increased intra–industrial
trade between the two regions, Latin America and the
Caribbean would open up new routes into the Asian
markets; at the same time, the incorporation of new
technologies would be promoted and workers’ skills
and business management techniques would be
improved, thanks to productive activities and the
appropriate technical assistance.
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Business services play a strategic role in the overall
arena of services. They are becoming increasingly
knowledge–intensive (for example, advisory services,
services related to information technology, engineering
services and research and development services),
The growing importance of services in the economy, employment and trade is a trend
common to both advanced and developing countries. Services are essential inputs for
many activities, and play a crucial role in increasing economic growth and productivity
by improving financial intermediation, infrastructure, the use of information and
communication technologies (ICT), education, health and the State apparatus. They
currently represent approximately two thirds of the gross domestic product (GDP) of rich
countries, and close to half that of developing countries, even though a clear difference
exists between the types of services prevailing in each group. In terms of employment,
the services sector accounts for 70% of workers in developed countries, but only one
third of workers in emerging economies. Latin America and the Caribbean are positioned
between the two groups. Cross–border trade in services has tripled since 1990, while foreign
direct investment has quadrupled. Emerging economies have expanded their service exports
at a rate exceeding that of developed countries (UNCTAD, 2004, 2005).
and have become strategic inputs that increase the
productivity and competitiveness of businesses.
Moreover, thanks to advances in ICT, firms can now
outsource many services to suppliers offering the
best price–quality ratio, anywhere in the world. This
Trade in services in Latin America
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process has played a key role in the explosive growth
of trade in services provided to businesses, as well as
the internationalization of such trade. Developing
countries such as India and China, as well as certain
nuclei in Latin America, have shown a strong capacity
to attract a considerable share of this dynamic component
of global trade.
This chapter will compare the trends of trade
in services (save for transportation and travel) in
Latin America and the Caribbean, China, Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of China, India and the
countries that comprise the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). It will also assess the
main determining factors of such trade, and propose
measures to improve international insertion in this
sector. To that end, the dynamics of service exports
over the last decade will be examined. The relative
diversification of service exports will also be analysed
and compared to the pattern of concentration found in
more traditional services (transportation and tourism).
The varying performance of the countries of the region
in this field will then be examined —particularly
with regard to the factors that have influenced trends
in service exports, the progress made by regional and
bilateral trade and investment agreements and the
differing levels of regulation to which the sector has
been subjected. Finally, policies will be proposed
to improve the region’s performance in terms of
service exports.
These questions will be addressed in four sections.
The first section deals with the strategic role of
services, and sets forth the main trends in global trade.
The second section compares the performance of the
region in terms of trade in services with that of a group
of Asian countries, both at a global level and in the
main markets of the United States and the European
Union. It also discusses the success of certain Latin
American transnationals in this sector. The third
section analyses certain factors that play a determining
role in export performance, taking into account issues
such as regulation, human capital and the progress
achieved by countries in the field of information
and communication technologies. The fourth section
analyses policies that may improve the region’s
competitiveness in this regard by harmonizing
regulatory frameworks among countries. This would
be accomplished by establishing trade agreements,
improving workforce quality and increasing the
adoption of cutting–edge technologies.
This chapter covers all market services, with the
exception of transportation and travel.1 The annex at
the end of this paper contains a list of sectors based
on balance of payments and World Trade Organisation
(WTO) classifications. This chapter will address
not only auditing, computer, engineering and legal
services provided to companies, but also construction,
financial, insurance and communication services.
Transportation and travel have been excluded for
a variety of reasons.2 The term “services” will
hereinafter be understood to apply to all services,
except for transportation and travel.
1 The following two minor categories were also excluded: (i) personal, cultural and recreational services; (ii) government services.
2 Firstly, travel and transportation services are usually provided directly to consumers, whereas other services are sold mainly to businesses.
Since some of the determining factors of services provided to consumers differ from those offered to companies, a decision was made to focus
on a single category. Secondly, while the literature on transportation and travel services is relatively abundant, trade in other services, which
has become increasingly relevant in recent years, has not been extensively studied —particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean— and
deserves closer attention.
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One common feature of most services is interaction
between suppliers and businesses, with the general
objective of increasing the productivity and
competitiveness of the latter. This is true of knowledge–
intensive services —advisory, auditing, computer,
engineering, and research and development services,
among others— as well as those which make intensive
use of unskilled labour, such as cleaning and security.
As production inputs, services are key to increasing
competitiveness and productivity in an increasingly
globalized world.
The services sector has displayed one of the highest
growth levels of any sector in advanced economies and
trade, primarily as a result of two phenomena (Kox and
Rubalcaba, 2007)3. The first is the imperative to lower
costs by delegating auxiliary tasks to third parties.
By outsourcing such activities to service providers,
companies can focus their resources on their core
business. An increased supply of services also enables
companies to achieve a greater degree of specialisation.
This, in turn, reflects a “simple” shift whereby services
move from one sector to another without undergoing
any change in their nature. The second phenomenon
is the ability of service providers to sell services that
are different —superior in quality or more specialised—
from those which the purchasing companies produced
for themselves. This includes new services. Consequently,
outsourcing grants companies access to inputs of
greater quality than those they could have produced on
their own. Services thus acquire a strategic role, as
they lead to the development of other sectors, both
industrial and tertiary, and attract foreign investment.
Several studies of the European Union suggest that
the second phenomenon is more relevant than the
first in terms of explaining the massive expansion of
this sector.
Another productive feature of services —particu-
larly knowledge–intensive ones— is the key role they
play in innovation in other sectors and national
innovation systems (Kox, 2002; Miroudot, 2006). This
occurs through three channels. Firstly, information–
technology and engineering firms tend to develop
technological innovations. Secondly, service companies
offer their clients managerial or entrepreneurial
innovations that may not be strictly technological
in nature. Finally, the interaction between companies
that have received innovative techniques helps
disseminate best practices.
The internationalization of services is gaining
importance as a result of trends supply and demand.
From a demand perspective, a growing number of
businesses are outsourcing or procuring their services
abroad, attracted by competitive advantages. This
practice, coupled with the transferral of certain internal
company services overseas, is known as “off–shoring”
(or “nearshoring”, when services are transferred to a
nearby country). Companies require such services to
improve the quality of their products and processes,
sell their products abroad and coordinate the activities
(inventories) of their branches in different countries,
among other reasons. This trend, which is a basic
feature of the globalisation of economies, has its
origins in advances in information and communication
technologies, strong competitive pressures to reduce
costs and improve productivity and increased
liberalisation of trade in the aforementioned services.
Technological advances have reduced transportation
costs, as well as the cost of disseminating information
and ideas, leading businesses to transform their
processes and production structures. ICT has made it
possible to digitalize many aspects of production,
and has simplified the provision of services over long
3 Such services account for half the growth of employment in the European Union since 1995.
A. The strategic role of services
1. Theoretical arguments 
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distances. Services have thus become increasingly
tradable, and the feasibility of outsourcing them or
procuring them overseas has grown immensely. During
the late 1980s and early 1990s, services shifted toward
the client (particularly back office operations); in later
years, however, they expanded to include professional
services, software development, financial services
and other activities that make intensive use of human
capital (Mashayekhi, 2005). Off–shoring introduced a
new form of entrepreneurial organization known as
“extended organization”, in which the parent company
maintains strict control of services transferred
abroad. Free trade agreements have also made it
possible to exchange information in real time
(Aron and Singh, 2005). 
Another phenomenon which has become more
relevant over the last few years is insourcing, which
involves the participation of sub–contractors into their
client companies. It differs from outsourcing in that
the sub–contractor intervenes in the operations of the
client company to redesign its productive and logistical
processes. United Parcel Service (UPS), one of the
world’s leading companies in this field, has developed
systems for the management of the entire supply chain
of many of its client companies (Friedman, 2005).
While the global trade in “other services” (total
services minus transportation and travel) is growing
faster than trade in goods, it is difficult to accurately
measure its volume, given the lack of complete
statistics in most countries. The only data available are
estimates of cross–border trade based on the balance
of payments. Such trade involves services that cross
national borders while their providers and consumers
do not. International phone calls and telemedicine
are examples of this phenomenon. It is often the case,
however, that no record is kept of operations in which
a provider or client travels to provide or receive a
service. In other words, many services require the
physical presence of both parties, one of whom
must necessarily cross a border (see box III.1 and
figure A.1).
Available data show that, as a result of the above,
global cross–border trade in “other services” has
expanded at a faster rate than that of other goods and
services over the past two decades (see figure III.2).
Its share of the global trade in goods and services has
increased by three percentage points, reaching 9.0%
in 2006. Between 1985 and 1995, exports of such
services on the part of developing countries grew
faster than those of advanced countries, although this
trend was surprisingly reversed during the following
Services have also become internationalized
from a supply standpoint. In other words, the
companies offering them are operating in more
and more locations around the world. Product
differentiation based on point of sale and customer–
oriented services are key success factors in the
successful globalisation of services. This is made
possible by the exchange of personal knowledge, or
through information and communication technologies.
Internationalisation can be achieved by means of 3
models (Toivonen, 2004): (i) the “evolutionary
model”, in which companies begin by increasing
their local market share, and then export their services,
often by following their national clients overseas; (ii)
the “born global model”, in which companies offer
products to clients in different countries from the
very outset, relying on intensive use of ICT; and
(iii) the “think globally, act locally” model, in which
companies operate mainly in the local market but
provide services to branches of foreign clients or
national firms that are active in many countries.
Companies in this category are often part of
international networks made up of similar firms in
other countries.
2. Trends
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decade. Developing countries lost two percentage
points of their share in global trade between 1995
and 2005.
The structure of the global trade in services
changed considerably between 1995 and 2005, shifting
toward computer and information–technology
services, as well as financial services (see figure III.2).
Available data on the seven main categories show
that “other services” represent half of worldwide trade
in those services. In the “other services” category,
services related to commerce (buying and selling),
legal services and research and development deserve
special attention.4
4 It has only been in recent years that breakdowns of the category of “other services” in most of the advanced countries have been published;
such services represent two thirds of the combined exports of OECD countries.
The main difference between services
and goods lies in the immediacy of
the relationship between supplier
and consumer. Many services are
“non–transportable”, and cannot be
exported like goods; the consumer
must go to the supplier, or the supplier
must go to the consumer. To reflect
this type of trade, the Manual on
Statistics of International Trade in
Services extends the definition of
international trade in services to include
the value of services provided through
foreign affiliates established abroad.a
Services are also provided by individuals
located abroad, either as service
suppliers themselves or employed by
service suppliers. While a large part
of this type of trade in services is
covered by the balance of payments,
the remainder requires additional
information, as it would include tran-
sactions among residents. The Manual
describes four modes through which
services may be supplied:
Mode 1, or cross–border supply,
takes place when both the consumer
and the provider of a service remain
in their respective countries, while the
service crosses the border. The delivery
of the service can be effected by
telephone, fax, Internet, mail or courier,
among other means. It is similar to
the traditional notion of trade in goods.
Freight transport services, correspon-
dence courses and telediagnosis
are examples of this type of trade
in services.
Mode 2, or consumption abroad,
takes place when a consumer moves
outside his or her home territory and
consumes services in another country.
Overseas tourism is one example of
this phenomenon.
Mode 3, or commercial presence,
entails close contact with the consu-
mer in his or her home territory in
the various stages of production and
delivery, as well as after delivery.
Medical services provided by a
foreign–owned hospital, courses in a
foreign–owned school and services
provided by a domestic branch or
subsidiary of a foreign bank are
examples of supplies through com-
mercial presence.
Mode 4, or presence of natural
persons, occurs when an individual
has moved into the territory of the
consumer to provide a service, whether
on his or her own behalf or on behalf
of his or her employer. This type of
supply applies to two areas: trade in
services in the Balance of Payments
Manual sense (e.g., financial auditing
services by an auditor sent by a foreign
firm or provision of entertainment
services by a professional who is
temporarily in the host country), and
employment, meaning physical pre-
sence of persons in the receiving
country on a “non–permanent” basis.
Short–term employment of foreign
doctors or teachers, intra–corporate
staff transfers, the presence of foreign
staff in foreign affiliates or the employ-
ment of construction workers or paid
domestic helpers are some examples.
This chapter employs data recorded
in the balance of payments, and
adheres to the extended definition of
services. The main service categories
are as follows: transportation, travel,
communication services, construction
services, insurance services, financial
services, computer and information
services, royalties and license fees,
other business services, personal,
cultural and recreational services and
government services. During recent
years, the countries of the region
have improved the breakdown of their
service trade in accordance with
the fifth edition of the Balance of
Payments Manual. These data cover
trade in modes 1 and 2, and partially
cover trade arising from the temporary
movement of persons (mode 4).
More efforts are needed, however,
to collect data on trade in services
through commercial presence. Other
sources cited in this paper include
national data and data obtained from
the World Trade Organization and
the Organisation for Economic Co–
operation and Development (OECD).
These sources help shed light on
certain issues involving the trading
partners of industrialized economies
in the international service trade. This
makes it possible to assess the
participation of Latin America and
the Caribbean in the trade of those
economies. The Investment Map data-
base of the International Trade Centre
was also used, as were other sources
related to foreign direct investment,
in order to study international trade
in services from the standpoint of
commercial presence.
Box III.1
SOURCES OF DATA ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a This extended definition of international trade in services conforms with the 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA), as well as the fifth edition of the Balance
of Payments Manual published by the International Monetary Fund. Its conceptual and methodological aspects are explained in United Nations (2002).
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Service exports from developing countries represent
23% of trade in that sector. Three fourths of this
percentage are attributable to a small group of 15
countries. Developing countries in Asia have achieved
a considerable increase in their share of world
trade, from 9% in 1995 to around 17% in 2005.
Latin America and the Caribbean export only 1.8% of
services worldwide.
Figure III.1
GLOBAL EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES, 1985–2006
Source:World Bank, World Development Indicators and International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP) database” [online] http://www.
imfstatistics.org/bop/.
Note: “Other services” refers to total services less transportation and travel.
Figure III.2
STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL TRADE IN SERVICES, 1995–2005
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP) database” [online] http://www.imfstatistics.org/bop/; Organisation for Economic
Co–operation and Development (OECD), OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services, Detailed Tables by Service Category.
Note: Transportation, travel, personal and government services have been excluded.
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The growth rate of service exports from Latin America
and the Caribbean between 1985 and 2005 was lower
than that of Asia and the world as a whole. Over the
course of those two decades, service exports multiplied
by 4.5 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 6.2
worldwide, 8 in ASEAN countries and the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, 14
in India and 24 in China. Consequently, the Latin
American and Caribbean share of the world service
trade fell as that of Asia rose. The growth rate of
the “other services” category surpassed that of
transportation and travel in those two regions and the
world. Different growth rates led to a profound change
in the share of trade captured by those three categories.
Transactions in the “other services” category, which
are the focus of this chapter, increased considerably
throughout the world. While the volume of this type of
services also increased in Latin America and the Caribbean,
particularly between 1985 and 1995, it continued to lag
far behind Asia and the world as a whole.
The lower dynamism of Latin America between
1985 and 2005 conceals a great deal of intraregional
diversity (Camino, 2003 and 2005; Ventura–Días and
others, 2003). Guatemala, Chile and Costa Rica displayed
the highest growth rates for services in general, while
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia and
Ecuador posted the lowest rates in this category. The
greatest expansion in transportation services took
place in Panama and Chile. The latter became the chief
exporter of such services in the region. The strongest
growth in tourism services was recorded in Guatemala,
Brazil and Cuba, with annual rates exceeding 20%.
Finally, Brazil, Argentina and Costa Rica posted the
highest growth rates in the “other services” category.
This category captured its largest share of overall
exports in 2005 in Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina
(see table III.1). 
This intraregional diversity led to significants
shifts in the shares of each country and subregion in the
service trade between 1985 and 2005. While Mexico
remains the region’s largest exporter, its share dropped
by seven percentage points during the period in
question (see figure III.3). The Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) and the Andean Community also lost
ground. Conversely, service exports from “other
countries” (particularly Chile) and Brazil increased
considerably. The good performance of Brazil can
be attributed mainly to its buoyancy in the “other
services” sub–category, where its share rose from 15%
to 38%. The Andean Community and Mexico were
the biggest losers in this regard. The latter maintained
its position only thanks to the good performance of its
tourism services sector. 
B. Export trends: a comparison between
Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia
1. Export growth
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Table III.1
SERVICE EXPORTS, 1985–2005: LEVELS, COMPOSITION AND ANNUAL GROWTH RATES
1985 2005 Average annual growth rate
Millions Composition Millions Composition
of (percentages) of (percentages)




Total 16 514 33 49 19 74 152 22 52 26 7 5 8 9
Andean 
Community 2 594 39 37 24 6 834 29 52 19 5 3 7 4
Bolivia 87 42 36 22 437 30 49 21 8 7 10 8
Colombia 863 43 25 31 2 388 31 48 22 5 3 9 3
Ecuador 321 39 42 18 940 36 50 14 6 5 6 4
Peru 615 37 32 31 1 926 22 60 18 6 3 9 3
Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of) 709 34 55 11 1 144 32 50 17 2 2 2 5
Central American 
Common Market 613 27 33 40 5 512 15 64 21 12 8 15 8
Costa Rica 257 21 47 31 2 393 11 65 24 12 8 14 10
El Salvador 175 29 21 50 1 070 33 46 21 9 10 14 5
Guatemala 56 14 22 64 1 100 8 74 18 16 13 23 9
Honduras 88 48 27 24 687 11 66 24 11 3 16 11
Nicaragua 37 26 28 46 261 12 77 12 10 6 16 3
MERCOSUR 3 988 59 22 20 20 708 22 32 46 9 3 11 13
Argentina 1 524 56 32 12 5 626 22 44 34 7 2 9 12
Brazil 1 928 73 3 24 13 258 21 27 52 10 4 22 14
Paraguay 177 3 57 40 607 15 12 73 6 16 -2 10
Uruguay 360 21 62 17 1 217 34 45 22 6 9 5 8
Mexico 4 456 13 70 17 15 035 10 75 14 6 5 7 6
CARICOM 2 727 13 76 10 8 748 12 69 19 6 5 5 9
Other countries 2 137 44 36 22 17 315 42 40 17 9 9 10 8
Chile 638 42 18 40 6 528 58 18 24 12 14 12 9
Cuba 4 245 45 20
Panama 960 67 21 13 2 905 57 25 19 6 5 7 8
Dominican
Republic 538 6 76 18 3 637 3 92 5 10 7 11 4
Asia (selected
countries)
China 2 854 45 33 22 67 983 20 40 39 17 13 18 21
Hong Kong
SAR (China) 7 420 42 25 33 58 638 31 16 52 11 9 9 13
India 3 201 16 26 59 45 803 11 13 76 14 12 10 16
ASEAN 11 427 23 39 38 92 081 32 34 42 11 13 10 12
World 400 33 30 37 2 420 23 28 48 10 8 9 11
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP) database” [online] http://www.imfstatistics.org/bop/.
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The rest of this chapter will focus exclusively on the
“other services” category, also referred to simply as
“services”. This category includes all services except
for transportation and travel. Growth of service exports
in Latin America and the Caribbean has lagged behind
the world average, with the region’s share of this
sector dropping from 2.4% to 1.8% between 1995 and
2005. The picture in Asia is mixed; while the ASEAN
countries and the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR) of China suffered a drop in their share,
the buoyancy of China and India led to an increase (see
figure III.4). These overall results conceal a great deal
of diversity among subsectors. While the share of
Latin America and the Caribbean in the communication
and insurance markets fell sharply, it remained above
that of Asia. The only category where growth occurred
was “other business services” (see annex). India
warrants special attention, as its share of the global
computer services market reached 14% in 2005.
This goes a long way toward explaining its superior
overall position in the “other services” trade. The
countries of ASEAN lost overall market share,
although their share of the communications and
construction sectors improved. 
Figure III.3
LATIN AMERICAN SERVICE EXPORTS BY COUNTRY OR SUBREGION,
1985–2005
(Percentages)
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP) database” [online] http://www.imfstatistics.org/bop/.
Note: “Other countries” refers to Chile, Panama and the Dominican Republic; “other services” refers to all services except for transportation and travel.
2. Participation in the global trade in
“other services” 
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Figure III.4
PARTICIPATION OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND THEIR ASIAN COMPETITORS IN THE GLOBAL
TRADE IN “OTHER SERVICES”, 1995–2005
(Percentages)
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP) database” [online] http://www.imfstatistics.org/bop/.
Note: Percentages in parenthesis refer to each category’s share in total “other services” trade as of 2005. “Other services” are all services except transport
and travel. 
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Latin America and the Caribbean succeeded in
maintaining their modest share of the global computer
services market, which was the category that experienced
the highest amount of growth over the past decade
(see box III.2). The relatively large volume of exports
generated by Brazil, Argentina and Mexico should
also be noted. When commercial performance is
analysed as a percentage of overall sales, however, the
leader is Uruguay, followed by Argentina.
The software–related service trade is
an important component of computer
and information services, and consti-
tutes one of the most dynamic service
categories. While its growth in the
region has been low compared to that
of India, Latin America and the
Caribbean saw their share of world
software sales increase from 1.9% to
2.7% between 2001 and 2005. Sales
may reach 5% in a few short years.
While Uruguay, Chile and Brazil are
the largest producers of such services
in relative terms (as a percentage of
GDP), Uruguay and Argentina have
produced the largest share of exports
in terms of sales (see table). This is
undoubtedly attributable to the fact
that these two countries, together with
Costa Rica, also lead the region in
terms of human capital.
Over half the region’s sales and
exports proceed from the Latin
American subsidiaries of only nine
extraregional transnationals. These
companies can be divided into three
categories, depending on the type of
strategy they employ. The first group
of companies supplies services
—particularly outsourcing— to other
multinationals active in the region. The
main firms in this category are EDS
and Accenture, of the United States,
and Tata Consultancy Services, of
India. The second group is made up
of equipment, software and service
providers engaged in activities such
as business process outsourcing (IBM,
Unisys and HP). This is undoubtedly
the most important group in the region
in terms of sales and employment.
The third group is involved in the pro-
vision of licenses, including enterprise
resource planning licenses (Microsoft,
Oracle and SAP). 
It should be noted that, over the
past few years, several computer
manufacturers in the region have
successfully morphed into software–
related service providers. IBM in
Argentina is one example of this
phenomenon. In 2001, at a cost of
50 million dollars, the company
transformed a printer factory into the
best–equipped “technology campus”
in Latin America. This transformation
made IBM in Argentina a leading
high–value–service supply centre,
capable of competing on equal terms
with centres in Brazil, China and India.
Since 2002, the company has hired
over 500 professionals per year for
a variety of services. It currently
employs 5,300 workers, and continues
to expand.
Box III.2
LATIN AMERICAN SOFTWARE–RELATED SERVICE EXPORTS 
SOFTWARE–RELATED SERVICE SALES AND EXPORTS, 2004
Source:P. Bastos Tigre and F. Silveira Marques, “A indústria de software e serviços na América Latina: uma visão de conjunto,” document prepared for the
Project @LIS, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2007, unpublished; and G. Anlló, G. Lugones and
F. Peirano, “La innovación en la Argentina post–devaluación, antecedentes previos y tendencias a futuro”, Buenos Aires, ECLAC office in Buenos Aires,
2007, unpublished.
Sales Exports Sales/GDP Exports/Sales
(millions of dollars) (millions of dollars)
Argentina 1 173 192 0.77 16.3
Brazil 8 213 314 1.36 3.8
Chile 1 385 69 1.46 5.0
Colombia 340 a 10 b 0.35 3.0
Ecuador 90 11 0.28 11.9
Mexico 2 871 125 0.42 4.4
Uruguay 226 89 1.70 39.3
Total 14 298 809 0.85 5.7
Source:P. Bastos Tigre and F. Silveira Marques, “A indústria de software e serviços na América Latina: uma visão de conjunto”, Santiago, Chile, 2007, unpublished.
a Does not include local service firms. Estimate based on the sales of 561 companies: 542 local software manufacturers (sales of 150 million dollars) and 19
transnationals (sales of 190 million dollars).
b Exports from 542 local software manufacturers.
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Service imports in Latin America and the
Caribbean grew at a higher rate than exports between
1995 and 2005, leading to an increased deficit in the
balance of services. While a similar trend has been
observed in ASEAN countries, the opposite is true in
the other three Asian countries (see figure III.5).
countries studied was 3% in 2005; significant differences
exist, however, both between sub–categories and in
terms of trends (BEA, 2007).5 While Latin America
and the Caribbean enjoy a strong position with regard
to communication, construction and, to a lesser degree,
financial services, the participation of Asian countries
in computer services is relatively high (see figure
III.6). Mexico is by far the largest Latin American
exporter, followed by Brazil and the Caribbean. 
Another way to compare trends in exports in the two
regions is to analyse their share of service imports to
the United States and the European Union. These
two markets represent almost 60% of world services
imports, and more detailed statistics, broken down
by category and trading partner, are available for
their study.
In the case of the United States, the share of
services imported from the Latin American and Asian
Figure III.5
BALANCE OF TRADE IN “OTHER SERVICES”
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, 1995–2005
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Balance of Payments Statistics
(BOP) database” [online] http://www.imfstatistics.org/bop/.
Note: “Other services” are all services except transport and travel.
3. Share of imports to the United States and
the European Union 
5 The bilateral service trade data of the Bureau of Economic Analysis are incomplete, as they exclude trade flows between parent companies
headquartered in the United States and their branches abroad and between American subsidiaries and their foreign parent companies. 
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Between 1995 and 2005, exports from India and
China to the United States grew more rapidly than
exports from Latin America —with the exception of
the Caribbean— and the ASEAN countries. This is
surprising, given the proximity of Latin America to the
United States. The good performance of the Caribbean
is partly attributable to offshore financial centres.
During the period in question, imports to the United
States from India increased by a factor of 24, whereas
imports from Latin America and the Caribbean merely
doubled (Engman, 2006). As of 2005, Indian exports
were equivalent to over half of Latin American and
Caribbean exports. The share of the region —particularly
Mexico— in United States service imports has, in fact,
declined. When transportation and tourism are factored
in, however, the volume of Latin American exports is
still seven times larger than that of China and India
combined.
One World Bank study (Freund, 2006) shows that
India has effectively displaced the region in terms
of trade in four types of services: research and
development, legal services, industrial engineering and
other services. The same cannot be said, however, of
the other categories.6
The share of imports to the European Union
from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2005 was
much lower than that of the sub–group of Asian
countries. The only categories in which this percentage
exceeded 1% were construction and communication
services, while the share of the Asian countries studied
surpassed that figure in almost every instance. It
should be noted that the respective shares of China
and India were larger than those of ASEAN countries.
The European Union lacks detailed bilateral time–
series data with which to study possible changes in the
performance of both regions.
Source:Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States and Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT).
Note: “Other services” are all services except transport and travel.
Figure III.6
PARTICIPATION OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND EAST ASIA IN SERVICE IMPORTS
TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, 2005
6 Another interesting finding of this study was that database and other information service exports from the United States are shifting from the
region to India. This may be a cause for concern, given the intensity of intrasectoral trade in this category. The Indian computer industry
requires inputs from the United States (Freund, 2006).
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The regional average conceals a great deal of diversity
in terms of the position and trends of subregions
and countries. While average service exports as a
percentage of GDP amount to only 1%, their relative
importance is much greater for the Caribbean, whereas
Mexico saw them drop to 0.3% in 2005 (see figure
III.7). The dynamism of Brazil and the rest of the
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) deserves
special attention. The balance of trade in services is
negative in almost every country except for Central
America, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and the
Caribbean.7 A larger deficit does not necessarily imply
weakness, however; it may suggest an increased use
of external services as a means of improving the
competitiveness of the rest of the economy, particularly
with regard to the export of goods. 
Two other indicators also display a significant
degree of diversity. Firstly, the diversification of
exports within the overall context of services plays an
important role in evaluating the efforts of countries to
penetrate other niches that hold promise in terms of
learning, productivity and reducing exposure to crises
in specific markets. The progress achieved by Argentina,
Uruguay and the Caribbean in this regard deserves
special notice. Secondly, intrasectoral trade reflects the
degree to which a country participates in international
networks that encourage the differentiation of services,
increase productivity and generate economies of scale
with regard to production. The greatest achievers in
this area are Brazil and the rest of MERCOSUR, which
possess the highest percentage of intrasectoral trade.
While there appears to be a marked correlation
between the two variables —the most diversified
countries are also those which have increased their
intrasectoral trade, or vice–versa— the exact causes of
this phenomenon are unknown. The performance of
Argentina, Brazil, the Caribbean, Costa Rica and
Uruguay should be noted in this regard. Certain




TRADE IN “OTHER SERVICES” BY SUBREGION AND COUNTRY OF LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1995 AND 2005
7 Significant contrasts exist between the islands of the Caribbean. Barbados, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, and Trinidad and
Tobago posted surpluses in 2005, while Suriname, Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica and the Bahamas posted deficits. 
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(a) The Caribbean (English–speaking and
Dutch–speaking)
The economies with the highest relative volume of
service exports in the region are those of the Caribbean
(English–speaking and Dutch–speaking). On average,
services represented almost two thirds —and in some
cases almost 90%— of exports of goods and services
from Caribbean countries between 2000 and 2005.8
Tourism accounted for two thirds of service exports
—a ratio which has remained steady over the last few
decades. This category is followed by transportation,
with a share of between 11% and 17%.9 Business
services represent around 18% of service exports,
while financial and insurance services represented
only 2.5%. This last category is significantly
undervalued, given the exclusion of services provided
by offshore companies.10
Several economies have been able to achieve
and maintain relatively high income levels and good
standards of living by focusing on the export of
services. Success is neither automatic nor guaranteed,
however. On the contrary, it entails a long–term process
of continuous learning and feedback, in which service
exports generate growth, which in turn increases
productivity and the diversification of service exports.
This cycle of mutually reinforcing factors requires
concerted action in the public and private spheres, as
well as the constant renewal of competitive strategies.
While there is no direct evidence in this regard, it
is safe to say that offshore services have acquired an
important role in the Caribbean in recent years.
Offshoring involves the incorporation of companies on
the islands without any requirements as to physical
presence. The success of these services, which were
pioneered by the Bahamas, can be attributed to the
non–existent or very low corporate taxes to which
these companies are subject. Over the last few decades
—particularly in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New
York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001—
the industry has modernized its legal framework
and controls, in order to avoid abuse on the part of
criminals and terrorists. In addition to low taxes, the
main factor encouraging businesses to form offshore
Figure III.7 (concluded)
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Balance of Payments Statistics (BOP) database” [online] http://www.imfstatistics.org/bop/.
Note: “Other services” are all services except transport and travel.
8 Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago are exceptions, as their chief exports proceed from the energy, agricultural and mining sectors.
9 The World Travel and Tourism Council estimates that the direct and indirect contribution of tourism to the region in 2004 was equivalent to
15% of GDP and 16% of employment. In countries more focused on tourism, these percentages exceeded 80%.
10 The data contained in the Services section of the balance of payments is deficient with regard to the coverage of certain service areas. This
applies to services supplied by consultants who travel to deliver services, and is especially true of business and professional services, as well
as services delivered by offshore companies (CARICOM, 2004, p. 7).
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centres in the Caribbean is the confidence generated
by a modern, stable legal framework.11 This enables
companies exporting financial and insurance services
to achieve high levels of productivity and sophistication,
thanks to their enhanced efficiency and ability to assume
risks. In several countries, offshoring dovetails neatly with
tourism, as visitors can combine recreational activities
with the purchase of financial and insurance services.
It is impossible to gauge the true importance
of services exported by offshore companies, since
Caribbean countries do not include them in their
balances of payments. These balances include only
the fees companies pay governments to become
incorporated on the islands. A comparison of the
declared value of Caribbean exports with data on
imports brought into the United States from those
countries (given that the United States is their most
important trading partner) suggests that Caribbean
exports are undervalued by a factor of at least two.12
Bermuda, which according to The Economist
(2007) has the highest per capita income in the world,
ranks at the top of the market for insurance and
extraterritorial funds. Its exports seem to have been
underestimated at least by a factor of 10.13 The
Bahamas, which has the highest number of ships
registered and a well–established international services
sector, is specializing, among other things, in managing
the assets of the wealthiest people in the world. The
British Virgin Islands have the highest number of
registered offshore companies.
Offshore companies have become a significant
source of tax revenues and foreign exchange in
several countries and non–independent territories of
the Caribbean. However, the available information on
their contribution to the economy and to exports is still
scanty. According to a study dealing specifically with
the Bahamas, the offshore sector accounts for 15% of
GDP, 13% of jobs and 19% of tax revenues (Bahamas
Financial Services Board, 2006). In other countries,
including the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda and the
Cayman Islands, it is estimated that the sector accounts
for an even higher share of the economy.
(b) Brazil
The service sector is one of the fastest growing
categories in Brazilian exports. Exports of services
more than tripled between 1995 and 2005, while
exports of goods rose two and a half times. In 2006,
services other than transportation and travel accounted
for more than half of all services (including transportation
and travel), a high percentage for the region. The
subcategories that grew most in recent years were
professional services and execution of technical
projects. These activities are related to engineering and
architecture, which still rank at the top in exports of
services (one third of the total) and which constitute
one of the main comparative advantages of Brazil
(World Bank, 2004; Bom Angelo, 2004; Valls Pereira,
2002; Moreira, Alves and Kubota, 2006).
The success of services is partly a result of high
demand from exporters of manufactured goods and
commodities. Financial services support the marketing
firms, whose business is growing in leaps and bounds.
Different banks take different approaches: Banco do
Brasil (a State bank) serves medium–sized firms, while
the local branches of foreign banks (ABN–AMRO,
HSBC and Santander) carry out large, complex
transactions for multinational corporations. IT and
information services are also quite successful:
Brazilian (CPM, Datasul and Microsiga) and foreign
companies (EDS, IBM and TATA) follow similar
strategies in providing support for multinationals
within and outside Latin America. The main functions
they perform are: administrative control activities,
payroll management, help–desk services and call
centres. Although the growth of these sectors is
higher than the average growth of exports, it is small in
comparison with countries like India (Mantega, 2005).
11 The flip side of low taxation in fiscal paradises is the loss of tax revenue in other parts of the world.
12 In 2005, the Caribbean islands recorded service exports (excluding transportation and travel) in the amount of 1.706 billion dollars, whereas
the United States declared imports in the amount of 3.5 billion dollars (IMF and Bureau of Economic Analysis).
13 Bermuda’s exports of services (other than transport and travel) totalled US$ 1.3 billion, while the United States declared imports of US$ 12.478
billion in 2004. These data suggest that actual exports must be at least 9.5 times higher than the figures declared by Bermuda (IMF and Bureau
of Economic Analysis).
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To complete the analysis of exports by firms located
in Latin America and the Caribbean, the preceding
analysis of cross–border trade needs to be supplemented
with an assessment of the volume of sales by branches
set up by these companies in other countries. As noted
above, around half of the world’s trade in services is
accounted for by sales of branches located in foreign
markets (mode 3).
Although the data are still relatively scarce, some
partial figures and qualitative information suggest
that over the past few years, there has been an increase
in the presence in foreign markets of several Latin
American multinational corporations (trans–Latins).
The data on sales of Latin American transnationals are
incomplete, among other things because in many cases
sales by subsidiaries are not published separately.
Also, many subsidiaries are relatively small and are
therefore not included in classifications of large
corporations.14 For example, in its 2004 and 2005
rankings of the 500 largest corporations (branches) in
Latin America by volume of sales, América Economía
only included two branches of one trans–Latin outside
its country of origin, namely, Empresa Brasileira de
Telecomunicaçoes (EMBRATEL) and Claro de Brasil,
which belong to the Mexican firm América Móvil.15
Sales of services by the trans–Latins may be
approximated by looking at their levels of foreign
direct investment (FDI) (see box III.3). The data on
Brazil, Chile and Colombia show that in the last few
years, services accounted for at least half of FDI.16 The
services sector (excluding transport and travel) grew
significantly, especially in engineering and construction,
telecommunications and finance. Except in the case of
the first segment, this is a fairly recent phenomenon.17
The following companies are leaders in services
(other than distribution, transportation and travel):18
• Engineering and construction: these companies,
especially in Brazil (including Odebrecht and
Andrade Gutiérrez) and Argentina (including
Techint and Impsa) started doing business
internationally during the 1980s as a result of a
decline in projects in their original markets. The
competitive advantages of this group of trans–
Latin companies were a combination of technological
capacity, operational flexibility and low costs. The
ability to operate in environments characterized
by complex regulations and legal and economic
constraints has given these companies an advantage
over world competitors in some markets, especially
in developing countries.
• Telecommunications: the Mexican firms TELMEX
and América Móvil (Grupo Carso) now figure
among the largest corporations in the region
and the five largest in the world in terms of
subscribers. Their international activity began in
1990 with the privatization of Teléfonos de
México (TELMEX). The Mexican Government
wanted to sell a vertically integrated corporation in
5. The trans–Latins
14 There are several sources of partial information on foreign sales by branches in Latin America and the Caribbean and in developing countries
in general: (i) some databases such as the Country Reports published by UNCTAD in its World Investment Directory and the Investment
Map (based mainly on Who Owns Whom, by Dun and Bradstreet, London) published by the UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre;
(ii) América Economía magazine, which every year publishes a database showing the characteristics (including sales) of the 500 largest
companies in the region, including several in the business services sector (the main findings of this database are reported every year in
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, published by ECLAC), and (iii) data on FDI abroad. Only a few countries in the
region, including Brazil, Chile and Colombia, publish sectoral breakdowns of these data. Considerable caution must be exercised in
comparing these data, given the multiplicity of sources and the different accounting methods used. Indeed, the main purpose of this discussion
is to illustrate trends rather than make assertions about absolute levels.
15 Another case is that of Cencosud in Chile and its branches Disco and Cencosud in Argentina.
16 These three countries, along with Argentina, Mexico and Panama, are the largest investors in the region in absolute terms. In relative terms,
the countries with the highest levels of FDI abroad in terms of GDP are Panama, Chile, Argentina, Brazil and the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (UNCTAD, 2007).
17 The growth of the trans–Latins in other services sectors, including distribution and electricity, is also noteworthy.
18 For more information on trans–Latins, see ECLAC (2006 and 2007). Other successful trans–Latins operate in retail and air transport services,
see ECLAC (2006).
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order to create a “national champion” that could
compete with foreign firms. The two companies
focused on Latin America, beginning operations
in Brazil and Colombia and later expanding to
Argentina, Central America (El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and, more
recently, Chile, Paraguay and Peru.
• Financial services: the countries with the most
dynamic banks abroad are Brazil, Mexico and
Panama. The Brazilian bank Itaú, which already
had a considerable presence in Argentina, recently
expanded its activities to Chile and Uruguay. The
Mexican bank Banorte expanded its activities in
the United States with the purchase of INB bank
and the money–transfer firm UniTeller. On the
other hand, several Panamanian banks lost a
substantial part of their participation in other
Central American countries in 2006, as they sold
their assets to HSBC, Citibank and Lloyds TSB.
The partial data that are available on
outward FDI from Brazil, Chile and
Colombia show that services accoun-
ted for at least half of such investment
during the period studied. In Brazil,
services accounted for between half
and two thirds of investment abroad
between 2001 and 2005 (other than
investment in tax havens). The main
subsectors are trade (50%), construc-
tion (25%), transportation, telecommu-
nications and real estate (which make
up the remainder). In Colombia,
almost half of investment abroad
in 2005 was in services. Within this
sector, the main subsectors were
business services (40%), transporta-
tion, storage and telecommunications
(31%), public services (12%) and
trade (11%). In Chile, three quarters of
investments between 1990 and 2006
were in the services sector, mainly in
energy, trade and financial services.
The location of the main branches
of the trans–Latins gives a general
idea of their geographical strategy.
UNCTAD data for 2002 suggest that
branches of trans–Latins are set up in
a number of different countries or
regions (see table below). In the case
of Argentina and Chile, other countries
in the region are the main destina-
tions; for other countries, the preferred
destination is the United States. There
has been very little development
in Asia; Panama has the greatest
geographic diversification.
Box III.3
TRANS–LATINS IN THE SERVICES SECTOR: AN OVERVIEW OF PARTIAL DATA
LOCATION OF THE 50 MAIN BRANCHES OF TRANS–LATINS
IN THE SERVICES SECTOR, 2002
(Percentages)
Investor Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Panama Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of) 
Latin America 70 6 81 21 4 16 33
United States 15 78 19 74 92 42 56
European Union 15 11 0 5 4 37 11
Others 0 6 0 0 0 5 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
World Investment Directory.
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Several recent empirical studies suggest that performance
in export of services depends on several factors.19 The
first one consists of the classic gravitational variables,
such as size of markets of origin and destination,
distance or proximity of markets and the effects of
clustering. The second are the so–called natural barriers
(differences in language, culture or institutions). Third,
the rise of information and communications technologies
(ICT), a key factor because it helps determine whether
a service is tradable and at what cost, partly cancelling
out the repercussions of distance in trade. The fourth
factor is the presence, cost and productivity of skilled
labour, bearing in mind that many services are labour–
intensive. These last two factors have a considerable
influence on operational risks (capacity to provide a
steady supply of high–quality services) and structural
risks (probability of customer relations not living up
to expectations) (Aron and Singh, 2005). Finally, it
is also important to bear in mind the impact of the
regulatory systems in the different countries, including
intellectual property regimes and legislation on migration.
To allow for a better understanding of the differences
in the performance of Asia and of Latin America and
the Caribbean with respect to the export of services,
this analysis focuses on three issues: regulation, human
capital and ICT.
C. Factors determining performance abroad
1. What are they?
2. Impact of regulation on trade and investment
National regulatory systems affect at least three
dimensions of international trade in services (Kox and
Nordas, 2007). The first has to do with the ability to
engage in trade. On this point, regulation itself and the
differences between regulatory systems in different
countries represent a barrier or a fixed cost for trade
that affects not so much the price of services provided
as the level of exports needed to begin operations, and
this in turn determines the average size of the export
firm (Melitz, 2003).20 The second is the direct impact
of regulations on the volume of flows of trade in
services, and the third has to do with the repercussions
19 Dihel, Eschenbach and Shepherd (2006), Kox and Nordas (2007), Markusen and Strand (2007) and Piña (2005). These recent studies were
undertaken with available data on bilateral trade in European Union countries and then extended to all OECD countries (Kox and Nordas,
2007). A standard model found in the literature was used, namely, a gravitational model which includes several indicators of regulation
developed by OECD on the basis of the methodology used by the Australian Productivity Commission (Golub, 2003; Dihel and Shepherd,
2005) with respect to services in general and other business services and indicators developed by the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank for financial services. For a business point of view concerning the key factors for success in exporting services (e.g.,
subcontracting and purchase of services abroad), see Aron and Singh (2005).
20 The purpose of regulation is to correct market failures that lead to an inefficient allocation of services. These failures occur more frequently
in the services sector because of its innate characteristics. Depending on their intensity and heterogeneity, regulations —although legitimate—
can considerably restrict international trade in services by preventing one market from taking advantage of the economies of scale achieved
in another.
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of regulatory schemes on flows of foreign direct
investment in the services sector.
(a) Impact on the ability to engage in trade
Econometric models confirm that regulatory
intensity has a negative impact on the ability to start
operations in trade in services.21 However, the differen-
ces between regulatory systems in different countries
do not seem to affect the potential for trading in servi-
ces. The size of the importing market is also important.
Hence, service companies in countries with little
domestic regulation and large trading partners will
have a greater likelihood of becoming exporters.
(b) Impact on trade flows22
As regards the volume of trade flows, the evidence
shows that business services are much more sensitive
to regulatory restrictions than services in general.23
This sensitivity is higher in the exporting country. While
a more stringent regulatory context in the exporting
country has a negative impact on trade, the regulatory
intensity in the importing country does not seem to
have a significant impact. The diversity of regulatory
systems between countries also has a marked negative
impact on flows of trade. Accordingly, policies
designed to encourage harmonization of regulatory
schemes could be key to increasing trade in services.24
The differences in the incidence of the regulatory
framework between Latin America and the Caribbean
and Asia are not big enough to explain the differences
in performance of exports (see table III.2). Aggregate
indices of regulation of different service sectors are
consistently lower in the region than in Asia. However,
as indicated in the preceding section, the dynamism of
the Asian countries, especially China and India, in
exports of services is much greater. This would appear
to indicate the existence of other factors that affect this
type of trade, including the availability of qualified
personnel and of information and communications
technologies (ICT).
(c) Impact on foreign direct investment
The regulatory system not only affects cross–
border trade in services, it also affects exports of
services through the direct sales of branches abroad.
Given the lack of data, the volume of such trade is
estimated on the basis of flows of foreign direct
investment. As shown in the study of OECD countries
by Kox and Nordas (2007), regulation affects both
the inflow of investment to the services sector in the
receiving country and the country’s outward investment.
Indeed, except for legal barriers, regulatory restrictions
have a greater impact on investment abroad than on
foreign direct investment received. As far as the
other variables are concerned, there is a positive
correlation between market size and FDI within the
country and abroad.
Given the lack of data on foreign direct investment
by sector, it is only possible to illustrate the hypotheses
on incoming FDI in Latin America and Asia, which
seem to confirm the overall results for OECD countries
(see figure III.8). The fact that there are fewer
restrictions on foreign direct investment (mode 3) in
Latin America than in Asia was reflected in larger
flows of foreign direct investment with respect to GDP
during the period 1995–2004 in almost every sector of
financial services, telecommunications and construction.25
These flows to Latin America also reflect, to a large
extent, the greater role played by privatization of
state enterprises in those sectors in the region,
especially during the 1990s.
21 In this case, the model used was a Probit model based on regulation indexes and the existence of trade in services between countries. 
22 In this case, a Probit model based on indices of regulation and the existence of bilateral trade in services between countries was used. As
suggested by gravitational models, the impact of regulation is greater in trade in services than in trade in goods. With regard to the other
determining factors, the models suggest that trade in services depends on the same variables as trade in goods, although there are differences
in the relative importance of each variable in trade flows. While cultural differences have a greater impact on trade in services, geographic
variables have a greater impact on trade in goods. In addition, the quality of regulation and the efficiency of governments are much more
important in the case of trade in services.
23 In this case, a Poisson gravitational model of maximum verisimilitude was developed.
24 For example, the document shows that the adoption of a fully harmonized system would bring about a 60% increase in trade in services with
respect to 2003. Although this exercise tends to magnify the impact, it is nevertheless relevant.
25 Unlike other regions, Asia managed to attract more investment in “other services” in business, for which there is no indicator of regulatory
intensity. 
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Table III.2
AGGREGATE INDEX OF REGULATORY INTENSITYa
Sector Banking Insurance Fixed Telephone Mobile Telephone Engineering
Latin America
Argentina 0.76 0.86 0.28 0.35 0.51
Bolivia 0.88 1.41 1.36 0.89 N/A
Brazil 1.09 1.36 0.4 0.94 1.42
Chile 0.85 0.85 0.37 0.36 1.04
Colombia 1.44 0.90 1.19 0.50 N/A
Ecuador 0.66 1.62 1.38 0.64 N/A
Peru 0.61 0.61 0.34 0.17 N/A
Uruguay 0.46 1.24 1.30 0.15 N/A
Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of) 1.36 1.26 0.40 0.81 N/A
Average 0.90 1.12 0.78 0.53 0.99
Asia
China 1.73 1.95 1.66 2.01 1.71
Philippines N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.73
Hong Kong SAR
(China) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
India 2.11 2.81 1.41 2.00 N/A
Indonesia N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.57
Malaysia 2.6 2.48 1.22 1.86 2.01
Singapore N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.56
Thailand 1.46 1.78 1.63 2.50 1.39
Average 1.97 2.25 1.48 2.09 1.33
Source:N. Dihel and B. Shepherd, “Modal estimates of services barriers”, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper, No. 51, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co–operation
and Development (OECD), 2005.
a This index was constructed on the basis of weighted aggregation using a method of factorial analysis of qualitative indicators taken from surveys of different
governments conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co–operation and Development (OECD) (Regulatory Indicators Questionnaire). This indicator increases in
intensity, where 0 corresponds to a hypothetical country that is completely liberalized, i.e., it replies 0 to all questions on the questionnaire. Regional aggregation is
obtained by calculating the simple average of countries in which information on foreign direct investment is available.
Figure III.8
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND REGULATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA, 2004
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre, Invesment Map and N. Dihel and
B. Shepherd, “Modal estimates of services barriers”, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper, No. 51, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co–operation and
Development (OECD), 2005.
a The FDI pool represents the cumulative flows between 1995 and 2004 as a percentage of GDP in 2004.
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Other fundamental factors in trade in services are the
quality and cost of human capital and information and
communications technologies (ICT). Several private
consulting firms produce annual and biannual reports
measuring the competitive level of a group of
advanced and emerging countries for the purpose
of hiring or establishing offshoring, nearshoring or
outsourcing services.26 The measurements shown
in these specific reports are more useful than general
indicators for measuring true competitiveness,
especially that of the large countries. For example,
even though at the national level China and India are
behind the Latin American average with respect to the
penetration of ICT and levels of human capital,
the consultancies always classify them as being more
competitive than the countries in the region. In fact, the
national averages may mask a considerable degree of
heterogeneity within a given country. Although India is
still a poor country in general terms, it has managed to
attract a significant share of world trade in terms of
outsourcing and subcontracting abroad for information
technology (IT) services, thanks to the advanced
development of certain cities and regions. 
In this context, the competitiveness of different
countries was assessed on the basis of indicators
provided in the Global Services Location Index 2007
(GSLI) by AT Kearney and of qualitative information.
The Global Services Location Index consists of
three categories and 13 subindexes: costs (labour,
infrastructure, and taxes and regulation), business
environment (country risk, quality of infrastructure,
cultural adaptability and security of intellectual
property) and human capital (availability of labour,
training and language, experience/skills in negotiation
processes and retention of employees). The final index
is a weighting of the three subcategories. The type of
indexes considered and the weighting were arrived at
after multiple interviews with major stakeholders
in the offshoring industry and in outsourcing. The
indicators are “objectives” and are comparable between
countries. The information is taken from different
sources and hence was not obtained from surveys.
The countries that stand out most in the classification
are India and China, while the others are similar to
each other (see figure III.9). Each country has certain
advantages that make it interesting as a destination for
investment and trade. The classifications used by other
consultancies also show India and China in first and
second place, but the order of the Latin American
countries and ASEAN countries varies from one
ranking to another because they are relatively close to
each other. Both groups of countries are mixed in
the final classification. Thus, some Latin American
countries are ranked higher than Singapore, which has
a better business environment but very high costs.
(a) Human capital
The greatest competitive advantage that India and
China have over Latin America and the Caribbean and
the ASEAN countries is the large number of highly
skilled workers who receive very competitive wages,
despite the fact that the general population has a lower
level of schooling than the average in Latin America.
China and India have a huge economic critical mass
which enables them to create niches of excellence
despite their poverty levels. Several excellent universities
and technology institutes have been set up in India
which turn out some 200,000 graduates per year,
including 75,000 information technology engineers.
China is in a similar position, with some 50,000 IT
graduates per year. India has the additional advantage
of a common language with the United States, its
main trading partner, and this has contributed to the
establishment of a large number of call centres. 
Although in general terms, Latin America and the
Caribbean do not match the number of university and
IT graduates in India and China, some centres of
excellence have been created, especially in the major
cities.27 As a result, the services industry in those
3. Other factors: human capital and information
and communications technologies
26 These include CIO (2006), AT Kearney (2007a) and Diamond Cluster (2006).
27 Buenos Aires and Córdoba in Argentina; Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and other cities in southern Brazil; Santiago in Chile; Bogotá in Colombia;
San José in Costa Rica; and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico City, Monterrey and Tijuana in Mexico, among others (AT Kearney, 2007b).
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countries has grown considerably. Brazil, for example,
has 15,000 IT graduates per year (CIO, 2006). In
addition to having gained experience in the domestic
market, the region’s service industry has a highly
qualified work force that could increase exports.
According to AT Kearney (2007b), among the eight
Latin American countries that are most attractive to
international business in the remote services sector, the
availability of skilled labour is adequate in Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico; intermediate in Chile and Costa
Rica; and is inadequate in Colombia. In terms of
language skills, while some countries such as
Argentina, Costa Rica and Mexico have a significant
number of bilingual people (Spanish–English) who can
serve the United States market, language skills are
scarce in other countries including Brazil, Chile and
Colombia. The governments of these and other
countries are paying more attention to the teaching
of English. Spanish is also becoming increasingly
important in cross–border services with the United
States, given the growing Spanish–speaking population
of that country. Mathematics is another important skill
for trade in services, but in that regard, the region is
way behind the Asian countries. In fact, the results of
standardized mathematics tests (Trends in International
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS 2003) and
OECD Programme for International Student Assessment
(PISA)) that were administered in several countries
showed that Asian students (especially in Singapore,
Republic of Korea, Hong Kong SAR (China) and
Malaysia) scored higher than students in Argentina,
Chile and Brazil.
Another problem that arises in competing with
the Asian countries is the wage level, although worker
productivity must also be considered. For example,
wages for IT programmers or call centre operators in
India and the Philippines range between one third and
one half the average of the top eight Latin American
countries. Taking into account differences in productivity
and nominal exchange rates, Argentina and Uruguay
are the most competitive countries in the region and
can compete with India in certain services.
Considering that wages in India are rising by two
digits per year (15% in 2006), Latin America is
becoming a more appealing destination, as shown
by the investments made in the region by Indian
companies such as TATA.
(b) Access and quality of information and
communications technologies 
Other variables that affect the performance of
exporters of services are the quality and cost of
telecommunications, internet access and other
information technologies. A study by Freund and
Weinhold (2002) showed that improving Internet
access can enable a trading partner of the United States
to increase its exports of services to the United States
Figure III.9
APPEAL OF COUNTRIES FOR LOCATION AND TRADE IN SERVICES IN 2007
Source:AT Kearney, The Global Services Location Index, Chicago, Illinois, 2007.
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market by 1.7%. Different classifications suggest that
the quality of infrastructure in Latin America and Asia
is similar, but costs are somewhat higher in the Latin
American countries. Within the region, Chile stands
out for the quality of its infrastructure and Argentina
for its low costs in 2007. 
One factor that has had a negative effect on the
cost of access to information and communications
technologies (ICT) in Latin America and the Caribbean
is the fact that, unlike Asia, only a few countries
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Panama and the Dominican Republic) have signed the
WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The
70 countries that signed the Agreement in 2007
account for 97% of world trade in IT products. These
countries have undertaken to import those products
duty free on the basis of most–favoured–nation
treatment. However, no South American country has
signed the Agreement, although some, such as Chile,
apply a most–favoured–nation (MFN) zero tariff.28
Consequently, enterprises in several South American
countries are at a disadvantage because of the added
cost of acquiring foreign technologies compared
with companies in the signatory countries. Brazil, for
example, applies a 13% MFN tariff on ICT products in
order to protect its national industry.
Another key factor in competition is the ability
to guarantee high standards of quality of the services
provided by means of international certification.
This is essential in overcoming cultural barriers and
prejudices in advanced countries regarding standards
of services provided by developing countries. Quality
standards for industrial products (ISO 9000) and
the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) are two
certifications that are fundamental. The Capability
Maturity Model, which has five levels, is a model
for evaluating and improving software processes.
Level 5 is the highest and refers to the most important
processes that must be complied with by the company
concerned (Prieto, 2003). 
D. Promoting the sector
In brief, although Latin America and the Caribbean
have been less successful than India and China in
attracting the growing international demand for
services, there is a great potential for changing this
trend. The region has several advantages that make it
an increasingly appealing alternative for outsourcing
and nearshoring: a growing contingent of skilled
labour at fairly competitive wages, a sound technological
infrastructure and the same culture as other Western
countries. Moreover, interest in the Spanish language
has increased internationally, as have the English
language skills of Latin Americans. The region is
geographically close to the large importers of services
—the United States and Canada— and is in the same
time zones. The increasing political and macroeconomic
stability of most Latin American countries is another
positive trend.
Although the conditions for taking better advantage
of opportunities for trade in services are relatively
good, the change will not be automatic and will
require a considerable effort on the part of the public
and private sectors, as they must continue to improve
the quality of services at competitive prices. In
promoting services, the focus should be on the main
obstacles hindering the sector’s development. The
following is a discussion of two important issues that
are relevant to the preceding section: liberalization and
recognition of regulatory frameworks among countries
under bilateral and regional treaties, and the effort of
the public and private sectors to improve the supply of
28 Chile eliminated tariffs on all information and communications technology products after signing the free trade agreement with
Canada in 1997.
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skilled labour and create a legal framework that will
encourage production and the use of information and
communications technologies (ICT). In addition to
these, there are many other ways to encourage trade in
In some Latin American and Caribbean countries, as in
other regions, the dynamism of activities and trade in
services seems to have been determined and controlled
by technological change and regulatory reform.
Liberalization of trade in services in the context of
trade agreements signed in the region has been
relatively slow compared with these changes. Moreover,
deregulation of this activity in most of the countries
has been an independent decision made in the context
of specific trade agreements. 
Mexico was the first country of the region to
negotiate liberalization of trade in services in the context
of a trade agreement, namely, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These negotiations took
a new approach to liberalization in that cross–border
trade in services was separated from the sale of
services through foreign direct investment (mode 3)
and accordingly, the relevant rules and disciplines
were established. At the same time as NAFTA, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was
negotiated in the context of the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).30
The first generation of agreements between Latin
American countries, especially in the framework of the
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), included
a clause allowing further negotiations on services.
However, it was not until the late 1990s that this
dimension of trade began to be included in agreements. 
The three incentives that led to the definitive
inclusion of services on the trade agenda of the region
during the 1990s were the entry into force of NAFTA,
GATS and the decision of the countries in the region to
begin negotiations on the creation of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA); that decision was taken
in April 1998. Prior to that, for almost four years, a
collective analysis had been made of the implications
of negotiations on services in the context of free trade
agreements, and it was decided that the latter should be
included in the results of negotiations on FTAA. 
After Mexico, Chile was the second country of the
region to actively include this dimension in its trade
negotiations. Following the NAFTA model, services
were included in the agreement with Canada that was
signed in mid–1997. 
On 11 June 1998, the Andean Community adopted
Decision 439, on a General Framework of Principles
and Rules and for Liberalizing Trade in Services in the
Andean Community, in fulfilment of the provisions of
articles 79 and 80 of the Cartagena Agreement. On
30 October 2001, the Commission of the Andean
Community adopted Decision 510, which contained
an inventory of measures in force at the time that
restricted trade in services, and provided that such
measures should be eliminated by 1 January 2006. This
was achieved on 14 December 2006 with the adoption
of Decision 659, on services sectors where rules would
be liberalized or harmonized.31
The Andean Community adopted a liberalization
model for the services sector which is similar to that of
GATS but lays down a procedure for countries to list
services, including by improving access to financing,
granting tax incentives, promoting innovation and
improving the logistical apparatus (see ECLAC, 2003
and Prieto, 2003).
29 For a review of trade in services in the context of agreements signed in Latin America and the Caribbean, see Marconini (2005 and 2006),
Sáez (2005) and Stephenson (2002).
30 The Treaty of Rome, creating the European Community, lays down the principles governing trade in services among Member States. Such
trade is governed by the provisions on the “right of establishment” and freedom for suppliers to provide services. In addition, there are other
provisions and specific rules for certain sectors, such as transport and financial services. During the 1990s, this dimension of the European
Common Market received priority attention, especially with regard to financial services and telecommunications. Recently, some guidelines
for further liberalizing professional services have been met with considerable opposition. 
31 See Andean Community (2007), for a description of the different stages in the regional integration of services. 
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those measures that are incompatible with the agreed
rules (negative list) and undertook to eliminate them
and not to introduce new restrictions (Andean
Community, 2007). 
The MERCOSUR countries also followed the
GATS model in liberalizing trade in services on the
intraregional market, but only in the sectors specified
in the schedules of commitments (positive list). The
Montevideo Protocol, which lays down the regulatory
framework for trade in services, was adopted in
December 1997. The first commitments were annexed
in July 1998, but the agreement only entered into force
in December 2005, once the process of ratification by
the legislatures of Member States was finalized. One of
the main objectives of the Montevideo Protocol on
Trade in Services in MERCOSUR is to complete, no
later than ten years from the date of entry into force of
the Protocol, the programme of liberalization of trade
in services of MERCOSUR (article XIX). Annual
negotiations are to be held to that end. 
Although the Protocol entered into force in
December 2005, six rounds of negotiations have been
held since 1997, at which new sectors have been added
to the commitments undertaken.32 These negotiations
have made it possible to move forward in consolidating
the existing restrictions, but they have not led to any
significant liberalization of the market within the free
trade zone (Grupo de Servicios del MERCOSUR
(no date)).
Progress has been made in the drafting of common
regulatory instruments, especially those aimed at
facilitating the temporary movement of persons. In
particular, the Agreement on the creation of the
MERCOSUR visa; the Mechanism for the exercise of
temporary professional services and the Agreement on
the facilitation of business activities. Ratification of
these instruments by the legislatures of Member States
is still pending. 
In 1997, CARICOM adopted an approach to
services integration that enshrined the right of
establishment, namely, the right to carry out any
commercial, industrial, agricultural, professional or
artisanal activities and to create and administer any
type of organization. This agreement also grants
persons in Member States the freedom to provide
services. In addition, there is a commitment not to
establish new restrictions and to remove existing
ones. The latter goal was to have been reached by 31
December 2005.
In negotiations conducted by the United States
with Chile, Central America, Colombia and Peru, the
NAFTA model was adopted, while European Union
negotiations with Mexico and Chile used the GATS
model, as will probably be the case with the Andean
Community, Central America and MERCOSUR
(Fereira Portela, 2001). One might ask how and to
what extent these negotiations between certain
countries of the region and the United States and
Europe have progressed further than multilateral
negotiations and negotiations within the region. 
Marconini (2006) conducted a comparative study
of the provisions of the World Trade Organization,
NAFTA and the agreements recently negotiated by
the United States with Latin American countries, the
European Union and Japan. Both the GATS model,
followed by the European Union, and NAFTA, used
by the United States, are similar in scope with respect
to the measures that affect services, and they make
a distinction between trade in services and modes of
supply.33 However, they differ in regard to the depth
with which each of these issues is treated. 
In the GATS model, the same disciplines are
applicable to all the modes of supply. In the case of
NAFTA, the disciplines are developed separately, with
a distinction being made between those that apply to
“cross–border trade” (including modes of supply 1, 2
and 4 of GATS), investment (mode 3 of GATS) and
procedures applicable for access of businesspersons
in the destination market (mode 4). However, this
criterion has not been uniform, especially in the
agreements signed by the United States subsequent
to the agreements with Chile and Singapore, which
contain no provisions on “businesspersons”. 
According to Marconini (2006), it is not possible
to determine a priori if the agreements signed by the
United States, the European Union and Japan have
created more liberalization than the results of WTO
negotiations. In some cases, certain sectors have
been excluded, such as air transport and audiovisual
services, while in others the scope of application in
certain areas has been limited. For example, movement
of natural persons has been limited to “businesspersons”,
while GATS includes all categories of service suppliers.
Finally, in other cases, certain sectors or activities
32 For the Spanish text of the Protocol of Montevideo, see Foreign Trade Information Service (SICE) (undated). For an assessment of efforts
carried out to date, see Services Group of MERCOSUR (no date). 
33 Modes of supply are defined as: (i) cross border; (ii) consumption abroad; (iii) commercial presence; and (iv) presence of natural persons.
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have been excluded by way of negotiated reservations
(maritime transport and subfederal and municipal
measures).
In other regards, however, some agreements
have gone beyond the WTO provisions, including in
financial services or telecommunications and even
some disciplines of the maritime transport sector (in
the context of agreements negotiated by the European
Union) (Pereira Gonçalves and Stephanou, 2007; Sáez,
2005b). Also, rules of origin applicable to service
suppliers appear to be more flexible than those agreed
in GATS.34 Furthermore, agreements negotiated by
the United States and Japan in the area of investment
(applicable to services established through commercial
presence) include stricter disciplines in terms of
performance requirements and the prohibition to
establish local–presence requirements as a condition
for providing a service.
One of the main elements supplementing the
disciplines regulating trade in services are the schedules
of commitments whereby the countries define those
sectors and terms that will be subject to the provisions
on trade in services. The agreements negotiated by
the United States and Japan include a larger number of
disciplines, follow a negative–list approach (everything
is included except that which is expressly excluded),
and adapt the level of commitments to the regulatory
status quo (consolidation); these agreements are
considered more transparent and liberalizing than the
GATS model followed by the European Union. As
noted above, however, the actual level of liberalization
is determined by the content of the schedules of
commitment. In WTO, in the subregional agreements
like NAFTA, and in the aforementioned bilateral
agreements, liberalization has been approached from a
standpoint that has simply maintained the prevailing
regulatory situation without achieving true liberalization
of trade in services (Marconini, 2006; Sáez, 2005b).
This has also been the objective achieved in the case
of MERCOSUR, whereas the Andean Community
has tried to freeze the current situation, assuming a
commitment to liberalization supplemented by specific
disciplines in certain sectors. Since this is a very recent
development, it is difficult to assess its effects. 
Marconini (2006) discusses four aspects of the
provisions on domestic regulation that are applicable
to trade in services: transparency, good governance,
requirements and recognition. The agreements negotiated
by the United States and Japan seem to move towards
transparency and good governance, as they establish
requirements relating to the drafting and the procedure
for adopting and applying rules, issues which are not
addressed in the agreements signed by the European
Union. As Sáez (2005b) points out, however, none of
the agreements show progress specifically in terms of
reducing the costs involved in rules and regulations
that service suppliers must comply with in order to be
able to carry out their activities. Nor do they clarify the
conditions under which domestic regulations might be
considered “unnecessary barriers to trade”, an issue
that is at the centre of the debate on trade in services
and trade agreements.
The difficulties involved in addressing liberalization
of trade in services are closely related to the regulatory
changes that must be made, economic policy and the
practical implications for managing economic and
development policies (Marconini, 2006; Sáez, 2005). It
is therefore advisable to keep open the possibility of
creating new regulations should the existing ones
prove inadequate and provided they are not challenged
under the dispute settlement system as being contrary
to the commitments assumed or as being unnecessary
barriers to trade. Another aspect that should be considered
is the degree to which the desired policies are aimed at
discriminating against foreign suppliers or to give the
State an advantage as a service provider. Consequently,
the most direct repercussions may be seen in the
type of policy instruments applied and their effect
(discrimination in favour of national suppliers) and
the degree of State participation in the provision of
services, either as a regulator or as a direct supplier
(Sáez, 2005b).
Both GATS and the aforementioned agreements,
including those negotiated by the United States,
contain a number of mechanisms that enable countries
to define a priori the policy options they wish to keep
open. In other words, sovereign decisions concerning
policies and instruments are preserved, and the sectors
affected, including the type of State participation in the
activity, are policy decisions that can be adequately
addressed in the context of international negotiations.
What is important is that governments should be able
to clearly identify their policy objectives and the tools
to be used in achieving them.
34 Although these might be relevant only for those countries that are not members of GATS, given that the most–favoured–nation clause requires
all WTO members to receive equal treatment.
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Other areas in which exports can be promoted are
the training of skilled workers and the creation of an
environment in which investment and information
technologies are encouraged. Cooperation between
the public and private sectors is key to identifying
problems and formulating policy proposals.
(a) Human capital
The improvement of human capital, a key factor
in India’s success, is probably the most important
challenge facing Latin America and the Caribbean.
Priority should be assigned to three areas. In the
first place, since many services require highly skilled
personnel, the public and private sectors should offer
incentives for university–level ICT programmes, as
well as training programmes, especially for small and
medium–sized enterprises. Furthermore, governments
should ensure the quality of technical education by
requiring accreditation at regular intervals. And finally,
citizens should be encouraged to learn English, the
main language of international trade, and the teaching
of mathematics and information technologies in
secondary schools should be improved.
(b) Development of (information) technology
and certification
An important step in promoting access to
modern (information) technologies —including in the
telecommunications sector— is to improve regulatory
policies and competition so as to encourage investment
and guarantee high–quality services at the lowest
possible cost. The increased availability of broadband
internet connections facilitates the sale of more
complex electronic services at the international level.
Broadband goes a long way towards promoting
competitiveness and productivity. Public policies
should encourage both the supply of and the demand
for broadband, with special emphasis on small and
medium–sized enterprises (Ueki, Tsuji and Cárcamo,
2005). This can be done by eliminating or reducing
import taxes and value added taxes on IT equipment
and related services. Another key measure will be to
encourage (micro) entrepreneurs to use ICT by
stepping up the development of e–government in
the areas of registration and transactions with the
business sector. Also, governments should strengthen
programmes aimed at raising awareness and training
businesses in ICT–related subjects and demonstrating
the potential of ICTs for promoting innovation and
competitiveness. It must be pointed out, however, that
ICTs should not be considered a goal in themselves but
rather a means of improving efficiency.
Exports of services can also be encouraged by
promoting different types of certification, including
quality standards for industrial products (ISO 9000).
Such certification —which applies to the processes
by which services are provided— enhances quality
and international credibility. However, considerable
resources are needed in order to obtain and maintain
certification. Governments and trade organizations
in the private sector have an important role to play
in encouraging certification. Governments could set
priorities for certain types of certification, maintain
their requirements and prevent them from becoming a
barrier to trade. Certification should be voluntary and
only for a limited time. Private trade associations could
carry out special activities for certifying the quality of
different services and help entrepreneurs comply with
the international quality standards that are applied to
management techniques, rationalization of costs and
quality control.
2. Human capital, technology and quality
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Annex 
Table A.1






Computer and information services





Personal, cultural and recreational
services
Government services
Post and courier activities
Telecommunications




Auxiliary services to insurance
Computer services
Information services (news agency services), other information provision services
Franchises and similar rights
Other royalties and licence fees
Merchanting and other trade–related services
Operating leasing services
Miscellaneous business, professional and technical services (including legal services,
accounting, auditing; consulting, advertising, research and development, waste
management and decontamination)
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Balance of Payments Manual, Washington, D.C., 1993.
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Figure A.1
THE FOUR MODES OF SUPPLY FOR SERVICES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on information from the Organisation for Economic Co–operation and Development
(OCDE).
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The Andean Community is going through a period of
adjustment and redefinition following the withdrawal
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the associate
membership extended to Chile and the signature by
The integration process is in a state of change in Latin America and the Caribbean. The
Dominican Republic —Central America— United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA–DR)
has come into effect in all the member countries, except in Costa Rica, where it is in the
process of being ratified. This agreement’s entry into force has injected vigour to the effort to
renovate the Central American integration scheme. Meanwhile, the Single Caribbean Market
has come into effect in 12 English– and Dutch–speaking member countries. Within that
scheme, the subgroup of Eastern Caribbean countries also agreed, in mid–2007, to form an
economic union. All this stands in contrast to the position in the other subregional integration
schemes. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela withdrew from the Andean Community
after two other members of the bloc concluded negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA)
with the United States. The country then requested and was granted full membership of
the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). In 2007, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela negotiated time frames and conditions for implementation of the common external
tariff and the incorporation of the MERCOSUR rules into its national legislation. Conversely,
the new administration taking office in Ecuador indicated a wish to keep trade relations
with the United States as they were, which led to the indefinite suspension of negotiations
for an FTA.
Colombia and Peru of bilateral trade agreements with
the United States.
Intraregional trade continued to expand, albeit
at a more sedate pace than in the preceding years. The
Economic integration in Latin America
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proportion of intrasubregional trade, measured by
exports, rose slightly in MERCOSUR and the countries
of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA),
but declined somewhat in the Andean Community
and the Central American Common Market (CACM)
(see table IV.1).
In 2007, some of the region’s countries, such as
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama and Peru, focused on
trade relations with the United States and the entry
into force of FTAs that had already been signed. For
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, the trade
agenda was also marked by the extension of the
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA), in the context of wider debates on the
extension of the United States President’s Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA) for the negotiation of
trade agreements.
The Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ALBA), an initiative of the
Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
has also remained active. ALBA was tabled as an
alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTTA) and initially, in December 2004, it was an
agreement between the Venezuelan and Cuban
governments, which were then joined by Bolivia
in 2006. Nicaragua joined in January 2007, on
the occasion of the group’s fourth summit. The
fifth summit, held at the end of April, was attended
by the president of Haiti and representatives of
Ecuador, Uruguay, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as the
presidents of the four member countries (Carriba,
2007; Vaillant, 2007).
Table IV.1
LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL EXPORTS BY SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEME, 1990–2007
(Millions of current dollars and percentages)





Total exports (1) 112 694 204 170 251 345 316 298 319 807 346 145 427 835 506 557 614 960 141 695 152 443
Exports to LAIA (2) 13 589 35 471 43 118 41 934 36 164 40 872 56 777 72 251 89 815 19 299 22 805
Percentage intrasubregional
exports (2/1) 12.1 17.4 17.2 13.3 11.3 11.8 13.3 14.3 14.6 13.6 15.0
Andean Community
Total exports (1) 31 751 39 134 38 896 53 543 52 177 54 716 74 140 100 089 124 111 29 670 30 108
Exports to CAN (2) 1 312 4 812 5 504 5 656 5 227 4 900 7 604 10 313 12 719 2 680 2 848
Percentage intrasubregional
exports (2/1) 4.1 12.3 14.2 10.6 10.0 9.0 10.5 10.3 10.2 9.0 9.5
Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR)
Total exports (1) 46 403 70 129 80 227 89 078 89 500 106 674 134 196 162 512 190 789 40 581 46 372
Exports to Mercosur (2) 4 127 14 199 20 322 15 298 10 197 12 709 17 319 21 134 25 675 5 410 6 740
Percentage intrasubregional
exports (2/1) 8.9 20.2 25.3 17.2 11.4 11.9 12.9 13.0 13.5 13.3 14.5
Central American Common
Market (CACM)
Total exportsa (1) 4 480 8 745 14 987 16 328 17 006 18 117 19 767 21 849 24 821 5 907 6 795
Exports to MCCA (2) 624 1 451 2 754 2 829 2 871 3 110 3 506 3 912 4 429 1 062 1 243
Percentage intrasubregional
exports (2/1) 13.9 16.6 18.4 17.3 16.9 17.2 17.7 17.9 17.8 18.0 18.3
Caribbean Community
(CARICOM)
Total exports (1) 4 955 5 927 5 537 7 544 7 110 8 624 10 395 14 125 18 522 … …
Exports to CARICOM (2) 509 843 1 031 1 384 1 220 1 419 1 810 2 150 2 639 … …
Latin America and
the Caribbean
Total exportsb (1) 130 214 227 922 280 065 345 484 347 610 376 590 472 444 569 295 689 985 152 830 164 822
Exports to Latin America
and the Caribbeanc (2) 18 727 45 180 56 644 58 607 53 424 59 635 79 952 100 340 120 051 26 702 30 503
Percentage intrasubregional
exports (2/1) 13.9 19.8 20.2 17.0 15.4 15.8 16.9 17.6 17.4 17.4 18.5
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the respective subregional grouping and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
a Figures include maquila trade.
b Includes LAIA, CACM, the CARICOM countries, Panama, Cuba and the Dominican Republic.
c Includes intrasubregional trade in the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, CACM, CARICOM and trade between Chile and Mexico and the rest of the region, as well as
trade between groups, plus exports from Cuba, Panama and the Dominican Republic to other countries in the region.
d Preliminary figures.
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The principles of ALBA are enshrined in an
instrument known as the People’s Trade Agreement
and basically consists of covenants of cooperation
covering a broad range of issues, including energy,
health and culture. Thus far, two such agreements have
been signed, one by Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela and the other by those two countries and
Bolivia. These agreements are based on the general
principles of complementarity, solidarity, cooperation
and respect for the sovereignty of peoples.1 The ALBA
countries recently signed up to three cooperation
projects in the areas of education, culture and trade.
The first two consist of literacy programmes and the
creation of a development fund for culture. The third
project, which is known as the ALBA Great National
Fair Trade Project, consists of the creation of two large
enterprises, one dealing with industrial supplies and
the other undertaking exports and imports through a
countertrade system based on networks of shops and
storage facilities and sales of merchandise.
The second Summit of Heads of State of the
Andean Community was held in Cochabamba, Bolivia
in December 2006. This organ has gained some
prominence in the region by tackling a broad agenda
of issues including infrastructure–related matters. In
addition, the first South American Energy Summit
was held on Margarita Island, Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela on 16 and 17 April 2007. On this occasion,
the Summit approved the Declaration of Margarita and
created the South American Energy Council, which
comprises the ministers of energy of each country and
is mandated to prepare draft versions for the South
American Energy Strategy, an Action Plan and the
South American Treaty on Energy, which will be
discussed at the third Summit of Heads of State of the
Andean Community in Colombia in 2007.
1 See, for example, the declaration of 14 December 2004 signed by the Governments of Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
2 See ECLAC (2006a), which contains an outline of developments in this regard in 2006.
3 These two agreements are denominated “trade promotion agreements”, unlike the arrangements with Chile, Central America and, more
recently, Panama.
A. The United States and the Latin American and
Caribbean region2
In 2006 and 2007, the United States has focussed its
trade agenda on multiple initiatives aimed at opening
markets, both bilaterally and multilaterally, as part of
a strategy of “competitive liberalization” (see table
IV.2). In the rationale of this strategy, free trade
agreements are a means to “establish the breadth and
scope of potential multilateral agreements in years to
come by setting precedents and by demonstrating the
real benefits of free and fair trade” (Schwab, 2007).
In the western hemisphere, the United States
signed trade promotion agreements with Peru and
Colombia in 20063 and concluded negotiations with
Panama late that year. Similarly to previous agreements,
these instruments are broad in scope and cover all
aspects of trade, including investment, services,
intellectual property and government procurement, and
they aim to eliminate tariffs and other barriers to trade
in goods and services.
In late 2006 the United States Congress passed
the Tax Relief and Health Care Act, whose most
interesting aspect, from the perspective of the Latin
American and Caribbean region, was its trade
provisions. These broaden the scope of the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) and the Andean Trade
Preference Act (ATPA)/Andean Trade Promotion and
Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) and authorize new
trade preferences for textiles and clothing from
Haiti. The Act also establishes normal and ongoing
trade relations with Viet Nam.
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The GSP was also extended until 31 December
2008. This covers most of the preferences applicable to
3,400 products from 133 developing countries. The
new legislation contains stricter rules regarding the use
of exemptions on the grounds of “competitive need”
with a view to limiting higher–income developing
countries’ use of the GSP. This could affect some
exports from such countries as Brazil and India, which
are among the largest users of GSP (see table IV.4),
because the Act eliminates exemptions for all products
of which a country exports more than 1.5 times the
amount established for that particular calendar year
—about US$ 180 million in 2006— or exceed the
value of the country’s imports of that product by 75%.
In the 2005–2006 biennium, the Latin American
and Caribbean region’s exports to the United States
were worth an average of US$ 309.905 billion, of
which only 1.7% came under GSP, while 7.6%
corresponded to other preferential accords and over
40% were governed by FTAs. By 2006, the preferences
applicable under CAFTA–DR were already on record
at the United States Department of Commerce. Over
50% of exports to the United States from Chile, El
Salvador, Honduras and Mexico are traded under
FTAs (see table IV.3). Few of the region’s countries
invoked GSP in 2006, but the number of exports
shipped under recently concluded FTAs increased.
The main 20 GSP beneficiary countries include only
four from the region: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and
Peru (see table IV.4).
Table IV.2
UNITED STATES: AGREEMENTS, PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS
AND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Signed agreements in force
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) (Canada and Mexico) (1994);
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
(2000); Andean Trade Promotion and Drug
Eradication Act (ATPDEA) (2002); Dominican
Republic – Central America – United States
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA–DR)
(El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and the United States) (2006);
Chile (2004)
Israel (1985); Jordan (2001); Bahrain (2006);
Morocco (2006); Oman (2006)
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Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United States Trade Representative.
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Table IV.3
UNITED STATES: PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT EXTENDED TO IMPORTS FROM WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
Imports under Other tariff Preferences Total imports
GSP preference under free trade
agreementsa agreements
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
Latin America and
the Caribbean 1.8 1.6 8.1 7.1 38.1 41.5 290 671 329 139
MERCOSUR 14.6 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 29 781 30 657
Argentina 13.3 17.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4 648 3 925
Brazil 14.9 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24 346 26 169
Paraguay 51.8 48.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 59 51
Uruguay 8.3 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 728 512
Chile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.5 57.7 6 745 9 551
Andean Community 2.2 2.0 57.1 59.9 0.0 0.0 20 060 22 510
Bolivia 9.2 6.0 53.6 45.9 0.0 0.0 293 362
Colombia 2.2 2.0 53.1 51.9 0.0 0.0 8 770 9 240
Ecuador 1.0 1.0 74.4 76.0 0.0 0.0 5 874 7 011
Peru 3.4 3.0 44.5 54.3 0.0 0.0 5 123 5 897
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 2.3 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32 750 36 283
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.3 64.5 169 216 197 056
Central American Common
Market (CACM) 2.0 1.3 46.7 20.4 0.0 28.2 13 422 14 020
Costa Rica 2.6 3.0 30.1 36.2 0.0 0.0 3 377 3 813
El Salvador 2.9 0.5 61.9 8.4 0.0 53.3 1 982 1 843
Guatemala 2.1 1.5 39.9 21.0 0.0 17.9 3 123 3 103
Honduras 1.5 0.3 63.1 14.9 0.0 53.6 3 758 3 735
Nicaragua 0.1 0.1 34.2 7.3 0.0 27.1 1 182 1 526
Panama 6.2 7.2 12.5 9.8 0.0 0.0 320 338
Caribbean countries 1.0 1.0 32.1 37.5 0.0 0.0 18 377 18 724
Bahamas 0.1 0.5 15.9 28.7 0.0 0.0 698 436
Barbados 2.8 0.0 12.5 15.2 0.0 0.0 32 33
Belize 1.5 4.1 56.1 49.3 0.0 0.0 98 146
Guyana 5.5 11.7 5.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 120 125
Haiti 0.4 0.3 68.0 76.4 0.0 0.0 447 496
Jamaica 2.5 2.6 44.6 52.2 0.0 0.0 341 471
Dominican Republic 3.3 2.9 54.0 54.6 0.0 0.0 4 603 4 540
Saint Kitts and Nevis 2.9 2.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 50 50
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.2 1.1 6.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16 2
Saint Lucia 1.3 1.3 9.2 18.9 0.0 0.0 65 37
Suriname 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 165 164
Trinidad and Tobago 0.1 0.1 35.1 43.8 0.0 0.0 7 793 8 398
Othersb 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 3 949 3 826
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the International Trade Commission (USITC). 
a Includes the tariff preference agreements extended by the United States to different groups of countries in the region: the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, as well as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) with the countries of Central American and the Caribbean Basin. 
b Includes Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, Grenada, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
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ATPDEA was extended for an additional six
months in the cases of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru. Subsequently, another similar measure was
approved for countries whose legislatures concluded
the approval of a trade promotion agreement with the
United States. Only Colombia and Peru are in the
process of being granted a second automatic extension
and the United States Congress still has to approve
the respective free trade agreements. In March 2007,
however, the democrat majority in the United States
Congress was examining the possibility of extending
the preferences for a two–year period after their expiry
in June 2007. Non–renewal of ATPDEA could hurt the
beneficiary countries, especially Bolivia and Ecuador,
which are the less developed members of the group.
Of the possible consequences of ATPDEA not being
renewed, the worst are job losses, migratory pressure
on the United States and drops in well–being, not only
in the Andean countries but also for United States
consumers (USITC, 2005; Durán, 2007).
After tough negotiations in the United States
Congress and thanks to an agreement brokered by the
Committee on Ways and Means, four days before its
expiry ATPDEA was extended for a further eight
months, with an expiry date of 29 February 2008. This
extension comes as a relief for Bolivia and Ecuador,
because it affords their exporters some breathing
space. The time left is still quite short, however, and is
causing concern in many business circles. For Peru and
Colombia the additional time serves as a bridge while
their respective governments await approval of the
FTAs negotiated in the last two years, but if the United
States Congress should fail to approve the pending
agreements they will be obliged, like Bolivia and
Ecuador, to request further extensions in the future.
Table IV.4
UNITED STATES: MAIN BENEFICIARIES OF GENERALIZED SYSTEM
OF PREFERENCES, 2006
(Millions of dollars)
Order Beneficiary Tax–free imports Total imports from Percentage of
developing country under GSP the country imports into
the United States
under GSP
1 Angola 5.92 11.72 50.5
2 India 5.67 21.83 26.0
3 Thailand 4.25 22.47 18.9
4 Brazil 3.72 26.39 14.1
5 Indonesia 1.89 13.40 14.1
6 Equatorial Guinea 1.34 1.73 77.3
7 Philippines 1.14 9.70 11.8
8 Turkey 1.12 5.36 21.0
9 South Africa 1.07 7.53 14.2
10 Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of) 0.69 37.17 1.8
11 Argentina 0.67 3.97 16.8
12 Russian Federation 0.51 19.78 2.6
13 Kazakhstan 0.48 0.96 50.3
14 Chad 0.40 1.92 21.1
15 Yemen 0.34 0.45 75.5
16 Romania 0.27 1.12 24.6
17 Colombia 0.18 9.27 2.0
18 Peru 0.18 5.88 3.0
19 Croatia 0.15 0.35 41.3
20 Sri Lanka 0.14 2.14 6.7
21 Dominican Republic 0.13 4.53 2.9
24 Costa Rica 0.11 3.84 3.0
25 Ecuador 0.07 7.09 1.0
27 Guatemala 0.07 3.10 2.2
32 Uruguay 0.05 0.51 9.8
39 Paraguay 0.03 0.06 47.5
40 Panama 0.02 0.38 6.4
42 Bolivia 0.02 0.36 6.0
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC). 
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In the first four months of 2007, among other
issues on the trade agenda of the United States
Congress and government was the matter of how
labour and environmental provisions would be
incorporated into new trade agreements signed. With
respect to the agreements awaiting approval by
Congress, a consensus was reached that the legislation
and practices of partner countries must comply with
the obligations set out in chapter I of the International
Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on the
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted
in 1998. It was also made obligatory to sign seven
agreements on the environment and undertake to
implement any multilateral agreements signed (Inside
U.S. Trade, 2007a).
ATPDEA was enacted in 2002, substituting and
broadening the Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991
(ATPA), which was designed to stimulate a more
diversified type of economic growth and combat drug
production and trafficking. ATPDEA allowed tax–free
market access for an initial list of 700 products, which
later swelled to a total of 6,300. The following
products, among others, come under the Act: leather
articles, petroleum and petroleum products, refined
copper, fresh flowers, asparagus, textiles, made–up
clothing, footwear, tuna and clothing assembled from
United States fabric.
In 2006, more than half of imports into the United
States from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, with
a value of US$ 13.5 billion, entered the market under
the ATPDEA programme (see figure IV.1). Ecuador,
Colombia and Peru were the main suppliers from the
Andean group.
The preferences applicable to Haiti were augmented
through a new provision added to the Caribbean Basin
Initiative, the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity
through Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE),
which authorizes tax–free entry for new Haitian
products, including electrical cable for automobiles
and clothing. The Act will come into effect once the
President of the United States is able to certify to
Congress that Haiti has met certain requirements and
stipulations regarding reshipments.
The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
expires in 2008. Discussions about alternative courses
of action thereafter were to take place at the
Conference on the Caribbean: A 20/20 Vision in
Washington, D.C. in June 2007.
Figure IV.1
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS FROM ATPDEA BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES, 1992–2006
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC). 
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The year 2006 represented a very particular period in
the recent history of MERCOSUR. On the one
hand, it may be argued that, with the establishment
of the MERCOSUR Parliament at the end of the year
and the holding of the MERCOSUR Social Summit,
MERCOSUR has ceased to be a matter exclusively for
governments and administrations and has broadened to
include civil society. On the other hand, concern has
mounted over the need to extend differential treatment
to smaller partners and to weaker economic agents.
On the trade front, intrasubregional exports
swelled by over 20%, generating a half–percentage–
point rise in the proportion of these exports, which
were up from 13% to 13.5% en 2006. This momentum
continued into the first quarter of 2007 and the
proportion rose a further point to 14.5% (see table
IV.5). The upturn in intrasubregional trade in
MERCOSUR owes much to bilateral trade between
Argentina and Brazil which is becoming more stable.
Trade in industrial manufactures from Argentina
and Brazil climbed strongly up to March 2007, with
a steep rise in sales of vehicle parts, common metals
and chemicals.
B. MERCOSUR: larger but weaker
Table IV.5
MERCOSUR EXPORTS, 1990–2007
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
1990 1995 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 January January
-March -March 
2006 2007a
Total exports (1) 46 403 70 129 80 227 89 078 89 500 106 674 134 196 162 512 190 789 40 581 46 421
Percentage annual growth -0.3 13.3 -2.9 4.0 0.5 19.2 25.8 21.1 17.4 15.9 14.4
Exports to MERCOSUR (2) 4 127 14 199 20 322 15 298 10 197 12 709 17 319 21 134 25 675 5 408 6 740
Percentage annual growth 7.6 17.8 -1.1 -13.6 -33.3 24.6 36.3 22.0 21.5 18.6 24.6
Percentage exports
intra–MERCOSUR (2/1) 8.9 20.2 25.3 17.2 11.4 11.9 12.9 13.0 13.5 13.3 14.5
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information form the MERCOSUR Secretariat and official country
information (Secretariat of Foreign Trade of Brazil (SECEX), National Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Argentina (INDEC), Central Bank of Uruguay and
Central Bank of Paraguay).
a Preliminary estimates.
1. Differential treatment for smaller partners and agents
In the interests of providing differential treatment for
smaller partners and agents, on 15 December 2006
the Minister of Finance of Brazil and the Minister for
Economic Affairs of Argentina signed a protocol of
intent to implement a system of payments in local
currency for bilateral trade in the second half of 2007,
with obvious benefits for SMEs. In January 2007,
however, the governments of Uruguay and Paraguay
indicated that the elimination of the United States dollar
for regional transactions would not be acceptable to
them. Hence, although the project has moved into a
phase of technical preparation, it affects mainly trade
between the two largest partners.
Also with a view to countering trade distortion, on
9 January 2007 the Government of Brazil announced
its decision to eliminate the double levy of the common
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external tariff (CET) on products imported by
MERCOSUR. One possibility would be to use a
certificate of exemption to allow products to circulate
within the bloc. The political decision has been taken,
but the measure still hinges on a number of feasibility
studies. Uruguay is the country to have lobbied most
strongly for an end to the double CET levy. Paraguay
has objected, however, fearing fiscal losses, since tariff
levies represent 18% of its government’s total receipts.
An end to the double CET levy is also one of
the European Union’s requirements in negotiations
between the two blocs and the matter is working
its way through the technical procedures. The lack of a
regional institution to administer the receipts from the
tariff levy and the constitutional restrictions on the
allocation of resources are the two main stumbling
blocks standing in the way of a rectification of
this distortion.
Also in January 2007, Brazil announced that it
would facilitate the entry into its territory of Uruguay
and Paraguayan products by reducing the level of
national content required to qualify for tariff preferences,
which is currently set at 40% for Paraguay and 50%
for Uruguay. Brazil proposed that MERCOSUR should
reduce those percentages to 30% for Uruguay and 25%
for Paraguay. At the MERCOSUR Summit in Rio de
Janeiro, held on 18 January 2007, it was agreed to
postpone the decision on whether to extend those
benefits. The Summit also set up a task force of deputy
ministers to examine support measures for smaller
partners, with proposals to be submitted to a ministerial
meeting in April.4
The MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund
could help to compensate smaller members for
possible losses in receipts and could also, given the
difficulty in making progress on other issues, represent
a form of partial compensation that would benefit
those members in other ways. The fund holds a capital
of US$ 100 million, of which 75% corresponds to
contributions from the Government of Brazil. Eleven
pilot projects were approved at the Rio de Janeiro
Summit, with a total cost of US$ 73 million. Of these,
five are located in Paraguay, two to build up the
capacities of the MERCOSUR Technical Secretariat
and one to combat foot–and–mouth disease in the region. 
Some less controversial initiatives refer to production
complementarity among the five economies. In
December 2006, the ministers approved a number
of measures in this direction. Petróleo Brasileiro
(Petrobras) will be at the heart of an effort to
coordinate a network of enterprises to bring them up to
the standards of quality, innovation and price that their
suppliers require, in order to increase the share of
the region’s goods– and services–producing firms in
petroleum and gas projects throughout the world.5
In early May 2007, six of the region’s ministers of
economic affairs (Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay)
met to agree upon the creation of the Bank of the
South. One of the purposes of this institution will be to
finance infrastructure projects, especially those that
can contribute to regional integration.
2. Enlargement of MERCOSUR
4 The proposal has generated some internal conflict. The National Confederation of Industry of Brazil opposed the proposal to make the
MERCOSUR rules of origin more flexible, on the basis that industry had not been consulted by the government.
5 Measures have also been examined for the automobile sector, including the integration of assembly firms and producers of vehicle parts with
locations in more than one country and, for the tourism sector, the interconnection of business between hotels and manufacturers of products
the sector uses, such as bed–linen, uniforms, towels, foods and others. Similarly, Brazil and manufacture parts for tractor assembly operations.
These factories now pay tariffs of between 14% and 18%, but under the proposal would pay 8%.
The process of enlargement has become increasingly
important for the future of MERCOSUR. On 15
December 2006, the Common Market Council approved
a request for entry from Bolivia. However, rather than
formalizing the request in order to become a full
member as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had
done, Bolivia asked for the establishment of an ad hoc
task force to examine the costs and benefits of full
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membership, with conclusions to be submitted in a
period of 180 days, renewable for a further like period.
Bolivia intends to continue as a member of the Andean
Community and has made no commitment to substitute
the Andean CET for that of MERCOSUR. 
The new Administration in Ecuador did not
request full membership of MERCOSUR at the
Summit of January 2007, preferring to remain as an
associate member of this group and retain the benefits
of its Andean Community membership.
The protocol of adherence signed with the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela6 in July 2006, which
formalized the country’s entry as a new partner in the
bloc, represented an unprecedented step in the regional
integration process: this was the first time since its
formation in 1991 that MERCOSUR had been
enlarged and had admitted a new full member into
the customs union. Up till then, relations between
MERCOSUR and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
had taken place in the framework of interregional
negotiations between MERCOSUR and the Andean
Community, which had been governed since 2004 by
the Economic Complementation Agreement between
the States Parties of MERCOSUR and Colombia,
Ecuador and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
whose main purpose was to form a free trade area.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s entry to
MERCOSUR signifies a 13.2% increase in the bloc’s
GDP and the addition of a market of 38 million
inhabitants. The Venezuelan economy is the third
largest in South America and the region’s second–
largest exporter. The country is also one of the world’s
biggest oil producers and possesses considerable
reserves of hydrocarbons. However, the importance of
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s incorporation
into MERCOSUR as suggested by these data stands in
contrast to the magnitude of its trade relations with the
bloc, which are relatively minor. The country’s imports
from the region are not only much smaller than the
main intrasubregional flows, but also represent a small
portion of its total exports and imports. It accounts for
some 4.5% of intrasubregional trade and its exports to
MERCOSUR countries represent only 2% of its total
exports. The bulk of Venezuelan exports go to markets
outside the region and the country’s imports from
MERCOSUR come mainly from Brazil and Argentina
(see table IV.6).
6 In order for the protocol of adherence to enter into force, the parliaments of the five member countries must confirm it. Thus far, only the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay have ratified the entry of the new partner.
Table IV.6
SOUTHERN COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR): MATRIX OF INTRASUBREGIONAL TRADE, SUPPOSING THE INCLUSION OF THE
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA AS A FULL MEMBER, 2006
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Argentina 8 152 616 1 139 793 10 700 27.0 2.0 3.8 2.6 35.5 22.8
Brazil 11 714 1 231 1 006 3 555 17 506 49.0 4.1 3.3 11.8 58.1 12.6
Paraguay 168 328 420 10 916 0.7 1.1 1.4 0.0 3.0 21.1
Uruguay 301 583 58 78 1 020 1.3 1.9 0.2 0.3 3.4 22.7
Venezuela
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 25 592 140 599 1 356 0.1 2.0 0.5 2.0 4.5 2.0
MERCOSUR 12 208 9 655 2 045 3 164 4 436 30 142 51.1 32.0 6.8 10.5 14.7 100.0 11.4
2006 Millions of dollars Percentages “Intra”
coefficient
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information form the MERCOSUR Secretariat and official country
information (Secretariat of Foreign Trade of Brazil (SECEX), National Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Argentina (INDEC), Central Bank of Uruguay and
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As regards trade, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela’s entry into MERCOSUR brings two
main challenges: the adoption of the CET and trade
liberalization vis–à–vis the bloc’s founding members.
The protocol of adherence established a four–year time
frame for the adoption of the CET and delegates the
preparation of a timeline for its implementation to the
task force.7 The main problem arising in this process is
tariff convergence. Some studies have found a degree
of parity in the mid–level tariffs, but the complexity
of the Venezuelan tariff scheme could give rise to a
certain amount of conflict during the process of
convergence.
With regard to the liberalization of trade within
the bloc, the protocol of adherence stipulates a time
frame within which Argentina and Brazil must open
their economies to Venezuelan products, starting on
1 January 2010. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
will allow products from all MERCOSUR members
free access to its market as of 1 January 2012. Lastly,
Uruguay and Paraguay will fully open their markets to
Venezuelan products as of 2013. The protocol provides
for deadlines to be brought forward in the case of
products covered by agreements signed previously
between MERCOSUR and the Andean Community,
particularly for “sensitive” products for which the
establishment of zero tariffs was moved from 2018
to 2014. The greatest differences between the two
timeframes affect the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
Paraguay and Uruguay. In any case, the activities
that have the greatest potential to increase trade flows
are already covered by some degree of preference, so
the benefits of moving trade liberalization schedules
forward should not be overestimated.
There has been discussion in the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela over some of the possible
economic effects of trade liberalization, given that it is
less competitive than the MERCOSUR countries in
certain branches of production. In particular, the trade
deficit that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has
been running with the countries of the southern bloc
throws some doubt on whether the country’s productive
fabric can reach the standards necessary within the
times stipulated. Moreover, in those sectors and
products that offer potential opportunities for new
Venezuelan exports in general, it appears that the new
partner will have to compete with one of the bloc’s two
largest economies. For the moment, the country has
comparative advantages in a number of products, such
as iron and steel, chemical and non–ferrous metals
(Andean Community, 2007a), in which both Argentina
and Brazil also have great potential. For those
products, therefore, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela will probably continue to rely on demand
from the Andean countries, especially Colombia and
Ecuador, which entail lower transport costs than do the
MERCOSUR countries (Fernández and Pineda, 2006).
The withdrawal of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela from the Andean Community has drained
momentum from Venezuelan trade with Peru, however,
with Venezuelan imports into Peru down by 70% in the
first two months of 2007 (Aduanas del Perú, 2007).
There is still a question mark over the role the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela will play in the
dynamics of decision–making within MERCOSUR.8
Some see the country as a possible strategic ally for
Argentina, with the two forming a counterweight to the
economic power of Brazil in the region. Others see it
as a potential leader uniting the smaller economies of
the bloc, perhaps helping to lay to rest the separatist
pressures that have arisen within the smaller partners.
Too little time has elapsed to draw any conclusions,
however, and, more importantly, it remains to be seen
what policy measures the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela will take to finalize its entry into
MERCOSUR, including its real willingness to negotiate
an association agreement with the European Union.
Two aspects have aroused some uncertainty on the
political front. The first is the leverage the Government
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela might be
able to exert on the bloc’s external agenda, since the
country is becoming increasingly vulnerable in sectors
in which MERCOSUR is more competitive and
this could generate tensions in negotiations with third
parties (Peña, 2007a). The second, related, matter is the
choice of main economic partners outside the region,
which could become a source of conflict among the
members of MERCOSUR.
The process of admitting the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela as a full member of MERCOSUR is
generating a new layout of integration in South
America. An important test will be how relations
between the members evolve during the transition
process and how the competitiveness gaps between
7 See MERCOSUR [online] http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/es/index.htm.
8 Da Motta Veiga and Rios (2007) and Vaillant (2007) give an analysis of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’s entry into MERCOSUR.
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them are addressed. At the same time, the process
represents a great opportunity for MERCOSUR, since
the successful incorporation of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela would not only make the bloc institutionally
stronger, but would also help to attract other South
American countries.
In its trade relations with the rest of the region,
Brazil has been gradually adopting a strategy of
bilateral agreements, as have the other MERCOSUR
partners. Brazil has signed agreements with the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia and
Paraguay and is holding discussions with Argentina,
Chile and Uruguay. A prominent example is the
cooperation agreement on biofuels signed by Brazil
and the United States.9 Subsequently, Brazil formed a
strategic partnership with the European Union, in the
framework of the first Brazil–European Union Summit.
Such a partnership, which the European Union has
formed previously only with China, India and the
Russian Federation, involves, among other things,
the pursuit of an agenda of dialogue, contacts and
knowledge transfer activities on a broad range of
issues, including fuels, for which a mechanism known
as the “Energy Dialogue” has been created.10
The small economies in MERCOSUR would be
willing to explore new possibilities, not only as regards
internal linkages but also relations with countries from
outside the bloc. A number of technical experts from
government agencies and academic circles are now
assessing this possibility and the possible costs and
benefits involved.
9 Peña (2007b) gives an analysis of this agreement and its regional effects.
10 See European Union website [online] http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/brazil/intro/index.htm.
C. Relations within MERCOSUR
On 27 January 2007, Uruguay signed a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the
United States. Argentina and Brazil have stated that the
ultimate signature of an FTA with the United States by
Uruguay would be incompatible with the country’s
continued membership in MERCOSUR. However, the
prospect of the framework agreement’s signature
helped to attract a number of foreign investments to
Uruguay, with a view to the United States market. The
TIFA also reflects Uruguay’s dissatisfaction with the
results of MERCOSUR and its disappointment over
the stance the bloc has taken on its conflict with
Argentina over pulp mills in Uruguay.
A number of conflicts remain among the
MERCOSUR partners. The most entrenched is
between Uruguay and Argentina and concerns
potential environmental damage from two pulp mills
sponsored by European groups, Botnia of Finland and
ENCE of Spain. In 2002, the two firms began
procedures to set up operations in Fray Bentos in
Uruguay’s eastern region. The project involves a total
investment of almost US$ 1.5 billion and could have a
considerable impact on the Uruguayan economy in
terms of employment, exports and tax income. The
plan triggered opposition in Argentina, however, where
questions were raised over the project’s potentially
harmful cross–border impacts, the choice of location,
the production technology to be employed and the
plants’ waste management. The rationale for the
environmental criticisms was that the plants would use
a water resource shared by the two countries. The
Argentine government claims that Uruguay has
breached the River Uruguay Statue (ERU) a treaty
between the two countries that was concluded in 1975,
by failing to consult with the Administrative
Commission for the River Uruguay (CARU) regarding
its intention to undertake a project of this magnitude.
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Uruguay questioned the rationale for these
criticisms, noting that Argentina has allowed the
establishment and operation of several pulp mills that
use inferior technology on its territory. In addition,
permits for the construction of the plants at the planned
location had been issued following commitments that
they would operate to international standards and
rules. The dispute worsened when the Uruguayan
government unilaterally gave the go ahead for work to
begin which, in the case of Botnia, was enshrined in a
bilateral investment agreement signed with Finland.
The conflict become even more bitter in the early
months of 2006, when inhabitants and civil society
organizations of Gualeguaychú, a city in the Argentine
province of Entre Ríos almost opposite Fray Bentos on
the River Uruguay’s other bank, blocked border
crossings into Uruguay at the height of the tourist season.
In May 2006, the Government of Uruguay
appealed to the MERCOSUR Dispute Settlement
Mechanism under the Protocol of Olivos, alleging that
the Argentine government’s failure to take action over
the roadblocks had caused it serious economic losses.
The Argentine authorities defended their stance before
the MERCOSUR arbitration tribunal, arguing that
respect for the constitutional principle of freedom
of expression must take primacy over free road
movement as established in the Treaty of Asunción.
Seeking to keep the conflict in the terrain of a
bilateral dispute and out of the regional sphere,
Argentina pressed ahead with the procedure set forth in
the River Uruguay Statue, filing proceedings against
Uruguay in the International Court of Justice in
In 2006 the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
withdrew from the Andean Community. The member
countries are now concluding negotiations for the
administration of the five–year period in which the
benefits granted and received will continue to be valid,
as provided in article 135 of the Cartagena Agreement.
The Hague over the alleged violation of the Statute’s
provisions.11 In December 2006, ENCE informed the
two governments of its decision to change its mill’s
location to the Uruguayan department of Colonia,
while Botnia moved rapidly ahead with work at the
original location. The Spanish Crown is currently
engaged in a process of mediation in the matter.
The protests in Argentina have continued and the
roadblocks have spread to other border crossings.
The Uruguayan authorities have refused to enter into
any kind of official negotiation until the roadblocks
are removed.
In January 2007, Argentina brought a complaint
against Brazil before the World Trade Organization
(WTO) over antidumping measures taken against
imports of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) resin
from Argentina. Argentina bases its complaint on
the argument that the anti–dumping investigation
conducted, the determination made and the duties
imposed by Brazil are inconsistent with the GATT
provisions of 1994 and the Anti–Dumping Agreement
(WTO, 2007).12
In late 2006, Argentina imposed new restrictions
on some household appliances, from Brazil by making
them subject to non–automatic import licences, which
slows and bureaucratizes the import procedure. Brazil
accused Argentina of avoiding importing those goods
from MERCOSUR countries and importing them from
China and Mexico instead, thus diverting trade.
Argentina argued that it needed to reach a level of
production that would enable it to compete with Brazil
(Valor Econômico, 2007).
11 The International Court of Justice has rejected requests for provisional measures made by Argentina and Uruguay, seeking, respectively, the
suspension of works and the removal of roadblocks.
12 It is worthy of note that Argentina should have taken its complaint directly to WTO without exploring dispute settlement alternatives at the
regional level. Argentina alleges that MERCOSUR does not provide harmonized rules to deal with antidumping issues, whereas the WTO rules
are valid and accepted everywhere (O Estado de S. Paulo, 2007).
D. The andean community: a difficult renewal
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From the time of notice of withdrawal until five years
have elapsed, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
remains committed to: (a) maintain national treatment;
(b) prohibit barriers to trade proceeding from Andean
countries; (c) maintain trade liberation programmes
agreed upon with its former partners; and (d) extend
most–favoured nation treatment until full withdrawal.
The countries also agreed to continue to set specific
rules to govern issues concerning safeguards, the
dispute settlement mechanism, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures and technical barriers to trade, as well as the
goods liberalization programmes (Decision 641 of
the Commission of the Andean Community). The
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia and
Ecuador agreed that the provisions contained in the
Motor Vehicle Complementarity Agreement13 and the
related instruments would remain fully valid. The
Secretary General of the Andean Community and the
Presidents of Bolivia and Ecuador have engaged in
efforts to persuade the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to reconsider its decision and rejoin the
Andean Community (Andean Community, 2007c).
The member countries of the Andean Community
signed a Memorandum of Understanding giving Chile
the status of associate member and agreed to enter into
negotiations on an association agreement between
the two parties. A Joint Committee was set up for this
purpose, comprising representatives of the Government
of Chile and officials from the General Secretariat of
the Andean Community (Andean Community, 2006
and 2007f).
The Joint Committee’s preliminary activities
concluded with the adoption of Decision 666, which
contains provisions on Chile’s participation in the
bodies and mechanisms of the Andean Community
in its capacity as an associate member. Generally
speaking, the decision allowed Chile to participate
with the right to speak in ordinary and extraordinary
meetings of the Andean Integration System, including
the Andean Presidential Council, the Andean Council
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Commission
of the Andean Community. Trade relations will
continue to be governed by the complementarity
agreements signed between the bloc’s member
countries and Chile.
The Joint Committee, which was created in
September 2006, continues to function and will meet
at least once every year and hold extraordinary
sessions at the request of the member countries. The
Commission was mandated to address and resolve
differences arising from the implementation of
decision 666 (Andean Community, 2006, Decision 645).
Despite the withdrawal of the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela from the group, intrasubregional exports
continued to expand, registering a value of over
US$ 12.7 billion (see table IV.7). If the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela is excluded from the
calculation, the rate of expansion of intrasubregional
trade drops from 23% to 10% and the percentage of
intrasubregional exports drops from 10% to 8%. The
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela therefore continues
to be an important partner for the other Andean
countries, since its market generates a strong demand
for a number of key regional products, including
vegetable oils, medicines, motor vehicles, textiles
and clothing and fishery products. Conversely, the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela continues to supply
petroleum products, especially gasoil, liquid
hydrocarbons and crude oils, iron and steel, transport
equipment, chemicals and cosmetics to the rest of the
subregion. In all these sectors, the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela and the other Andean countries have
demonstrated a high level of complementarity (Andean
Community, 2007a).
In the first quarter of 2007, intrasubregional
exports continued to rise, although at a lower rate than
in 2006. This growth was driven mainly by Colombian
exports to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and
faster growth in Peru’s exports to all destinations,
except the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and
Ecuador. The latter two countries have seen their
exports to the subregion slow by 10% and 15%,
respectively.
13 Under this arrangement, the countries apply a tariff of 35% to light vehicles and can suspend tariff payments for parts and pieces for
assembly, subject to compliance with rules of origin. For heavy vehicles, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Colombia apply a CET of
15% and Ecuador of 10% (Andean Community, 2007b).
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Undeniably, the Andean Community has built
up assets as a mechanism of subregional integration,
particularly in the last few years, when it has engaged
in considerable efforts to modernize. The group is now
at a crossroads, however. As a number of authors have
noted, the Andean Community has a solid institutional
structure and a corpus of rules that govern its
members’ trade (Pineda Hoyos, 2007; Machinea and
Uthoff, 2007; González Vigil, 2005), the most recent
being rules on trade in services. Although the bloc
began developing these rules in June 1998, there were
a number of delays to their implementation and they
did not come fully into force until December 2006,
which makes it difficult to evaluate their operation in
practice. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the will of the
bloc’s current members to move ahead with deepening
the integration process.
The Andean Community and its members are
preparing for negotiations on an association agreement
with the European Union. On 19 April 2007, at the
thirteenth Ministerial Meeting between the Andean
Community and the European Union, the Ministers
expressed their intention to begin these negotiations in
the framework of the next meeting of the Joint
Committee, which was to be held at the end of May in
La Paz, Bolivia. As events transpired, however, the
negotiations were actually launched in Tarija, Bolivia,
on 14 June 2007 during the seventeenth Regular
Meeting of the Andean Council of Presidents. On 17
July the 14 panels that will examine the various
issues involved in the negotiations were set up, and the
parties agreed to hold the first round of talks in
Colombia from 17 to 21 September. In preparations for
these negotiations, on 13 July the Andean Community
adopted Decision 670 regarding the adoption of a
consolidated customs schedule and Decision 671 on
the harmonization of customs regimes, together with
other provisions on customs administration. These two
decisions are of vital importance in paving the way for
talks between these parties.
Thus far, the members of the Andean Community
have defined a common tariff reduction point, known
as the “base tariff”, for 75% of tariff items and for all
trade with the European Union (Andean Community,
2007e). Efforts are still needed to bring their tariff
lines closer together and develop an effectively
unified tariff.
With the adoption of Decision 663 in January
2007, the entry into force of Decision 535, by which
the group’s new CET is to be approved and existing
exemptions are to be extended until 31 January 2008,
was postponed once again.14 Given this postponement,
the picture in the region as regards CET is as shown in
table IV.8. There is a clear difference between Peru,
which has brought 43% of tariff lines down to zero,
and Bolivia and Ecuador, which have done so for only
6% of lines and Colombia, which has done so for
just 3%. Peru applies a CET of 12% for 40% of tariff
sub–items, while Colombia retains tariff peaks of up to
227% and Ecuador of 85.5%, although these peaks
represent no more than 1% of the tariff universe of
6,843 lines (see table IV.8).
14 The implementation of CET has now been postponed eight times. See Decisions 563, 569, 577, 580, 612, 620, 626 and 628, compiled and
analysed in table 16 in Durán and Maldonado (2005).
Table IV.7
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: EXPORTS INCLUDING THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA,
1990–2007
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
1990 1995 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 January January
-March -March
2006 2007a
Total exports (1) 31 751 39 134 38 896 53 543 52 177 54 716 74 140 100 089 124 111 29 670 30 108
Percentage annual growth 25.7 16.1 -16.5 -11.8 -2.6 4.9 35.5 35.0 24.0 32.2 1.5
Exports to the Andean
Community (2) 1 312 4 812 5 504 5 656 5 227 4 900 7 604 10 313 12 719 2 680 2 848
Percentage annual growth 26.3 28.2 -2.2 9.5 -7.6 -6.3 55.2 35.6 23.3 35.2 6.3
Percentage exports
intra–Andean Community (2/1) 4.1 12.3 14.2 10.6 10.0 9.0 10.5 10.3 10.2 9.0 9.5
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Andean Community and from the countries.
a Preliminary estimates.
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In addition, “advances were made toward approving
a set of Community customs provisions, leaving only
those referring to customs regimes and customs
offenses to be dealt with. As regards transportation,
the Decision on international highway transportation
of goods is being perfected in order to introduce a
series of improvements that will facilitate this service”
(Andean Community, 2007e). The entry into force
of community commitments on services should
also help to move talks with the European Union ahead
in this area.
The agreements Colombia and Peru have signed
with the United States have yet to come into force. In
the first case, the process of approval is under way in
both countries; in the second, approval is pending in
the United States. Bolivia and Ecuador are seeking
to extend the duration of the tariff preferences granted
under ATPDEA, which expire at the end of February
2008. Colombia is also negotiating an FTA with the
Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala
and Honduras) and Peru is in talks with Thailand
and Singapore.
Table IV.8
COMPARISON OF TARIFF STRUCTURE OF ANDEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES
(Number of sub–items)
Level Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru
No. lines Percentage No. lines Percentage No. lines Percentage No. lines Percentage
of the total of the total of the total of the total
0 395 5.8 192 2.8 418 6.1 2 975 43.5
5 1 688 24.7 2 293 33.5 2 224 32.5
10 4 749 69.4 962 14.1 1 201 17.6
12 2 742 40.1
15 1 633 23.9 1 283 18.7
17 47 0.7








More than one levela 11 0.1 66 1.0 62 0.9 41 0.6
Source:Andean Community, “Estado de situación de la aplicación del arancel externo común. Al 15 de febrero de 2007”, working paper (SG/DT.384), General Secretariat,
21 February 2007.
a Cases in which the more detailed 10–digit national schedule has two or more different tariff levels for a particular eight–digit line of the Common Tariff Nomenclature
of the member States of the Cartagena Agreement Decision 381, owing to overlaps occurring at that level of detail.
E. Central American regional integration:
renewed momentum15
Between 2002 and 2006, the Central American region
experienced considerable activity in the area of trade
agreements. Negotiations on the Dominican Republic
—Central America— United States Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA–DR)16 began in 2002; the Agreement was
signed in 2004 and it was ratified by every country
15 This section is based on Schatan and others (2007).
16 CAFTA–RD includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, which are also members of the Central American
Common Market (CACM).
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except Costa Rica in 2005 and 2006. In the case of
Costa Rica, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal decided
that it should be ratified or rejected by referendum rather
than by the Legislative Assembly. The referendum will
be held in August or September 2007 (Inside U.S.
Trade, 2007b).
Almost simultaneously, the countries of the region
have been renewing their efforts to achieve regional
integration. The Plan of Action for Central American
Economic Integration was signed by the governments
of the region with a view to moving from CACM to a
customs union, and other concrete steps have also been
taken to expedite the process. Among other things,
the Agreement on information exchange and mutual
assistance, the Standard Central American Tariff Code,
the community transit regime and the Agreement on
compatibility of tax systems are worth mentioning.
Another important step was the creation of the regional
dispute settlement mechanism and the establishment
of integrated and peripheral customhouses within
the customs territory, a measure which will help
streamline the transit of goods. Considerable progress
has been made towards eliminating obstacles to trade;
in 2006, only five of the 100 or so obstacles identified
by the Secretariat for Central American Economic
Integration (SIECA) soon after 2000 remained.
All this effort has led to a steady increase in
intrasubregional trade flows. In 2006, and so far in
2007, intrasubregional trade rose significantly in
practically every direction, with Nicaragua, Guatemala
and Honduras showing especially strong growth
during the first quarter of 2007. If this trend continues,
the intrasubregional trade coefficient will be over 18%,
the highest level attained to date (see table IV.9).17
There has been considerable discussion about the
relationship between CAFTA–DR and the integration
of the Central American countries. One might ask
to what extent the negotiation and subsequent
implementation of CAFTA–DR might undermine the
Central American countries’ integration efforts and
their desire to take advantage of their own regional
markets to stimulate their economies or, from another
standpoint, to what extent the new treaty would help
consolidate integration.
Actually, the interaction between activities
concerning CAFTA–DR and efforts to establish a
Central American customs union has been quite
dynamic. There are clear synergies between the two
agreements aimed at achieving institutional, legal and
procedural changes in the countries and achieving
greater flexibility and transparency in trade within the
region and between the region and other countries.
Most of these changes will benefit all stakeholders,
helping to improve regional integration and boost the
region’s position within the global economy.
17 In these calculations, maquila and free–zone activities are included in total exports of the group. This explains why the coefficient is different
from the official figures provided by the General Directorate of Informatics of the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration
(SIECA), which do not include maquila industries. See “Centroamérica Exportaciones (FOB) 2000–2006” [online] http://www.
sieca.org.gt/Publico/CA_en_cifras/COMERCIO_2000_2006/04.htm).
Table IV.9
EXPORTS FROM THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET, 1990–2007
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Central American 1990 1995 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 January January
Common Market (CACM) -March -March
2006 2007b
Total exportsa (1) 4 480 8 745 14 987 16 328 17 006 18 117 19 767 21 849 24 821 5 907 6 795
Percentage growth 25.2 17.1 17.4 -1.8 4.1 6.5 9.1 10.5 13.6 4.9 15.0
CACM exports (2) 624 1 451 2 754 2 829 2 871 3 111 3 506 3 912 4 429 1 062 1 243
Percentage growth 8.9 17.2 38.5 1.5 8.3 11.6 12.7 11.6 13.2 19.3 17.0
Percentage exports
within CACM (2/1) 13.9 16.6 18.4 17.3 16.9 17.2 17.7 17.9 17.8 18.0 18.3
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on official information supplied by the Secretariat for Central American Integration
(SIECA) and official information supplied by the countries concerned.
a Total export figures include maquila and free zones.
b Preliminary estimates.
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Thanks to the initiatives generated by CAFTA–DR
and by the CACM countries, with European Union
support, the groundwork has been laid for an effective
customs union. The region itself has developed some
essential common rules, as noted above, and when no
regional rules existed, they have been drawn up on the
basis of CAFTA–DR. Rules based on CAFTA–DR have
been developed in the following fields: government
procurement; investment (although a Central American
agreement on investment and trade in services already
existed, it had not been ratified by any of the countries);
cross–border trade in services, including financial
services; telecommunications; intellectual property;
labour and environmental issues; and transparency and
corruption. In some cases, the rules adopted in the
context of CAFTA–DR are WTO rules, so they
contribute towards harmonizing regional rules with
internationally agreed rules. In other areas such as
intellectual property, however, the requirements laid
down are considerably more stringent that those agreed
in WTO or even in previous free trade agreements
between the United States and other countries,
including NAFTA; this has led to discussions on the
potential cost of innovation and health in the region.18
As regards trade between the Central American
countries and between these countries and the United
States, concerns have been expressed in regard both
to the fiscal impact of tariff reduction and to the
possibility that intraregional trade might be replaced
by trade with the United States. One of the main
concerns has to do with different nature of intraregional
and extraregional trade. Indeed, most of the products
exported to the CACM countries are wholly
manufactured and hence have greater value added than
the products that are exported to the United States.
Exports to that country are mainly maquila products,
especially clothing and electronic subassemblies, and
commodities with very few local production linkages
and, hence, only limited economic benefits. 
In 2005, the main intraregional export products
were, among others, foodstuffs based on cereal or
flour; milk, eggs and others; alcoholic beverages and
vinegar; paper and cardboard, forged iron and steel,
chemical products; pharmaceuticals, data processing
machines and parts; plastics and plastic manufactures,
electrical machinery and apparatus. The only commodity
was meat and edible meat offal.
In considering the repercussions of CAFTA–DR
on trade flows in the Central American region, the
following points should be borne in mind:
(a) The United States has not been a significant
supplier of goods similar to those traded among
the Central American countries, at least up to
the entry into force of CAFTA–DR. Even when
CAFTA–DR enters into force, products from the
United States are not likely to “invade” the Central
American markets, since they probably will not
be able to compete with regional production of
similar goods.
(b) The sources of Central America’s imports have
become diversified and that trend is likely to
continue. China plays an important role and is
displacing the United States as a supplier of goods
to Central America, as are the Central American
countries themselves and the countries of the
European Union (see table IV.10).
(c) CAFTA–DR is not expected to bring about major
changes in the volume or composition of Central
American exports to the United States, a large
share of which are already entering the United
States duty–free under preferential agreements
with individual countries, i.e., through the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative.19
(d) There could be major changes in the maquila
clothing sector, since all the countries will be
granted certain preferences in addition to the
existing ones. Nicaragua, the poorest country of
the region, will be especially favoured, as it will
benefit from very flexible rules of origin during
the first five years. It will be able to use the
equivalent of 100 million square meters of fabrics
from third countries for production of clothing
and to export that production to the United States
free of tariffs.
(e) The countries are expected to attract more FDI,
while domestic investment would probably be
directed more towards exports that can take
advantage of rules of origin under CAFTA–DR.
In that regard, the agreement would be attractive
18 Díaz (2006) includes an assessment of intellectual property issues in free trade agreements. Schatan and others (2007) also provides
an overview.
19 The Caribbean Basin Initiative has been in force since 1983 and will expire in 2008 or on the date when CAFTA–DR is ratified by one of
its signatories. 
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because preferential access to the United States
market is now permanent rather than temporary,
as it was under GSP and CBI. Moreover, inputs
from throughout the region can be integrated for
export to the United States market. This advantage
is further enhanced by the agreement with the
United States under which the benefit also extends
to certain inputs originating in Mexico.
(f) The remaining challenges for regional integration
are to eliminate the exceptions laid down in Annex
A to the General Treaty on Central American
Economic Integration and to establish a common
external tariff. In 2006, 5.4% of items had yet to be
harmonized, potentially opening up a window for
unfair trade within the region and jeopardizing the
success of the customs union.
Table IV.10
CENTRAL AMERICA: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY DESTINATION, 2000-2005
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
CACM United European China Hong Kong Others Totala
Statesa Union
Millions of dollars
2000 2 617 9 640 1 943 17 19 1 924 16 168
2005 3 912 12 290 1 916 304 489 1 428 21 871
Percentages
2000 16.2 59.6 12.0 0.1 0.1 11.9 100.0
2005 17.9 56.2 8.8 1.4 2.2 6.5 100.0
Millions of dollars
2000 2 739 7 927 1 633 208 78 4 694 18 909
2005 2 602 9 557 2 529 1 355 135 8 448 26 758
Percentages
2000 14.5 41.9 8.6 1.1 0.4 24.8 100.0
2005 9.7 35.7 9.5 5.1 0.5 31.6 100.0
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) and
official information from Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) for intrasubregional trade, official information from Secretariat for Central
American Economic Integration (SIECA). 
a The figures include the value of maquila exports and of free zones. COMTRADE does not include these figures; in all cases, total export figures and figures for the







F. The Caribbean community: beyond the point
of no return
Regional integration among the English–speaking
countries of the Caribbean, which have recently been
joined by Dutch–speaking Suriname and French–
speaking Haiti, has always been about much more than
trade. Indeed, it has been argued that integration in the
area of trade would not entail significant advantages
for the CARICOM countries, given that intraregional
trade represents a relatively small share of overall
trade, especially if energy exports from Trinidad and
Tobago to the other countries in the group are excluded
(Mesquita Moreira and Mendoza, 2007).
In 2006, intrasubregional trade in the CARICOM
area amounted to around US$ 2.7 billion and grew by
around 23.6% (see IV.11). In absolute terms, the largest
increase appears to have occurred in Trinidad and
Tobago, which accounted for 72% of subregional
exports and whose main trading partners continue to be
Barbados, Belize and Jamaica.
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The regional integration process has moved
forward over the last two years (see box IV.1). During
most of the decade, it has become evident that
asymmetrical preferential agreements on access to
the European market by Caribbean exporters might be
incompatible with the WTO agreements. The Cotonou
Agreement (2000) envisages the establishment of a
symmetrical agreement between the European Union
and its former colonies in the African, Caribbean
and Pacific Group of States (ACP) that would be
compatible with WTO rules. This new trade agreement
would be drawn up in the form of an economic
partnership agreement.
The economic partnership agreement calls for
regional integration to be firmly established; this
means that the CARICOM countries are under
considerable pressure to make substantive progress.
From the European standpoint, the Caribbean
economic partnership agreement should include not
only the members of CARICOM, but also the
Dominican Republic. Accordingly, the Caribbean
Forum of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
of States (CARIFORUM) was created as a grouping
of countries as well as an organization that could sign
an agreement on trade and technical cooperation with
the European Union.
Table IV.11
EXPORTS FROM THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM), 1990–2006
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
1990 1995 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006a
Total exports (1) 4 955 5 927 5 537 7 544 7 110 8 624 10 395 14 125 18 522
Percentage annual growth 19.7 25.3 -6.5 -3.1 -5.8 21.3 20.5 35.9 31.1
Exports to CARICOM (2) 509 843 1 031 1 384 1 220 1 419 1 810 2 188 2 704
Percentage annual growth 8.2 26.5 5.7 12.4 -11.8 16.3 27.5 20.9 23.6
Percentage of exports
within CARICOM (2/1) 10.3 14.2 18.6 18.3 17.2 16.5 17.4 15.5 14.6
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the respective subregional schemes and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
These data do not include information on The Bahamas; hence, the intraregional trade coefficient with that country would be different than the figure shown
here. For the same reason, the series are different from those shown previously.
a Preliminary figures.
In 2006, a number of significant mi-
lestones were reached and significant
progress was made towards the
integration of CARICOM. The Caribbean
Common Market, conceived as a
preliminary step towards the CARICOM
Single Market and Economy (CSME),
was formally established on 1 January
2006. The Common Market provides
for the free movement of goods and
services originating in the region, the
right of establishment, free movement
of skilled workers (holding the Caribbean
Skills Certificate) and free movement
of capital. Six countries joined from
the outset: Belize, Guyana, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and
Jamaica; these countries have supported
the common market since 2004. The
Member States of the Organisation
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
were reluctant to make a commitment
to comply with the framework established,
as they first had to resolve certain
issues. Those countries joined once
they saw that sufficient progress had
been made in the process, a development
fund had been established, and the
regulations on foreign ownership of
land had been accepted. With the
addition, on 3 July 2006, of Antigua and
Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, mem-
bership of the Single Market rose to 12.
The establishment of CSME has
been a two–stage process. In February
2007, the Heads of State decided to
devote 2008 and 2009 to achieving
harmonization in several areas of
economic policy, including the broade-
ning of monetary cooperation and
establishment of a single currency,
as well as unified tax and incentive
systems. A full monetary union will be
established between 2010 and 2015,
and structural policies will be coordina-
ted in several sectors.
Not only did the members of OECS
join CSME, they also announced plans
for full economic union. The signing
ceremony was held in Saint Kitts
and Nevis on 21 June 2006; on that
occasion, the new proposal for an
OECS treaty, outlining the steps to be
followed in establishing an economic
union, was made public. The deadline
for establishment of the economic
union is 1 July 2007. 
Box IV.1
STEPS TOWARD A CARIBBEAN SINGLE MARKET
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), ECLAC subregional headquarters for the Caribbean, Port of Spain.
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The deadline for completing negotiations on
an economic partnership agreement between the
European Union and CARIFORUM, at least in general
terms, is July 2007. During the first few months of
the year, the countries have continued negotiating
those issues which up to now had represented a
challenge in the effort to reach an understanding
between the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery
and the European Union. Some of the key issues
are: (a) tariff reduction; (b) trade in services and
investment; (c) government procurement, as well as
tools for implementing development cooperation
(CRNM, 2007). At the end of 2006, some of the
fundamental issues hindering consensus with Europe
were yet to be resolved, including regional geometry,
harmonization of sectoral policies, the nature of tariff
reduction commitments, the position on sugar and
bananas and the deadline for negotiations. In
particular, the parties needed to reach consensus on
tariff reduction schemes in the region, so as to make
it possible to establish a variable geometry that would
take into account the legal issues arising from the
special economic characteristics of the Dominican
Republic, the Bahamas, Haiti and the OECS countries.
Consensus was also pending on how and when to
incorporate new agreements on sugar and bananas in
the economic partnership agreement and on liberalization
of services.
The inclusion of Haiti in CSME came up again
when CARICOM terminated its suspension of that
country’s membership, bearing in mind that the
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006 had
been free and fair and that they clearly reflected
the wishes of the citizens. Since Haiti had not been
allowed to participate in any of the discussions on
CSME for over two years, it can appeal for protection
under the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, which
also provides a certain degree of protection for
disadvantaged countries in the group through tools
such as the development fund.
With respect to the harmonization of sectoral
policies, energy is probably the most important issue
pending in Caribbean integration efforts. Thirteen
of the 15 members of CARICOM signed the
PETROCARIBE Energy Cooperation Agreement with
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. This agreement
is aimed at providing relief from high oil prices for
the Caribbean States by deferring payments. The
CARICOM countries welcomed the agreement,
especially Jamaica, which was paying more and more
for oil imports. The initiative was launched in June
2005, although many analytical problems remained to
be solved in 2006. 
Another important issue that must be dealt with by
CSME is the formulation of an energy policy for the
Caribbean. In 2006, considerable technical work was
done by the CARICOM task force on regional energy
policy, Trinidad and Tobago’s regional energy plan and
the proposed pipeline for the Caribbean Renewable
Energy Development Programme (CREDP), among
others. These projects are broad in scope and include
legislation on conventional and renewable sources
of energy, market regulation, intra– and extraregional
negotiations and initiatives for the processing of
raw materials.
The free movement of labour is essential in
CSME and continues to be encouraged. There is some
preferential treatment, as some OECS countries are
not required to apply reciprocity, that is, they are not
required to accept workers from the region in cases
when their own workers might not be able to compete
in certain places in CSME. Efforts to harmonize
educational certificates, travel documents and
debarkation permits have continued in the region.
There are clearly many opportunities within the region
for CSME workers but past experience has shown that
skilled workers and college–educated professionals are
likely to benefit the most from the free movement
laws. Suriname, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines and Grenada are already issuing
CARICOM passports.
The CSME constitution will make it necessary to
reduce or eliminate practices that curtail the movement
of capital. Current laws on the right of establishment
allow companies to set up operations in all CSME
zones, and the promise that no new restrictions will be
established is maintained. Companies will also benefit
from the free movement of skilled workers, thus
enabling such workers to follow their employers
abroad. These measures are expected to provide
impetus to the economic growth of the region.
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At the first meeting of Heads of State and Government
of the South American Community of Nations (SACN),
held in Brasilia, Brazil, on 29 and 30 September 2005,
the member countries of SACN requested the
“[LAIA], MERCOSUR, [the Andean Community] and
CARICOM Secretariats to prepare, no later than the
first semester of 2006, studies on the convergence of
economic complementation agreements among the
countries of South America. These studies should
contemplate the objective of the gradual establishment
of a South American free trade zone as well as the
complementation of the economies of the South
American countries and the promotion of their growth
and development, taking into consideration the reduction
of existing asymmetries and in the case of member states
of [LAIA] preserving the advances achieved in
Resolution 59 of [LAIA’s] Council of Ministers.”20
To this end, the secretariats drew up a set of
proposals which were transmitted to Ambassador
Celso Amorim, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil,
on 13 July 2006.21 The reports are divided into three
categories: (a) a new treatment of asymmetries in
South American integration; (b) convergence of
integration agreements in South America; and (c) legal
and institutional issues relating to the South American
Community of Nations.
In order to facilitate convergence between South
American integration agreements, the documents
prepared by the secretariats include proposals on the
trade issues covered by the integration schemes: tariff
reduction; rules of origin; customs valuation and
special customs regimes; trade remedies; non–tariff
measures; technical barriers to trade; sanitary and
phytosanitary measures; trade in services; investment;
intellectual property; competition policies; government
procurement; and dispute settlement.
As far as tariff reduction is concerned, progress
in creating the South American free trade zone on the
basis of the network of existing agreements has
been slow. Trade between members of the Andean
Community and MERCOSUR is practically liberalized,
except in the sugar and automotive sectors in
MERCOSUR. Trade liberalization among members
of SACN, however, is moving slowly. In 2011, for
example, tariff–free intracommunity trade will account
for between 50% and 70% of total trade. In 2018, the
figure will be between 65% and 95% (ECLAC, 2006c;
SACN, 2006; Vaillant, 2007). There is room for
speeding up liberalization of reciprocal trade,
especially among the smaller and relatively less
developed countries.
G. The South American Community of Nations
as a mechanism for convergence
20 See “Declaration on the Convergence of Integration Processes in South America” [online] http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/
documentos/documents/casa_2005_1.htm. 
21 The documents in question may be found under Documentos elaborados por las secretarías generales de la Comunidad Andina, Mercosur y
LAIA para el proceso de convergencia sudamericano [online] http://www.comunidadandina.org/csn/estudios.htm.
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As far as origin is concerned, it appears that the
differences between these agreements and decisions
are not significant. Nevertheless, the rules should be
harmonized in order to allow for full convergence of
the agreements. Indeed, there should be a common
legal basis because so far, each one has its own reference
to responsible authorities. A free trade zone should
have a common legal basis in order to ensure greater
transparency in relations. Furthermore, uniform criteria
should be followed so as to facilitate intracommunity
trade. It would also be useful to harmonize the format
of certificates of origin, bearing in mind the high cost
of bureaucracy and red tape; this would make it possible
to shorten time limits for verification and control.
In resolution 226 of 5 March 1997, the Committee
of Representatives of LAIA adopted common customs
valuation rules for the 11 member countries of the
Association to supplement the relevant WTO agreement,
which is also in force for members of LAIA. Resolution
226 establishes that the customs value of imported
goods shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of the agreement on the application of
article VII of GATT 1994.
Thus, a common base is already in place for
members of SACN. Nevertheless, an additional issue
that should be included in the SACN agenda and
was not dealt with by the secretariats is that of the
relationship between the customs procedures generally
applied by the countries. In particular, a greater effort
should be made to automate, simplify and facilitate
trade without reducing oversight.
A key element in establishing a South American
free trade zone is the elimination of non–tariff barriers
that are not directly aimed at achieving legitimate
trade policy objectives. In this regard, the documents
prepared by the secretariats propose that members
should initiate negotiations with a view to gradually
eliminating non–tariff measures (NTMs). In terms
of offers, these negotiations would entail setting a
deadline for the elimination of all measures. This
would entail identifying the measures adopted in the
individual countries, so as to ensure transparency
and facilitate market access. Elimination would be
achieved through a “request–offer” approach. NTMs
should be gradually attenuated until full reciprocal
elimination of NTMs is accomplished. All this
would be supplemented with the following steps: (a) a
notification procedure, covering both the measure
and the products affected; (b) a commitment to the
status quo; and (c) special and differential treatment
for relatively less developed economies by means
of facilitation.
The secretariats’ proposal has a number of
positive features, particularly in the light of the need
to significantly reduce the impact of NTMs and move
towards their elimination. However, the procedure
suggested does not seem entirely appropriate, since
the negotiation process would unnecessarily delay
achievement of the objective. At the same time, since
a multilateral process is involved, elimination might
depend on what concessions other countries have
obtained. Moreover, each country would have to
“unilaterally” recognize the measures under negotiation.
This procedure had been suggested previously in
connection with trade agreements between countries in
the region but did not lead to the elimination of NTMs.
It would seem more appropriate to approach the issue
by strengthening the disciplines associated with
NTMs, e.g., by reference to the corresponding WTO
provisions, establishing the prohibition of NTMs along
with the relevant explanations, emphasizing the impact
of the measures and their possible justification in the
context of the agreed rules. They could eventually be
eliminated through dispute settlement procedures.
As far as technical barriers to trade are concerned,
the secretariats’ proposal discusses the existing
agreements, including the Framework Agreement for
the Promotion of Trade through overcoming technical
barriers to trade. The secretariats suggest moving
forward on substantive issues in the framework of
this agreement, in particular, in areas relating to
harmonization of technical rules and regulations,
and on agreements on mutual recognition of national
conformity assessment procedures, as well as other
initiatives relating to confidence building and
technical assistance.
In this area, it does not seem advisable to proceed
with harmonization of technical rules and regulations.
In the first place, the exercise is not efficient from
the economic standpoint, since the rules have been
developed in different circumstances. In the second
place, the experience of the European Union has
shown that this is a very slow way to reduce the costs
associated with differences among countries. It would
be wiser to take decisive action on the issues of
equivalency and mutual recognition, as well as on
trade facilitation measures in connection with
accreditation and conformity assessment procedures.
With respect to sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, the reports prepared by the secretariats
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recommend “taking steps to ensure increased
implementation and application of the principles
laid down in the WTO Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures”. They also
suggest that the following actions should be taken:
(a) promote harmonized rules for the development of
common sanitary and phytosanitary requirements
for specific products;
(b) promote free movement of agricultural products
through recognition of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures;
(c) develop harmonized mechanisms and procedures
for inspection and quarantine control;
(d) promote training activities for personnel specializing
in the application and development of the principles
laid down in the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; and 
(e) promote the strengthening of agricultural health
institutions in the signatory countries.
All these actions will facilitate trade in agricultural
products. Also, in this case, the efforts of the members
of the South American Community of Nations should
emphasize the principle of equivalency more than
harmonization. In addition, the operating criteria of
“pest– or disease–free zones” should be implemented
more effectively in the region; management and
decision–making and risk assessment procedures
should be improved, and cooperation between
responsible institutions should be strengthened so as
to promote the effective use of equivalency as a trade–
facilitation tool.22
In the area of trade remedies, two safeguard
mechanisms are proposed. One would be a general
safeguard (trade safeguard). The other would be
applied to a small group of agricultural products and
would be triggered by volume and price, in a manner
similar to that laid down in the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture; certain provisions would be included
to moderate the impact, such as a possible period of
non–application. One way to maintain trade flows
would be to establish volume criteria that would be
kept separate from such measures. In cases of unfair
competition (dumping and subsidies), the idea would
be to maintain national provisions in accordance
with WTO rules.
In this regard, the secretariat proposals could go
even further. As far as safeguards are concerned, limits
could be set on the time frame for applying them and
the grounds for doing so, with a view to completely
eliminating them in intracommunity trade. Likewise,
in cases of unfair competition, only those measures
necessary for remedying the negative impact of
subsidies should be maintained. Antidumping measures
should not, however; these have proliferated in the
region in recent years (Finger and Nogués, 2005)
and are unjustified in a free trade zone. Moreover, as
they are envisaged in international agreements, they
are of limited usefulness in economic terms and could
potentially be used as a disguised protectionist tool.
With respect to trade in services, the Andean
Community and MERCOSUR have attained the
greatest level of normative development. In both cases,
the model followed has been the WTO General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). More
detailed provisions have been developed in some
sectors, especially in transport, including land
transport, financial services, telecommunications and
professional services. The Andean Community has
drawn up a list of barriers that are incompatible with
the terms of the services regime which the countries
undertook to liberalize in January 2007. The
MERCOSUR countries have been working on
identifying those sectors and services that are governed
by the provisions of the common regime (positive list),
along with the terms, conditions and limitations
thereof. Other economic complementarity agreements
signed in the region do not include disciplines and
commitments in the area of services. The secretariats’
reports point out that a suitable framework exists
for moving ahead in this area, based on GATS and
the experience of the Andean Community and
MERCOSUR. Agreements on services are being
negotiated between Chile and MERCOSUR and
between Chile and Colombia, and Peru and Ecuador.
Although the GATS model serves as a common
base for all SACN members, it is not necessarily the
right model for an ambitious regional integration
process, since it does not include essential rules in
certain areas, such as the principles of regulation,
mutual recognition, professional services and
movement of persons. Moreover, this model does
not make sense if the goal is to develop regional
disciplines in the area of investment.23 The key issue
is to take an approach like the one followed in the
Andean Community, undertaking, within a short
period of time, to eliminate restrictions that are
incompatible with the guiding principles of trade in
services. This means doing away with the current
22 This issue is discussed in Salles (2007).
23 This is because there cannot be two treatments for the same issue: investment in services and other activities.
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focus on holding to the status quo and establishing
commitments based on a positive list. Otherwise, two
levels of liberalization would be cohabiting in SACN:
one within each subregional scheme and another
between the subregions. In the case of services,
although not only in this case, a permanent mechanism
is needed for the negotiation and improvement of
trade disciplines.
With regard to investment, the secretariats’ reports
indicate that the economic complementarity agreements
signed by the member countries of the Andean
Community and those of MERCOSUR show greater
convergence than do the norms of the two economic
blocs (Decision 291, and MERCOSUR Protocols).
However, the MERCOSUR Protocols have not yet
entered into force.
Convergence in the area of investment seems
difficult, given the differences in approach of the
members of SACN. This may be one of the aspects
in which South America will find it hard to achieve
convergence. In relations between SACN members
and with respect to third parties, priority has been
given to agreements on promotion and protection of
investment under the terms of their domestic
legislation. However, the questions of access to and
operation of investment (treatment, performance
requirements and others) have not been addressed. In
their relations with countries outside the region, some
SACN members have adopted models which in practice
offer better treatment than that available between
members. The extensive network of bilateral agreements
on investment promotion and protection between
South American countries and developed nations could
make convergence even more difficult to achieve.
Competition policy has been regulated in Latin
America only for the last 20 years. Regional
agreements have dealt with it in different ways and the
practical results have not been fully assessed.24 Within
SACN, the Andean Community has developed a set
of disciplines and has reached a degree of institutional
development that can be useful in addressing the
question of competition policy. MERCOSUR has
drawn up rules that have not yet entered into force
(Decision 18/96), so it is not possible to assess their
effectiveness. No agreements are in place among the
South American countries for substantively regulating
anticompetition practices.
In this regard, the best approach is to create
effective mechanisms for cooperation among the
agencies responsible for preventing such practices. It is
not realistic to consider a substantive instrument covering
practices that have cross–border effects, especially
since such measures usually require the existence of a
supranational institution.
Intellectual property is an important item on the
contemporary trade agenda. The studies prepared by
the secretariats acknowledge that the WTO Agreement
on Trade–related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) is the fundamental
instrument on which to base trade policy relating to
intellectual property. Not all the substantive rules
laid down in this multilateral instrument have been
developed or treated in depth in the Andean Community
and MERCOSUR regulations and, in fact, the
normative and procedural treatments tend to be
different. The reports add that the Andean Community
rules have greater normative and procedural depth than
those of MERCOSUR. This could serve as a basis
for normative complementation and institutional
capacity–building. The studies specify that the two
subregional groupings have rules in only four of the 12
areas of protection that might be considered for an
eventual common regime. However, a comparative
review shows that there are differences, often substantial
ones, in their scope and their content. While the
Andean Community emphasizes harmonized procedures,
MERCOSUR usually refers to the domestic legislation
of its members. There is no question that a common
set of rules would also call for the existence of an
institution to deal with the settlement of disputes which
are not only of general interest, but usually involve
private interests and therefore lead to claims for
compensation and indemnity.
In this regard, before a proposal is developed, it
would seem appropriate to identify the objectives
being pursued by including intellectual property
in SACN, indicating what priority it would have on the
agenda and in what areas protection would be provided.
The question of government procurement has of-
ten been absent from trade negotiations in Latin
America and the Caribbean. On the one hand, none of
the countries in the region are parties to the corresponding
multilateral agreement administered by WTO. On the
other hand, regional treatment has been relatively
24 A preliminary study on this topic may be found in Brusick, Alvarez and Cernat (2005).
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general in nature. Accordingly, the secretariats
correctly recognize that there is ample room for
convergence using international experience as a
reference point. This is an area that several countries in
the region have included or intend to include in
their negotiations with countries outside the region,
including the United States and the European Union.
Trade disputes have played an important role in
recent years as a tool for giving trade agreements
solidity and credibility (see box IV.1).25 The secretariats’
studies stress the importance of having an instrument
of this type to give legal certainty and protection to
trade rules that might be developed by SACN.
Indeed, it is a very necessary tool. Nevertheless, this
mechanism should be one option among others that are
available, including in WTO. To the extent that there is
the potential for competition between forums, there
will be an incentive to make them more efficient, but
disputes in one forum or the other should be dealt with
in the light of the rules involved. This would help
ensure that rules are carefully constructed, given that if
the disciplines agreed by SACN were less developed
than those available at the multilateral level, for
example, SACN members could resolve their disputes
by invoking the tighter rules and more secure mechanism.
The construction of SACN on the basis of trade
rules should be underpinned by the engagement of all
its members in the integration process. The secretariats
have addressed this aspect by preparing a report on the
treatment of asymmetries, with the support of ECLAC26
and other regional organizations. This document
recognizes that the instruments used to date in
subregional and intraregional integration processes
have not produced satisfactory results when it comes
to addressing asymmetries between the countries.
Many asymmetries are more acute within the countries
themselves. Thus, they are structural in nature and have
to do with a country’s level of relative development
and with its size. The report proposes a new treatment
for addressing asymmetries.
This new treatment would involve three tracks:
(i) market access; (ii) policies for treatment of
structural asymmetries and policies for treatment of
asymmetries created by public policy; and (iii) policies
relating to the first track should expand on their
traditional design, in terms of both the tools used
and their duration. These pillars would provide the
basis for a programme covering specific lines of
work in the following categories: (a) special and
differential treatment; (b) market access guarantees;
(c) complementarity and competitive development,
with emphasis on support for microenterprises, small
and medium–sized enterprises and other production
organizations; (d) physical infrastructure, by deepening
the approach of the Regional Infrastructure Integration
in South America (IIRSA); cooperation in macroeco-
nomic policy; (e) export incentives and investment
policies; and (f) other measures involving the tools to
be used for addressing specific lines of action.27
The secretariat proposals are important, inasmuch
as they recognize that the creation of a South American
Community of Nations entails ensuring that all members
are effective parts of the whole. As mentioned earlier,
however, if this goal is to be attained, it will be necessary
to mobilize substantial resources which compete with
the need to address the existing asymmetries within
individual members of the Community, and this
hinders its viability. Be that as it may, any effort to
preserve Community values through consensus and
greater political and economic cooperation must be
welcomed and strengthened, especially if it helps reduce
transaction costs and avoid regional fragmentation.28
25 In this regard, ECLAC has developed an Integrated Database on Trade Disputes (IDATD) [online] http://idatd.eclac.cl, which covers the Latin
American and Caribbean countries. See also ECLAC (2007).
26 See Durán and Masi (2007) for further details and an overall analysis of this issue.
27 A full analysis of this issue may be found in “Un nuevo tratamiento de las asimetrías en la integración sudamericana” [onnline]
http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/estudios.htm.
28 On this subject, see Rosales (2006).
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Between 1995, when WTO entered
into force, and May 2007, the countries
of the region have been involved in 86
of a total of 361 disputes, i.e., 24% of
all cases. Four countries account for
64% of the cases submitted to WTO:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
The remaining 36% are divided among
other countries, and only one involves
the English–speaking Caribbean. The
WTO members against which most
claims have been brought by countries
in the region are the United States
(27%) and the European Union (18%).
Disputes between Latin American and
Caribbean countries account for 43%.
In terms of specific issues addressed in
most complaints brought before WTO,
the main ones are unfair competition
(antidumping measures and counter-
vailing duties), representing 36% of the
total. These are followed by cases
relating to the Agreement on Safeguards
and the Agreement on Agriculture.
Agricultural products are involved in
nearly 40% of all claims submitted by
countries of the region. This is to be
expected, given the export patterns
of many of the countries; it is also an
indication of which countries are more
active in the system. Disputes on
agricultural products do not refer only
to questions relating to the Agreement
on Agriculture, but also to the applica-
tion of safeguards, subsidies and
countervailing duties, import licences
and even services (bananas).
Since the entry into force of
MERCOSUR in 1991, there have been
around 542 disputes between its
members, which shows a significant
level of use of the system. The highest
percentage of disputes in this scheme
involve Argentina and Brazil, both as
plaintiffs, 42% and 30.6% respectively,
and as defendants, 33.6% and 41%,
respectively. Disputes between Argen-
tina and Brazil are at the top of the
agenda in the system, as they account
for 53% of the total. This is understan-
dable, considering the significant
level of bilateral trade. Most of the
disputes occurred during the early
years of MERCOSUR, between 1995
and 2001, when 85% of the cases
were brought.
Three hundred and seventy–five
disputes have been initiated in the
Secretariat of the Andean Community,
including those originated within the
former Andean Pact, from 1980
onwards. The General Secretariat
(the former Board of the Cartagena
Agreement) has been active in bringing
complaints against members of the
integration scheme, given its responsi-
bility for ensuring that members comply
with their obligations. The active
approach taken by the Secretariat
could explain why there have been
relatively fewer disputes among
members; although the number is high
(34%), it is much lower than the 54% of
complaints brought by the General
Secretariat. Complaints submitted by
the private sector represent around
12.5% of the total. As respondent
countries, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela and Ecuador account for
around 45% of all complaints. (This is a
further exploration of the analysis by
Rosales, Durán and Sáez (2007), ECLAC
(2005), chapter 3; and that contained in
Durán and Maldonado, 2005).
The problems most frequently
submitted to the WTO dispute settlement
system have to do with unfair competi-
tion, including antidumping measures
and countervailing duties in the case of
subsidies. The second most common
category of complaints are issues rela-
ting to the application of the Agreement
on Agriculture. In third place are issues
relating to safeguards and GATT.
In the case of NAFTA, most of the
disputes have involved allegations of
unfair competition (dumping practices
or subsidies) and the means used
by countries to compensate for their
negative impact.
In MERCOSUR and the Andean
Community there are several common
issues that give rise to disagreements:
(i) disputes relating to tariffs, usually
associated with the formative period of
the common market (the first five
years) and bilateral tariff reduction
programmes; (ii) disputes relating to
domestic taxes and their impact in
creating trade discrimination (national
treatment), which coincide with the
period of disputes on tariffs; (iii) in both
schemes a high percentage of disputes
fall within the category of “other non–
tariff measures”, although these are
more frequent in MERCOSUR. In the
Andean Community, disputes on the
application of safeguards and antidumping
measures account for a large share
of the total.
In every instance, agricultural and
food products account for a significant
percentage of disputes. In NAFTA,
steel products and by–products are
significant. Both in WTO, and in the
Andean Community and MERCOSUR,
there have been frequent disputes
about “trade policies”, as reflected in
the percentage of disputes over “broad
or non–specific” issues.
Box IV.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN TRADE DISPUTES: AN IDATD–BASED ANALYSIS
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Integrated Database on Trade Disputes (IDATD) [online] http://idatd.eclac.cl.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2006 • 2007 Trends 139
Abeceb.com (2007), “3920 empresas argentinas
exportaron a Brasil en 2006. 77% fueron pymes”
[online] http://www.abeceb.com/.
Aduanas del Perú (2007), “Perú: regímenes definitivos
exportaciones e importaciones por continente,
zona económica y país. Periodo: enero–febrero
2007/2006”, Boletín estadístico mensual [online]
http://www.aduanet.gob.pe/aduanas/informae
/balbloque_01022007.htm.
Andean Community (2007a), “El comercio exterior
de bienes entre los países andinos y la República
Bolivariana de Venezuela”, information paper
(SG/di 813), General Secretariat, 5 February.
(2007b), “Estado de situación de la aplicación del
arancel externo común. Al 15 de febrero de 2007”,
working paper (SG/DT.384), General Secretariat,
21 February.
(2007c), “Secretario General de la CAN destaca
el papel político que tendrá la naciente Unasur”
[online] http://www.comunidadandina.org/prensa/
articulos/efe17–4–07.htm.
(2007d), “EU–Andean Community Ministerial
Meeting” [online] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/93742.
(2007e), “CAN define arancel base para negociar
con UE y logra coincidencias en el 75% de partidas
arancelarias” [online] http://www.comunidadandi
na.org/ prensa/notas/np30–3–07.htm. 
(2007f), “Decision 666: Participation of the Republic
of Chile, as an Associate Member Country, in
Andean Community bodies, mechanisms and
measures” [online] http://www.comunidadandi
na.org/ingles/treaties.htm.
(2006), “Decision 645: Granting of the status of
Associate Member Country of the Andean Community
to the Republic of Chile” [online] http://www.co
munidadandina.org/ingles/treaties.htm.
Bernanke, Ben S. (2007), “The level and distribution
of economic well–being”, document presented
at the Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce,
Omaha, Nebraska, 6 February.
Brusick, Phillipe, Ana María Alvarez and Lucian
Cernat (2005), Competition Provisions in Regional
Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development
Gains (UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1), United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), 13 October.
Carriba, Victor M. (2007), “Cumbre ALBA aprueba
estrategia y proyectos”, Gramma Internacional,
Havana, 30 April [online] http://www.gran
ma.cu/espanol/2007/abril/lun30/cumbre.html.
CRNM (Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery)
(2007), “CARIFORUM Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) negotiations” [online] http://
www.crnm.org/acp.htm.
da Mota Veiga, Pedro and Sandra Rios (2007),
“Regionalismo pós–liberal, na América do Sul: origens,
iniciativas e dilemas”, Comercio internacional
series, No. 82 (LC/L.2776–P), Santiago, Chile,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC). United Nations publication,
Sales No. P.07.II.G.11.
Díaz, Álvaro (2006), TLC y propiedad intelectual:
desafíos de política pública en 9 países de América
Latina y el Caribe (LC/BRS/R.163), Brasilia,
ECLAC office in Brasilia, October.
Durán, José (2007), “Some considerations on the
possible effects of the failure of the United States
Congress to renew the ATPDEA”, Project
documents, No. 131 (LC/W.131), Santiago, Chile,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), May.
Durán, José E. and Fernándo Masi (2007), “Diagnóstico
de las asimetrías en los procesos de integración
de América del Sur”, Project documents, No. 132
(LC/W.132), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), May.
Durán, José and Raúl Maldonado (2005), “América
Latina y el Caribe: la integración regional en la
hora de las definiciones”, Comercio internacional
series, No. 62 (LC/L.2454–P), Santiago, Chile,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC). United Nations publication,
Sales No. S.05.II.G.200.
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean) (2007), “América Latina y el
Caribe en las controversias comerciales: un análisis
aplicando BADICC”, April, unpublished.
(2006a), United States–Latin America and the
Caribbean: Trade Developments 2006 (LC/
WAS/L.88), Washington, D.C., ECLAC office in
Washington, D.C., December.
(2006b), “Reducing legal uncertainty: a challenge
for subregional integration in Latin America and
the Caribbean”, Fal Bulletin, No. 235, Santiago,
Chile, March.
(2006c), Latin America and the Caribbean in the
World Economy, 2005–2006 (LC/G.2313–P),
Santiago, Chile, October. United Nations publication,
Sales No. E.06.II.G.67.
Bibliography
140 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
(2005), Latin America and the Caribbean in the
World Economy, 2004. Trends 2005 (LC/G.2283–P),
Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales
No. E.05.II.G.117.
El comercio (2007), “El Banco del Sur tiene ya el
apoyo de seis naciones”, May [online] http://
www.e lcomerc io . com/no t i c i aEC.asp? id_
noticia=108378&id_seccion=6.
Fernández, Cristina and José Gregorio Pineda (2006),
“Implicaciones de la salida de Venezuela de la
CAN” [online] http://www.caf.com/attach/11/
defau l t /La_Sa l ida_de_Venezue la_de_ la_
CAN(may–2006).pdf.
Finger Michael and Julio Nogués (2005), “The
unbalanced Uruguay Round outcome: the new
areas in future WTO negotiations” [online]
http://129.3.20.41/eps/it/papers/0502/0502010.pdf.
González Vigil, F. (2005), “Logros y límites de la
integración andina”, working paper (DD/07/01),
Lima, University of the Pacific Research Centre. 
Hornbeck, J.F. and William Cooper (2006), “Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA): issues, options, and
prospects for renewal”, CRS Report to Congress,
Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service,
5 December.
Inside U.S. Trade (2007a), vol. 25, No. 19, 11 May.
(2007b), vol. 25, No. 18, 4 May.
LAIA (Latin American Integration Association)
(2007), Comercio exterior global: enero–diciembre
2005–2006 (ALADI/SEC/di 1996.3), 21 March.
Machinea, José Luis and Andras Uthoff (2007)
(comps.), “Integración regional y cohesión social:
lecciones aprendidas y perspectivas”, Project
documents, No. 29 (LC/W.29/Rev.1), Santiago,
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Mesquita Moreira, M. and E. Mendoza (2007),
“Regional integration, what is in it for CARICOM?”,
INTAL–ITD Working Paper, No. 29, Washington,
D.C., Inter–American Development Bank
(IDB), April.
O Estado de S. Paulo (2007), 6 January. 
Peña, F. (2007a), “La imbricada agenda externa”,
La Nación, 20 March [online] http://www.lanacion.
com.ar /edicionimpresa/suplementos/comercioex
terior/nota.asp?nota_id=892297.
(2007b), “La hora de los bio–combustibles? Una
ventana de oportunidad que no altera prioridades en
la OMC y del MERCOSUR”, Newsletter, March
[online] http://www.felixpena.com.ar.
Pineda Hoyos, S. (2007), “Treinta y cinco años de
integración andina: un balance de los cambios
estructurales”, Integración regional y cohesión
social: lecciones aprendidas y perspectivas, Project
documents, No. 29 (LC/W.29/Rev.1), José Luis
Machinea and Andras Uthoff (comps.), Santiago,
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Reuters (2007), “Costa Rica fija fecha en octubre para
referéndum sobre CAFTA”, San José, 16 August
[online] http://latino.msn.com/noticias/articles/
ArticlePage.aspx?cp-documentid=5121029.
Rosales, Osvaldo (2006), “Integración regional:
propuestas de renovación”, document presented
at the international seminar on paradoxes of
integration in Latin America, Santiago, Chile,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC)/Latin American Faculty of
Social Sciences (FLACSO)/Fundación Carolina,
13–14 December.
Rosales, Osvaldo, José Durán and Sebastián Sáez
(2007), “Recent trends in Latin American integration:
an overview”, Texas, Baylor University, unpublished.
SACN (South American Community of Nations)
(2006), “Convergencia de los acuerdos de integración
económica en Sudamérica” [online] http://www.
c o m u n i d a d a n d i n a . o r g / c s n / D o c u m e n t o _
Convergencia.pdf.
Salles, J. (2007), “Convergence and asymmetry in
sanitary and phytosanitary measures in the region's
trade agreements”, FAL Bulletin, No. 245, Santiago,
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), January. 
Schatan, Claudia and others (2007), “Integración
regional y el DR–CAFTA. El rumbo del comercio
centroamericano”, México City, ECLAC subregional
headquarters in Mexico, forthcoming.
Schwab, Susan (2007), “The case for trade promotion
authority renewal”, document presented to the
National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 12 February.
SIECA (Secretariat for Central American Economic
Integration) (2006), “Medidas contrarias al libre
comercio intrarregional. Centroamérica”, 4 December
[online] http://www.sieca.org.gt/Obstaculos/obs
taculos_041206.htm.
USITC (United States International Trade Commission)
(2005), “The impact of the Andean Trade Preference
Act. Twelfth Report 2005”, Investigation No. 332–
352, USITC Publication, No. 3803, Washington,
D.C., September.
Vaillant, Marcel (2007), “Heterogénea evolución de la
integración económica en América del Sur: entre
la complementariedad y el conflicto”, Santiago,
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), unpublished, May.
Valor econômico (2007), 13 February.
WTO (World Trade Organization) (2007), “Brazil–
Anti–dumping measures on imports of certain
resins from Argentina”, Request for the Establishment
of a Panel by Argentina (WT/DS355/2), 8 June.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2006 • 2007 Trends 141
In Asia over the last decade, trade–preference or
free–trade agreements have proliferated both at the
regional level and bilaterally, a phenomenon known as
a “noodle bowl” to reflect the Asian culture rather than
The following analysis of the proliferation of trade agreements shows that East and
South–East Asia are in a second phase of economic integration and trying to extract greater
synergy from de facto and de jure integration processes. For that reason, other regions of the
world are interested in taking advantage of this favourable situation, while, at the same
time, defending their own interests in the region. Nonetheless, the current economic
integration process in East Asia, based on increasing trade and investment links, and
now promoted by formal agreements, could place Latin America and the Caribbean at a
disadvantage. The countries of the region urgently need to adopt a strategy for Asia–Pacific
engagement that includes agreements between the two regions.
the “spaghetti bowl” of the western world. Although
not originating in Asia, this phenomenon (Menon,
2006a) has achieved maximum expression in that
region since the second half of the 1990s.1 According
The economic restructuring of the
Asia–Pacific region and its impact
on Latin America and the Caribbean
Chapter V
Introduction
A. The “noodle bowl” phenomenon
in Asia and the Pacific
1 The number of trade agreements in Asia and Pacific quadrupled between 2000 and 2006. According to a count made by Menon (2006a), which
includes the United States and Canada, as of October 2006 there were 176 bilateral agreements; and all Asia–Pacific countries apart from
Mongolia had participated in at least one agreement of this type. The most active countries in this process are India, with 22 agreements; the
United States with 20; and Singapore and Pakistan with 10 each.
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to data from the Asia Regional Integration Center
of the Asian Development Bank, between 1976 and
December 2006, there have been 192 trade agreements
of various types involving Asia and the Pacific (which
includes not only East Asian countries but also those of
South Asia and the countries of the former Soviet
Union). Of these agreements, 57 are already in force;
27 have completed negotiations; 39 are in the negotiation
phase, and 18 have a framework agreement signed or
being negotiated. 
A clear characteristic of the new regionalism in
Asia and the Pacific is the fact that several large
regional economies, such as Japan, China, the Republic
of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, are abandoning
their traditional reluctance to sign preferential
agreements and join trade blocs, and have decided
to sign bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements with
other economies both within and outside the Asia–
Pacific region (see table V.1).
Examples of trans–Pacific agreements include
the treaty between Chile and China, the first trade
agreement that China has signed with a western–
hemisphere country; the agreement signed by Chile
with India and Japan, and the agreement between
Panama and Singapore and with Taiwan Province of
China. The Agreement between Japan and the United
Mexican States for the Strengthening of Economic
Partnership entered into force on April 2005 and is
the first broad–scope agreement that Japan has signed
thus far. Other initiatives between Pacific Rim and
Latin American countries include: the Chile–Korea
Free–Trade Agreement, which was the first ever
trans–Pacific free–trade treaty; the Trans–Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement between
Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei
Darussalam (referred to as a P4 agreement), the
Peru–Thailand Free Trade Agreement, for which
negotiations concluded in 2005. Chile is also in
preliminary talks (feasibility studies with a view to an
FTA) with Thailand, Malaysia and Viet Nam. This set
of initiatives reveals a serious intent by Latin American
countries to take a long–term view in their relations
with Asia and the Pacific, but it cannot yet be described
as a strategic approach.
For a number of countries of the Pacific Basin (the
countries of North America, Latin American States
members of APEC, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), a
large proportion of trade is already subject to preferential
tariffs. As of August 2007, the network of free trade
agreements in force in the Pacific Basin involved
preferential tariffs applicable to 45% of total exports,
most of which were grouped around the ASEAN
countries (53.5%). The interests of China, Japan and the
Republic of Korea, which make up the “ASEAN + 3”
area, and those of Australia, India and New Zealand
(“ASEAN + 6”), together with the drive and dynamism
of Canada, the United States and other countries of the
region (Chile and Peru), are reflected in the proposal to
build a large–scale agreement on the basis of APEC,
a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). The
proportion of trade subject to preferential tariffs could
quickly increase to 65%, and within the ASEAN area
that figure could rise to 97% of total exports (see
figure V.1). The adoption of FTAAP is already
supported by the business communities in Brunei,
Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and the
United States.
Regional integration sub–groups and countries of
the region that do not belong to subregional blocs
(Chile and Mexico), have entered into agreements of
this type outside the region, some of them with the
Asia–Pacific region. Until recently, these bilateral
agreements had a small specific weight in the growth
and direction of the region's trade flows. Nonetheless,
by late 2005, the countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean had signed or negotiated over 60
agreements; and roughly 60% of the region's total
exports took place under their auspices, in stark
contrast to the situation prevailing in the early 1990s,
when the four existing trade preference schemes
accounted for about 6% of the region's total exports
(Kuwayama, Durán and Silva, 2005).
In brief, while the conclusion of bilateral or
subregional agreements between the economies of
Asia and Pacific is not a new phenomenon, the recent
wave of free–trade treaties displays two new features:
the transpacific scope of the new agreements, and
participation by the leading economies of North–East
Asia (Japan, China and the Republic of Korea) and
the United States.
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Taiwan province of China–Panama
Taiwan province of China–Guatemala
Taiwan province of China–Dominican Rep.c
Taiwan province of China–El Salvadora
Taiwan province of China–Honduras
Taiwan province of China–Nicaragua






Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the World Trade Organization, Asian Development Bank





Latin America and the Caribbean–China–Japan–Republic of Koreac
East Asia–Australasia
Trade Agreement for Closer Economic Relations of Australia and New Zealand (ASEAN–CER)a
EAFTAc
Outside The Asia–Pacific region
ASEAN–Indiaa
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) a
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This multitude of agreements stems from three specific
circumstances in the current world economic situation:
firstly, a certain disenchantment with the multilateral
negotiation process within WTO, especially the relative
stagnation of the negotiations. Nonetheless, while
multilateral negotiations are making little progress,
the other regions (mainly the American and European
continents) are negotiating bilateral or plurilateral
trade agreements that move towards the formation
of discriminatory trade blocs. Asia is also learning
in that direction. 
The second decisive factor in the change of
direction towards bilateral or plurilateral trade
agreements in that region was the Asian crisis of 1997,
which showed that APEC was unable to serve as
the assistance forum that the Asian countries needed.
The third key element was that the crisis endangered
fulfilment of the Bogor Goals, which had been agreed
under different circumstances; and this led to a number
of countries attempting to form a trade bloc of an
free–trade area (FTA) or economic union type.2 The
1997 crisis thus changed the way in which the Asia–
Pacific economies conducted regional integration: it
henceforth ceased to be an exclusively market–
oriented process driven by the private sector —de facto
integration— and began to incorporate a number of
government initiatives —de jure integration— which
were not only trade–oriented, but also included
Figure V.1
INITIATIVES ON FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC BASIN, AUGUST 2007
(Percentages of exports covered by preferential tariffs)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database
(COMTRADE) and agreements currently in force, signed, or under negotiation in Pacific Basin countries (expanded to India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka).
 
B. The causes of the “noodle bowl” phenomenon:
the asian crisis, the stagnation of the Doha round
and the domino effect
2 In the Meeting held in Bogor (Indonesia) in 1994, the APEC member countries undertook to liberalize trade and investments in the Asia–
Pacific region in 2010 for developed countries and 2020 in the case of developing countries. This liberalization was to take place on the basis
of an open regionalism process, in which concessions would be granted unilaterally (i.e., not reciprocally) to all WTO members.
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measures in the monetary and financial areas (Rana,
2006; Lamberte, 2005).3
The proliferation of bilateral preferential
agreements apparently also reflects the need to move
faster on the liberalization path, since neither the WTO
negotiations nor those within APEC have progressed
at a pace that satisfies the needs of the region's
economies. Moreover, the consolidation of other
regional agreements elsewhere threatens to undermine
the competitiveness of the Asian economies. Lastly, a
backdrop to the multiplication of agreements has seen
an intensification of intra–regional production and
trade links, which need greater depth and the creation
of more "formal" local cooperation mechanisms in
view of the growing interdependence (see chapter II). 
As in other regions of the world, bilateral
agreements, whether already in place or under
negotiation, can produce a domino effect mainly
among the smaller trading partners, whose fear of
losing comparative advantages and market share
prompts them to pursue bilateral agreements with
trade partners that have already signed agreements
(Baldwin, 2006). This multiplication of agreements
ends up generating strongly intertwined commitments,
and considerable lack of coordination, not to mention
higher operating costs in terms of both the negotiation
and its implementation, especially in the case of
multiple bilateral agreements. 
Preferential agreements among the Asia–Pacific
countries, especially those signed with developed
countries, have generated controversy as to whether
they are more or less complete than the more
traditional free–trade agreements. Generally, the trade
agreements prevailing in Asia are less wide–ranging:
although they involve commitments on “behind–
the–border” measures, they are mainly confined to
tariff reduction on goods, and they also exclude a large
number of products that are considered sensitive.
Although such measures feature in most agreements,
the breadth of coverage of their areas and the depth of
their commitments seem limited. More specifically, the
agreements that already exist, or are under negotiation,
vary greatly in terms of the liberalization timetable,
lists of exceptions, the different systems of rules of
origin applied, and implementation modalities
(Baldwin, 2006; Evenett, Venables and Winters, 2004;
and Dent, 2006). 
This domino effect is clearly visible in the case of
China's proposal to sign an agreement with ASEAN,
since it was followed by similar offers of wide–ranging
economic partnerships by Japan, the Republic of
Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. The signing
of a bilateral agreement between two of North–East
Asia's three main trading partners is expected to trigger
this broad–scope phenomenon in Asia and Pacific
(Evenett, Venables and Winters 2004). This is due to
the fact that the risk incurred by giving preference to
bilateral agreements among the large players (the
advantages resulting from hub–and–spoke integration
schemes) tends to be concentrated in the large
“hub” economies. 
Moreover, any agreement that involves one of the
three large players (Japan, China and the Republic of
Korea) will alter the relative competitiveness of firms
that export to the signatory countries. Changes in
the competitiveness of Asia's manufacturing sectors,
induced by the signing of such an agreement, would
encourage exporters from countries that are not
members of the treaty to pressure their governments
to join the free–trade treaty race; firms in the United
States or Europe would do the same, thus fuelling the
“domino effect”. 
3 Recently, the countries of East Asia have achieved greater integration by creating processes of regional surveillance, dialogue (such as
the ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue), coordination (the Chiang Mai Initiative) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative. The
members of ASEAN+3 decided to create a multilateral extension of the Chiang Mai initiative to manage funds, called the “Self–Managed
Pooling Reserve”, which would allow for additional regional interdependence thanks to investments in infrastructure projects in the region. 
146 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
The economic integration process in the Asia–Pacific
region has not been homogeneous, but has followed
various paths with different speeds of implementation.
Diversity among the sizes and development levels
of the different Asian countries is the main obstacle to
establishing the long–desired Asian free market. 
At the present time there are two broad–scope
proposals to create large economic communities in
Asia. The first relates to the creation of an Asia–
Pacific free trade zone within APEC; while the second
concerns the formation of an ASEAN+3 Economic
For many APEC members (including Australia,
Canada and the United States) the objectives of this
institution are both economic and strategic: to avoid
the polarization of Asia and Pacific. Nonetheless, the
variety of political and economic situations prevailing
among its members makes it hard to obtain a unified
stance on all political and economic topics of the
varied agenda. 
Furthermore, the non–binding (voluntary) nature
of the commitments assumed in APEC does not give its
participants incentives to move forward, nor does
it exert pressure in this direction; so the process tends
to stagnate and members spend their time signing
preferential bilateral and subregional agreements. The
fact that these commitments do not satisfactorily
respect the Bogor Goals is causing confusion as to
the function of APEC. There are also institutional
weaknesses that are probably undermining the efficacy
of the APEC discourse: confused objectives, too many
members, too long an agenda, the dysfunctional
structure of the Secretariat, and now new regional
competitors (ASEAN+3 and the East Asian Summit,
consisting of ASEAN+6 (Gyngell and Cook 2005).
With this problem as a backdrop, the participants
at a symposium held during the meeting of the APEC
Committee on Trade and Investment (25–26 May 2006,
Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam) agreed that the Bogor
Goals should be interpreted dynamically, to go beyond
the original objectives, since members perceived them
ambiguously.4 Participants felt that APEC should from
now on: (i) seek greater regulatory transparency
and consistency; (ii) promote mutual recognition of
standards; (iii) apply fewer restrictions on movements
of people, businesses and capital; and (iv) use better
practices in terms of logistics, including paperless
trade and other emerging applications arising from
information and communication technologies (ITCs). 
Community, consisting of the 10 members of ASEAN,
along with China, Japan and the Republic of Korea,
or with ASEAN+6, which additionally encompasses
Australia, India and New Zealand. The first alternative
is supported by the United States and member
countries that have moved forward along the road to
trade liberalization, such as Australia, Japan, Canada
and Mexico. The second originated from the ASEAN
member countries and the leading countries in North–
East Asia.
C. Proposals on the future economic integration
of the Asia–Pacific region
1. Challenges facing APEC
4 See the report of the APEC International Symposium, 2006.
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The trade ministers of the 21 APEC countries,
meeting in July 2007 in Cairns, Australia, reiterated
their call for progress in the WTO negotiations, but
also considered ways of boosting trade among the
member countries. The options they examined, aside
from a multilateral agreement (which is seen as the
most important), included the creation of an Asia–
Pacific free trade zone, which would however be a
long–term goal. At the same time, in light of the growing
complications resulting from the multiplication of
regional agreements and the danger raised by some
critics of a trade diversion, the ministers decided to
look into a possible rationalization of preferences and
the other provisions of such agreements. They also
approved a new trade facilitation plan which should
lead to a 5% drop in transaction costs (Bridges Weekly
Trade News Digest, 11 July 2007).
The United States has been showing increasing interest
in signing free–trade agreements with Asia–Pacific
countries; it has agreements currently in force with
Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico and Singapore; and it
is negotiating with Malaysia and Thailand separately,
and with India and Nepal jointly. It has also proposed
an agreement with Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Taiwan
Province of China, among others.5 The ASEAN–United
States Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
(TIFA) was also signed in August 2006 with the
ASEAN countries, since this type of agreement is
considered a precursor of a free trade agreement.
From the standpoint of the United States,
free–trade treaties with Asia–Pacific countries have the
following aims: they promote its trade and political
interests both tactically and strategically; they support
local democratic institutions and economic reforms in
the signatory countries; strengthen security in the zone;
they establish a benchmark for future negotiations
with other countries with a deep integration approach
that includes non–transboundary trade issues; and
they speed up regional–scope trade liberalization by
forging alliances with the region's political leaders
(Feinberg, 2006).
The “domino effect” observed in the Asia–Pacific
region is viewed as the outcome of a geopolitical and
economic game being played out on a global stage.
The United States is aware of the tremendous progress
made by the European Union in terms of signing
global trade treaties, and of China's growing influence
and its consequent rivalry with Japan for leadership
in the region. It also perceives the need to strengthen
its presence in various parts of the world, including
Asia and the Pacific.6
For the United States, boosting merchandise
exports is less important for the promotion of free trade
agreements than expanding services and investments,
protecting intellectual property, and taking labour and
environmental issues into account. The agreements
signed by the United States have broader coverage and
are deeper than those signed by the European Union; as
a result they are harder to propagate. As the trade
agreements that are emerging in different parts of the
world incorporate behind–border issues, bilateral
agreements are an effective instrument enabling the
United States to safeguard its commercial interests. 
A noteworthy recent event was the signing of a
free trade agreement with the Republic of Korea —the
world's tenth largest economy, whose per capita
2. Growing United States interest in promoting
trade with the Asia–Pacific region
5 In addition to these agreements, the United States has a free–trade or preferential trade agreement at the implementation stage with the
following countries: Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, Jordan, Marshall Islands, Morocco and Palau; it has also signed a free–trade
agreement with Bahrain (Menon, 2006a). 
6 In late 2005, the European Union had signed at least one type of preferential trade agreement with every country in the world apart from
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan
Province of China and the United States. 
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income measured in current dollars is currently
US$ 16,000. This country is a very important trade
partner for the United States, and the agreement is
considered the most important since NAFTA. It is
estimated that bilateral flows between the two countries
could grow by more than US$ 26 billion, raising the
current level of US$ 74 billion to US$ 100 billion
(Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 2007a and
2007b). Apart from tariff reductions on merchandise
trade, the agreement also includes chapters on services,
investments, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
contingency measures, technical barriers to trade,
intellectual property, dispute settlement mechanisms,
and others.7 There can be little doubt that ratification
of the agreement by the United States Congress
could change the course of the negotiations of these
agreements in Asia and Pacific.
3. Japan in pursuit of leadership in Asia–Pacific
economic integration
Japan has three free trade agreements currently in
force (with Malaysia, Mexico and Singapore), and it
has signed four others (Brunei Darussalam, Chile,
Philippines and Thailand). Apart from these seven
agreements, it is negotiating with Indonesia, Switzerland,
Viet Nam and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Looking
further into the future, there are possible agreements
with Australia and India, and also with the Republic of
Korea and the ASEAN countries. These agreements
are crucial for making headway in spreading economic
partnership agreements throughout Asia.
The stance adopted by Japan, previously based
on the multilateral principle, began to shift towards
bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, within
the Asian region and elsewhere, in 2002 when former
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed the
Initiative for Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic
Partnership. This change of approach occurred in
response to China’s growing leadership in the Asian
economy, and to contain that country's influence on the
direction being taken by regional integration centred
on ASEAN. The latter is a key subregion for Japan, not
only as a supplier of natural resources and manufactures
(especially parts and components), but also as an
important industrial base for Japanese transnationals.
In other words, ASEAN is a fundamental area for the
country's international competitiveness, owing to the
growing links between trade and investment. Japan has
made enormous investments in the ASEAN economies
and has provided them with a great deal of economic
assistance. It feels threatened by the growing presence
of China in this subregion, and has responded by
proposing a regional–scope free–trade treaty.
7 Both parties agreed to eliminate 94% of their tariffs within three years from the entry into force of the agreement, and the remainder
during the established period. In the case of the automotive industry, tariffs will immediately eliminated on vehicles with engines of less than
3,000 cc. and their parts, while those larger than 3,000 cc will be eliminated over a three–year period. The current tax regime applied to
automobiles will be adjusted. The United States will immediately eliminate 64% of its tariffs on textiles, apart from a number of ready–to–wear
garments. In the case of agricultural products, the Asian country will maintain the current level of tariffs on oranges, beans, powdered
milk, and other products of the agriculture sector. Rice will be excluded from the tariff reduction schedule, while the 40% tariff on beef will
be eliminated within 15 years.
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At the 2006 annual APEC summit held
in Viet Nam, the leaders of this grouping
decided to form a study group with a
view to creating the world's largest
economic and trade grouping, the Free
Trade Area of the Asia–Pacific (FTAAP),
a proposal originally put forward by the
APEC Business Advisory Council
(ABAC) at the summit held in Chile in
2004 (see ABAC, 2004). This initiative
reflects two fundamental features of
the international setting: First, it is a tacit
recognition of the virtual stagnation
of multilateral trade negotiations; and
second, it reflects the search for new
internal dynamism in APEC, which has
been affected by the proliferation of
agreements both within the Asia–
Pacific region and on the American
continent. It also aims to promote
fulfilment of the Bogor Goals and the
Osaka Agenda for Action (Bergsten,
2007b). Other elements of this initiative
concern the possibility that the new intra–
regional agreements may increase
discrimination against non–Asian coun-
tries, which would allow for the
emergence of an Asian bloc with a
strong presence in international policy
and economic forums, polarizing the
Pacific region into two blocs and the
world into three.
The initiative to create the study
group was originally suggested by
the United States, with support from
Australia, Canada, Japan and Mexico.
Coincidentally, these are countries
which (except for Australia and Japan)
are outside the main trend of bilateral
trade agreements in Asia, although
there are also agreements between,
among others, Australia and the United
States and Singapore, Japan and
Mexico, and Thailand and Australia,
in addition to recently concluded
agreements between the Republic of
Korea and the United States, and
between Chile and China, Chile and
Japan, and the 2005 agreement with
the Republic of Korea. In fact, some
of these countries would have much to
lose if an integration scheme were
established between Asian countries.
Nonetheless, apart from keeping this
threat at bay, the proponents of the
agreement are linking the formation
of this free trade area to the possible
advantages that all APEC economies
would enjoy. 
Among the expected benefits of
the agreement's implementation, it
should be remembered that the
relative importance of APEC members
in world trade and the global economy
would make it hard for multilateral
negotiations to surpass the advantages
produced by a free–trade agreement,
even if some exceptions to total
liberalization were adopted. Moreover,
the prospect of this agreement could
lead non–APEC countries to resist
continuing with multilateral negotiations
and reconsider their position, given the
repercussions that trade in these
countries would suffer as a result of
greater trade deviation and a reduction
in their market shares. The agreement
could act as a brake on the proliferation
of regional and bilateral agreements, it
could reduce the risks of polarization
between East Asia and the Western
Hemisphere, and attenuate the
economic conflicts affecting China's
relations with the United States. It
would also strengthen APEC in
moments of tension arising from trade
disputes being faced by certain
members and would maintain the
interest (and commitment) of the
United States in trade with the Asia–
Pacific region and also in world trade,
since the agreement would provide a
basis for renewing the mandate of the
Trade Promotion Authority, which runs
out in mid–2007 (Bergsten, 2007a). 
There is no consensus on the
feasibility of implementing this broad–
scope initiative. Morrison (2006), for
example, considers the agreement to
be politically unviable for various
reasons, including the fact that the
conditions do not exist to embark upon
the negotiations, since APEC would
have to call a halt to all other negotiating
activities; and, given the complexity
and scope of the agreement, it would
have to maintain strong support
throughout the negotiation period,
which it is estimated would last about
five years. This negotiation would only
be feasible if one of the main APEC
economies promoted the process. In
addition, a full free–trade agreement in
APEC means, in United States pubic
opinion, a trade agreement with China
and all Asian economies that follow its
competitive steps —something that
seems unviable today in the legislative
climate prevailing in the United States.
Moreover, negotiation of the agreement
would require changes in APEC, which
was never conceived as a negotiation
mechanism, but as an organization to
establish a community for socioeconomic
cooperation, although the strengthe-
ning of trade ties was always present
on its agenda. Nonetheless, the Bogor
Vision assumed that liberalization
would be achieved through a voluntary
and consensus–based process rather
than by binding commitments. To
establish a free–trade agreement, it
would be necessary to consider not
only binding commitments but also
the adoption of rules of origin that dis-
criminated against non–members, in
contradiction to the principle declared
in 2005 at Busan, Republic of Korea,
that APEC should not be an inward–
looking trade bloc, but should pursue
global free trade.
Some leading APEC countries,
such as China, stress aspects such
as open and voluntary regional
cooperation. For Japan, agricultural
liberalization is still a very difficult topic
domestically. Like China, Japan is very
interested in strengthening regionalism
in East Asia, as can be seen from
a proposal to create the East Asia
free–trade area, which would unite
ASEAN and another seven countries of
Asia and Pacific (ASEAN+6). Some
ASEAN countries might not be ready
to cope with such a large–scale
agreement, however, as was the case
with the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). 
Lastly, it should be recalled that
individual APEC members have different
approaches to trade treaties. China
prefers more strictly defined agree-
ments, whereas the North American
countries prefer broader and deeper
agreements (Bin, 2006). These differen-
ces, together with the preference
displayed by some Asian countries for
forming an East Asian FTA, could
end up exacerbating trends towards
polarization between the Asia–Pacific
countries (Bergsten, 2007b). 
Box V.1
PROSPECTS FOR A FREE–TRADE AGREEMENT IN APEC
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The Trans–Pacific Strategic Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement between
Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand
and Singapore (P–4) has broad
coverage and includes trade in goods,
services and investments, as well
as government procurement and
intellectual property. What is probably
unique is the “big bang” approach
to trade in goods liberalization – Singa-
pore has achieved MFN zero tariffs;
for New Zealand, all tariffs would be
eliminated with immediate effect; for
Chile, tariffs on 89.3% of products
would be eliminated immediately,
9.57% within three years and the
remaining 1.13% in six years. There
are breakthroughs in agricultural trade
liberalization, particularly as Chile and
New Zealand are both southern
hemisphere countries with similar
climates and seasons and compete in
a range of agricultural exports
The agreement takes into conside-
ration the most up–to–date manufacturing
methods, with rules of origin that allow
for the use of subcontracting. In the
area of trade facilitation, it provides for
self–certification in seeking preferential
tariffs; risk management in the area of
customs; and advance rulings. There is
also a section on cooperation in five
fields: economics, education, primary
industry, culture and science, and
research and technology, for example,
the sending of trade missions, the
strengthening of cooperation in the
area of education, increases in the
number of working visas issued, strategic
alliances for investment incentives
and collaboration on sanitary and
phytosanitary matters. There is also
a memorandum of understanding on
labour regulations and an environmental
cooperation agreement.
The P4 agreement is intended as a
model for various types of integration
schemes, both by being open to new
members (provided they accept the
existing conditions without additional
negotiation) and in terms of the initial
effect of its liberalization. Nonetheless,
despite the interest already shown by
a number of countries in joining the
agreement (including Malaysia, Mexico,
Peru and Thailand), two obstacles
arise that will make broader dispersion
difficult: (i) the political and economic
cost of applying such rigid rules at
the outset; and (ii) the large physical
distances that separate the main
partners, which requires a level of
logistics and transport management
that would be hard for all APEC
members to achieve (Yue and
Soesastro, 2006). For these reasons,
although the P–4 agreement could
increase the number of members, it
does not seem, ceteris paribus, to offer
the chance of achieving convergence
between integration processes in
Asia, although its architecture could be
very useful for countries that want to
achieve fast liberalization, by joining
that agreement.
Box V.1 (concluded)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Fred C. Bergsten, “China and economic integration in East Asia:
implications for the United States”, Policy Briefs in International Economics, Institute for International Economics, March 2007 and “Toward a Free Trade
Area of the Asia Pacific”, Policy Briefs in International Economics, Washington, D.C., Institute for International Economics, February 2007; Chia Siow Yue
and Hadi Soesastro, “ASEAN perspectives on promoting regional and global freer trade”, An APEC Trade Agenda? The Political Economy of a Free Trade
Area of the Asia Pacific, The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council/The APEC Business Advisory Council, 2006; C Morrison, “An APEC trade agenda,”
An APEC Trade Agenda? The Political Economy of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, The APEC Business Advisory Council, 2006; S. Bin, “The political
economy of an Asia Pacific Trade Area: a China Perspective,” An APEC Trade Agenda? The Political Economy of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, The
APEC Business Advisory Council, 2006.
Japan has four opportunities to exercise leadership
in the region. First, it should promote its EPA with
ASEAN as a model, since the other countries’
agreements are likely to be incomplete in certain areas.
Second, the Japanese government should continue
offering economic and technical cooperation, including
human resources development, to help improve
infrastructure in the region. Third, it should work
toward further liberalization of its own market, by
adopting the policy of protectionism as required but
compromise whenever possible. (JETRO 2005).
Fourth, it must accept the increased immigration
of skilled workers. Many countries compete for
immigrants in professional and technical fields, and
Japan should do the same by accepting people from
specific countries when FTA/EPA negotiations are
concluded. (JETRO 2005, Kimura 2006).8
From Japan's viewpoint, South–East Asia still has
major barriers to trade and investments, a general
framework that is unsuitable for business, compounded
by weak infrastructure and supplier industries. The
country should try to make cross–border logistics more
efficient and provide incentives for support industries
in the ASEAN region. In this regard, the Economic
8 If this is the case, Japan would be the first G–7 country to relax these criteria, which would technically be reflected in a broader negotiation
on Mode 4 service provision.
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Partnership Agreement (EPA) that Japan is negotiating
with ASEAN could be a good model allowing for
legal integration because of its comprehensive
nature, which includes liberalization along with trade
facilitation and investments (encompassing topics such
as regulations on investment, competition, certification
and intellectual property protection), and economic
partnerships and cooperation.
The first stage of market liberalization in South–
East Asia should be completed in 2007, while in 2008
negotiations are expected to be completed between
China and the Republic of Korea for a FTA with
ASEAN, and to create conditions for an even deeper
liberalization process. If the negotiations for the
agreement between these two countries and ASEAN
really are completed before 2010, the process of
establishing a South–East Asia free–trade area will have
ended ahead of schedule (JETRO, 2005). According to
the most realistic expectations, agreements with
ASEAN will be completed in 2009 in the case of the
Republic of Korea, 2010 in the case of China, and 2012
in the case of Japan. 
The signing of the free–trade agreement between
the Republic of Korea and the United States could
encourage Japan to resume the suspended negotiations
for a similar agreement with the Republic of Korea
and move towards an eventual bilateral agreement
with the United States. If substantive headway is
made towards these types of trans–Pacific initiative
between the major players, the balance of economic
and trade power between China and Japan would
be altered not only in the Asia–Pacific domain, but
also between China and the United States, thereby
substantially changing the integration panorama in the
Asia–Pacific region.9
9 An application of the general computable equilibrium model (CGE) by Lee, Roland–Holst and van der Mensbrugghe (2004), for the United
States, Japan and China, shows that the option of a trilateral treaty would generate greater advantages, whereas bilateral agreements
with ASEAN, such as between ASEAN and China, tend to divert Chinese trade. The advantages are greater when they include substantial
liberalization of the agriculture sector.
4. Agreements involving China as an integral part of trade
diplomacy and strategic partnerships
China began to speed up the establishment of its
network of trade agreements in 2001, when it signed
the first agreement with other members of the Bangkok
Agreement, thereby notifying the world that it was
abandoning the trade policy based on the multilateral
system to embrace the policy of nonalignment. By
late 2006 it had completed agreements, or had held
negotiations for that purpose, with 32 countries or
country groupings in Africa, Asia, Latin America and
the southern Pacific. The volume of trade with these
countries amounted to US$ 345 billion, a quarter of
the country's total trade in 2005 (Bin, 2006). It has
also embarked on feasibility studies for free–trade
agreements with India and Iceland (Rosales and
Kuwayama, 2007), and it is studying the feasibility of
a similar treaty with Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Several features distinguish the treaties signed by
China from those signed by other Asian and non–Asian
countries (Bin, 2006). Firstly, China adopts a very
pragmatic strategy that takes the different interests of
its trade partners into account; there is no single model
for all agreements. For example, its agreements with
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
(SAR) and Macau Special Administrative Region
of China (SAR) —Closer Economic Partnership
Agreements (CEPAs)— include specific disciplines and
rules, while those with Australia and New Zealand are
more declarations of intent with general commitments
on cooperation issues. Secondly, the implementation
process is staged, for example starting with the “early
harvest” program, and, in later phases, the possible
incorporation of other disciplines such as services,
investments and trade facilitation measures, as happens
in the agreement with ASEAN (Kwei, 2006) or with
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Chile.10 Lastly, several Chinese agreements exclude
sensitive products and sectors such as intellectual
property protection, sector liberalization and labour
and environment issues. 
China uses these agreements as tools of its trade
policy, like the “one country, two systems” model
applied in the cases of Hong Kong SAR and Macau
SAR. The ASEAN–China agreement is seen as a
tool of diplomacy to mitigate the growing trade and
investment competition between ASEAN countries
and China. Other agreements, such as those signed
with Chile, India, Pakistan and South Africa are seen as
diplomatic efforts to initiate or consolidate strategic
partnerships and a guarantee the supply of natural
resources. Another important objective is to ensure
recognition of market–economy status by the countries
signing trade agreements (ECLAC, 2005). 
Given these peculiarities, if a free–trade area like
the one proposed for APEC is achieved, the Chinese
authorities would not abandon ongoing negotiations or
those of future agreements. China would prefer to
maintain agreements that offer a degree of flexibility in
terms of preferential and differential treatment. Even
more importantly, it would not be in China's interests
to submit the bilateral disputes that exist with the
United States —such as the latter's burgeoning trade
deficit, China's rigid exchange–rate regime, new
measures applied by the United States to Chinese
products, prohibition of foreign investment in strategic
United States sectors— to as broad a regional forum as
a free–trade area. In other words, it would not be in its
interest to allow the United States to use that area as
the only forum for addressing bilateral disputes and try
to “fence in” or “contain” China (Bin 2006). It is more
likely that China would pursue the path of different
types of trade agreements to maximize its economic
and political power in its negotiations (Kwei, 2006).
10 An example of such flexibility is provided in the ASEAN–China agreement, which allows ASEAN member countries to negotiate individual
treaties with China. Thailand has also completed an agreement with China on various sensitive products such as fruit and vegetables; it is more
feasible to address the interests of small countries, such as Thailand, separately, rather than including them in a broader agreement.
11 Historically, ASEAN was Asia's first attempt to create a regional community. Its beginnings date back to 1967 when it was founded with the
aim of promoting regional cooperation, well–being and peace in Southeast Asia. The founding members were the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand; Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Viet Nam in 1995, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Myanmar in
1997, and lastly Cambodia in 1999.
5. ASEAN: achievements and challenges in creating
the ASEAN Economic Community
ASEAN countries have made major efforts to create
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), with a view
to forming a single market and productive base in
which goods, services, investments, capital and skilled
workers can all circulate freely.11 This initiative possibly
also needs a single currency and common financial
institutions to be successful (Rajan, 2005; Ferguson,
2004), and it has an implementation horizon that
extends to 2020, in view of the challenges it involves.
An initial step towards creation of the Community
was the establishment in January 1992 of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA). This aimed to eliminate tariff
and non–tariff barriers between member countries and
move towards integration of the ASEAN economies on
a single productive base, creating a single market of
over 570 million people, by applying the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT). The tariff
reduction program has proceeded satisfactorily, and in
fact the initially agreed upon date of 2008 has been
brought forward to 2002 (see box V.2) In addition, to
reduce trade diversion with third countries, ASEAN
members are continuing to lower their tariffs with
third countries, while at the same time reducing their
intra–zone duties. 
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Some countries of that region are major promoters
of a deep integration of ASEAN, such as Singapore
which has become a regional financial services,
transport, telecommunications and education hub.
The commitments assumed by Singapore in the
agreements' chapters on services, generally go beyond
those assumed in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS). It is therefore considered that this
grouping professes and at the same time practices the
concept of open regionalism and serves as an element
for unification of the multilateral system (Zhai, 2006,
Menon, 2006b). 
In addition to the rapid implementation of the
free–trade area, ASEAN has reached agreements to
forge Closer Economic Partnerships with its most
important trading partners (Australia, China, India,
Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea).12 It
has also signed a number of agreements with these
12 For further details on the preferential agreements signed or in the process of negotiation, see Rosales and Kuwayama (2007). On possible
repercussions of the India–ASEAN agreement, see Bhattacharya and Bhattacharyay (2006). The Republic of Korea has signed a free
trade–agreement with ASEAN, Chile, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the United States and Singapore; it is negotiating a
free–trade agreement with Japan (currently suspended) and Canada; and it is studying the feasibility of a free–trade agreement with China,
India, MERCOSUR, Mexico and possibly Israel. The Korea–ASEAN agreement, which excludes Thailand following its refusal to include
rice in the tariff reduction timetable, was signed in May 2006 and entered into force in July that year.
The various instruments designed
to achieve this objective include the
Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) scheme for the establishment
of the free–trade area. This scheme
established that tariffs on a wide range
of products traded in the region should
be lowered to no more than 5% by
2003 for the six founding countries of
ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand), while the tariff reduction
program would subsequently include
Viet Nam in 2006, Lao People's
Democratic Republic and Myanmar
in 2008 and Cambodia in 2010. In
addition, in 2010, the six original
members of ASEAN should eliminate
all tariffs on intra–regional imports,
while the four newer members would
have until 2015 to do this.
At the present time, the CEPT
scheme has been applied by the six
countries mentioned. According to data
from the ASEAN Secretariat and other
studies (Tongzon, 2005), 99% of the
products on the inclusion list (which
encompasses 65,080 out of a total of
65,743 tariff lines) submitted by the six
ASEAN founder countries have had
their tariff rates lowered to a range of
0–5%. The main exceptions have been
products in the automotive sector
and auto parts. The new members
(Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam)
have managed to put almost 80% of
their products on the respective lists
and about 66% of their tariffs are now
in the 0–5% range. Nonetheless, the
private sector has apparently been
using the scheme less than expected
(a use level of about 10%), as a result
of complicated bureaucratic procedures
on rules of origin which cause compa-
nies to prefer paying the most favoured
nation (MFN) tariffs (Langhammer,
2007). In fact, only Malaysia and
Thailand publish statistics on the use
made of this scheme; and these show
that intra–regional exports in which
the preferential tariff scheme is being
applied are increasing, with exports
from Thailand and Malaysia recording
the highest and most rapidly increasing
levels of use. Exports from Thailand
alone use this scheme 20% of the time,
while participation in Malaysia is still at
the one–digit level (JETRO, 2006).
This low rate of use reflects the fact
that tariffs levels are already low, and
the procedures entailed in using the
scheme are burdensome.
In a recent survey, Japanese firms
were asked which preferential tariff
schemes they were using. Of the replies
received, the ASEAN Free Trade Area
was mentioned most frequently (24
times), followed by the Japan–Malaysia
agreement (cited by 15 firms) and
the agreement between Thailand and
Australia (mentioned by eight firms). In
the opinion of those responsible for
the survey, the results highlight the
following: (1) the free trade area
scheme is the most widely used
because it covers the whole ASEAN
region, where Japanese firms have
established procurement and production
networks; (2) despite recent events,
firms have made intensive use of
the Japan–Malaysia agreement; and
(3) Thailand, which is now a major pro-
duction base for Japanese firms, is also
becoming an export platform for certain
companies to send their products to
markets outside ASEAN, by exploiting
its FTAs with countries such as
Australia and India.
Box V.2
PROGRESS OF THE ASEAN COMMON EFFECTIVE PREFERENTIAL TARIFF SCHEME
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Association of South–East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 2006 JETRO White Paper on International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (Summary). Japanese
Corporate Activity in New Growth Markets and the Emerging East Asian Free Trade Zone, Tokyo, 2006; J. L. Tongzon, “Role of AFTA in an ASEAN
economic community,” Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, Denis Hew (ed.), Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005; R.
Langhammer, “The Asian way of regional integration: are there lessons from Europe?”, Kiel Economic Policy Papers, No. 7, January 2007.
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countries giving rise to various free trade areas, such
as the Closer Economic Partnership agreements with
China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In
addition, the South Asian Free Trade Area was established
in January 2004 and is expected to be fully operational
in 2016; and in Central Asia the Central Asia Regional
Economic Cooperation CAREC has been established
since 1997. Lastly, an Asia–Pacific trade–preference
agreement is being negotiated, to replace the 1975
Bangkok Agreement (Asia–Pacific Trade Agreement–
APTA).13 In this regard, the new ASEAN agreements
involving a number of trade partners outside their
own groupings, such as the ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6
agreements, are seen as a second wave of preferential
trade treaties (Bhattacharyay, 2006).
(a) ASEAN+3
Viewing ASEAN as a hub seems an appropriate
defence strategy to prevent other country groupings
from exploiting their natural predominance. Nonetheless,
this stance poses major challenges for a grouping of
the size and characteristics of ASEAN. In the first
place, the diversity of its members is reflected in
non–convergent criteria concerning their roles in the
development of regionalism in the wider region; and,
secondly, this diversity is also reflected in different
capacities for adapting to pressures from “natural hubs”.
The formation stage of the ASEAN Economic
Community poses the challenge of establishing points
of convergence between bilateral agreements already
signed or currently under negotiation, mainly between
the largest economies of North–East Asia and members
of ASEAN. Apart from the bilateral agreements that
are being negotiated between ASEAN members and
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3),
ASEAN also has agreements with China and the
Republic of Korea and is negotiating an agreement
with Japan. This second group of agreements is
referred to as ASEAN+1. Although it might be thought
that having one agreement with three countries is
the same as three separate agreements, the final
effect would be very different, because an agreement
with three countries produces synergies; and, in this
case, the North–East Asia region would be liberalized
as a whole. 
Moreover, the fact that, of all the countries that
belong to the East Asia Free–Trade Area, only
Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and
Myanmar are not members of APEC, raises the problem
of coordination and overlapping preferences between
this area and the project to form a free–trade area based
on the Asia–Pacific Free–Trade Treaty within APEC.
There is also the risk that APEC could polarize around
two large countries (China and Japan), resulting in
serious losses for non–Asian nations. The creation
of the East Asia Free–Trade Area could bring major
benefits to China, although less than what would be
offered by constructing a system of agreements centred
on that country. China would benefit from additional
intra–regional trade and investment, and its integration
in the regional production network would be enhanced
through the elimination of trade barriers and lower
transport costs (Yue and Soesastro, 2006). 
(b) Alternatives for the future East Asia Free
Trade Area 
There are various ways in which this free–trade
area can be consolidated at the present time, including
the following (Yue and Soesastro, 2006): 
– Consolidation of agreements with South–East and
North–East Asia. This seems unlikely as it would
leave ASEAN at a disadvantage, since the North–
East Asian countries would outweigh those
of ASEAN;
– Consolidation of the various ASEAN+1 agreements.
These agreements could serve as an initial
framework for establishing the East Asia Free–
Trade Area. A positive factor is that there would
already be a common framework agreed upon
with a broad liberalization programme, thereby
minimizing potential conflicts; and
13 Also known as the first agreement on trade negotiations among developing member countries of the Economic and Social Commission
for Asia and the Pacific; this was initially negotiated by seven developing countries, but only four ratified and implemented it: Bangladesh,
India, the Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka. The aims of the agreement are to promote and sustain reciprocal trade and to develop economic
cooperation between the contracting parties.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2006 • 2007 Trends 155
– ASEAN+3 deepening. A free–trade area could
also be achieved through the existing ASEAN+3
agreements. This option had already been
considered when the Joint Expert Group for
Feasibility Study on East Asia Free Trade Area
(EAFTA) was created at the ASEAN+3
ministerial meeting. Nonetheless, a point that
remains to be resolved is whether ASEAN will
negotiate as a group or whether the 13 economies
will negotiate separately.
In any event, an East Asia Free Trade Area would
have advantages for ASEAN, particularly in the form
of economies of scale and scope. It would also provide
an incentive for member countries to adopt reforms
and restructure their economies to face the challenges
of globalization, allowing for the removal of trade and
investment barriers and freer circulation of capital and
people, which would have direct effects on regional
production networks and supply chains. It would
also be necessary to harmonize and standardize rules
of origin and other technical requirements, thereby
overcoming the disadvantages caused by the web of
agreements that only serve to raise costs and scare
away FDI (Menon, 2006b).
In addition, the diversity of the economies
and their different development levels could harm
countries or sectors that fail to match the efficiency
level of the other members, thereby leading governments
to refuse to liberalize certain sectors without
safeguards and guarantees of assistance. 
Nonetheless, the various challenges include
strengthening mutual trust between Asian countries, so
that they become convinced of sharing a common destiny;
but at the same time they should continue to promote
their international engagement. The East Asia Free
Trade Area should complement and not substitute
for multilateralism, so it would need to offer broader
concessions than those established in WTO agreements,
with exclusions and limitations kept to the minimum.
The European Union has shown growing interest in
signing free trade agreements with Asia. In late 2006,
the European Commission officially requested mandates
from its member countries to negotiate free–trade
agreements bilaterally with India, the Republic of
Korea and ASEAN. The Commission granted the
mandate as requested in April 2007, with instructions
that the agreements be broad–based and include the
liberalization of goods, services and investments.
These negotiations are set in the new trade–policy
orientation of the Community, as notified by the
European Commission in October 2006, which aims to
achieve bilateral free trade agreements to guarantee
new markets for the European Union. The agreement
that the European Union is preparing to negotiate with
ASEAN, India and the Republic of Korea is justified,
according to the European Commission, because these
markets combine a high level of protection with high
market potential. These new free trade treaties are
expected to enable the European Union to increase its
exports by US$ 40 billion, thereby raising GDP of the
European Union by the equivalent of 0.13%. These
estimates are based on expectations of additional
manufactured exports to India, along with commercial
services supplied to ASEAN and the Republic of
Korea. Overall, if the expected objectives of the
liberalization are achieved, exports from the European
Union to these three trade partners could increase
by 3.7%, while ASEAN exports to Europe would grow
by 18.5% and those to India and the Republic of Korea
by 18.7% and 36.0%, respectively (Bridges Weekly
Trade News Digest, 2007b).
6. The European Union and the Asia–Pacific region:
a necessary approach for the new Asian regionalism
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The European Union has also been engaging in
more active and energetic trade diplomacy towards
China, in response to the drastic increase in its
trade deficit with that country. In 2006, China was
the European Union's second largest trade partner,
displacing the United States as its largest export
market. Exports from the European Union to China
amounted to ¤63 billion, while imports from that
country totalled ¤191 billion, with a deficit of ¤128
billion. According to official data published by China,
the European Union remains its largest export market,
surpassing the United States and Japan. 
With the aim of correcting the trade imbalance and
addressing outstanding issues between the two parties,
the European Union has been deploying a more active
policy in its relations with China since 2006, while also
pursuing deliberations in the WTO, the mechanism
through which the European Union has traditionally
managed trade policy with that country.14 The Partnership
and Co–operation Agreement signed in late 2006,
which replaces the earlier 1985 agreement, provides
the framework for this cooperation.
14 Issues of dispute between China and the European Union include the fulfilment of commitments assumed in WTO with respect to market
access, services, investments and public procurement; forced technology transfer; export requirements; intellectual property protection, lack
of transparency in the sector subsidy regime, and the slow progress of banking reforms in the country.
15 Unless indicated otherwise, in this section the Asia–Pacific region encompasses the group of 12 countries and territories consisting of Australia,
China, Philippines, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Taiwan Province of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore
and Thailand. The other members of ASEAN (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam)
are not included in the analysis for statistical reasons. 
D. The proliferation of trade agreements in the
Asia–Pacific region: consequences for
Latin America and the Caribbean
1. The Asia–Pacific region is one of Latin America
and the Caribbean's main trade partners
Trade between Latin America and the Caribbean
and the Asia–Pacific region has recovered after two
years of stagnation (1998–1999) following the Asian
crisis, and it continues to expand.15 The Asia–Pacific
region has also become a very important trading
partner for Latin America and the Caribbean,
particularly in terms of the latter’s imports. In 2005,
exports to the Asia–Pacific region from Latin America
and the Caribbean amounted to US$ 48.5 billion (9.0%
of the region's total exports); while Asia–Pacific
imports totalled US$ 97.1 billion (a 20.5% share). In
the same year, the United States share of exports from
Latin America and the Caribbean was 50.2%, while the
European Union (27 member States) accounted for
12.1%. On the other side of the equation, the United
States and the European Union provided 36.3% and
14.3% respectively of the region's imports (see figures
2A and 2B). The importance of the Asia–Pacific region
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as a trade partner is thus much greater in terms of
imports than exports, and this has generated a growing
trade deficit with that region since 1992, amounting
to US$ 48 billion in 2005. Given the important and
increasing role of the Asia–Pacific region as a trade
partner for many Latin American and Caribbean
countries, it is not surprising that several of them
have signed or are in the process of negotiating free–
trade agreements. 
It is interesting to note that the countries of the
region give justified priority to negotiations with the
European Union, whose relative importance as one
of the region’s main trading partners is gradually
diminishing; whereas in Latin America and the
Caribbean there is insufficient awareness of the
importance of the Asia–Pacific region, let alone a
coordinated strategy between countries or country
groupings to seek closer trade and investment links
with that region, whose importance as a trade partner is
growing significantly. Approaches to the Asia–Pacific
region by Latin American countries have thus far
been somewhat sporadic and individual, involving the
signing of bilateral free trade agreements by countries
on an individual basis.
Behind this dynamic trade between the two
regions, China is playing an increasing role in both
exports and imports, displacing Japan as the largest
trade partner in Asia at the start of the decade (see
figures 3A and 3B). In addition, the ASEAN (5) grouping
has overtaken the Republic of Korea as a source of
imports from Latin America and the Caribbean and as
a destination for its exports.
(a) Trade flows between Latin America and the
Asia–Pacific region
Countries comprising the ASEAN+6 grouping
in 2005 accounted for 8.2% and 19.3%, respectively,
of Latin America and the Caribbean's exports and
imports.16 Bi–regional exports are concentrated in
South America, while Central America and Mexico are
relatively minor players (see tables V.2 and V.3).
Nonetheless, Mexico is a major importer from
ASEAN+6, especially from China and Japan, which
16 The countries considered in tables V.2 and V.3 are the countries of ASEAN (5), plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and the
Republic of Korea.
Figure V.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE OF THE UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION (27 MEMBER STATES)
AND THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION IN THE REGION'S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(Percentages)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database
(COMTRADE).
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provide 8% and 6% of its total imports, respectively.
ASEAN+6 absorbs about 15% of the total exports of
MERCOSUR countries, but only about 4% of the
exports of other subregional groupings, and just 2% in
the case of Caribbean countries.
The trade flows between the two regions reveal the
growing importance of China as a buyer and supplier.
This country absorbed 3.4% of the region's total
exports and was the source of 7.3% of its imports in
2005, rapidly overtaking other trade partners such as
Japan and the Republic of Korea. China, Japan and the
Republic of Korea, in that order, are the leading trade
partners for each of the subregions of Latin America
and the Caribbean (MERCOSUR, Andean Community,
Central American Common Market and the Caribbean
Community). In the case of Mexico, the weight of
ASEAN+6, its second largest import source, is high
and rising, with 22% of its imports coming from
that grouping (ECLAC, 2006). India is also playing an
increasingly important role as a destination for Latin
American and Caribbean exports, drawing ever
closer to the level of the Republic of Korea. ASEAN
countries are emerging as another hub of bi–regional
trade in Asia, surpassing the Republic of Korea as a
destination and origin of products. The Oceania region,
defined as Australia and New Zealand for the purposes
of this study, occupies a small but increasingly
important space.
Figure V.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SHARE OF SELECTED COUNTRIES AND GROUPINGS OF THE ASIA–PACIFIC
REGION IN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(Percentages)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database
(COMTRADE).
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(b) Structure of trade between
Latin America and the Caribbean
and the Asia–Pacific region
The structure of Latin American and Caribbean
exports destined for the Asia–Pacific region is
concentrated on the natural resource sector and
manufactured goods based on them (see figure V.4).
This can clearly be seen in the cases of India and
Japan, and to lesser extent China, ASEAN (10) and
the Republic of Korea. In general, the share of
manufactures of differing technological intensity (low,
medium or high) is very small and contrasts starkly
with the structure of Latin American intra–regional
trade, which includes a high component of products of
medium–technology intensity. ASEAN has an export
basket in which manufactured products, including
those in the medium– or high–technology categories,
take more than a negligible share. The countries of
Oceania overall report a large component of medium–
technology manufactures, which largely reflects the
Latin American intra–regional trade structure.
In contrast, the structure of Latin American and
Caribbean imports from the Asia–Pacific region is the
reverse of its export structure, but with sharp variations
between countries and subregions. In the case of Japan
and, to a lesser extent, China, the Republic of Korea
and ASEAN, the most important components are
high– and medium–technology–intensive manufactures,
while natural resource–based manufactures are the
leading category in India. The largest coefficient of
high–technology manufactures occurs in the ASEAN
group. In contrast, the export basket of the countries of
Oceania is concentrated in primary products.
As the analysis of the previous section shows,
intra–industry trade (IIT) is a growing feature of the
trade links that exist between the economies of East
and South–East Asia. Nonetheless, bi–regional trade
flows strongly feature inter–industry trade, while the
countries of the region export primary and processed
primary products, but import different types of
manufactures. It remains to be seen whether trade
agreements currently in force or in the negotiation
stage in the Asia–Pacific region, or between the two
regions, will be able to change these structures.
The 30 product categories exported by Latin
America and the Caribbean to ASEAN (5)+3 (Japan,
China and the Republic of Korea) with the highest
export values in 2005 are highly concentrated in
natural resources and processed products based
thereon (see table V.4, which also shows the value of
trade in these products worldwide). These categories
account for about 86% of the region's total exports to
the Asia–Pacific region; table V.4 also shows the five
largest providers of each of the 30 products exported to
the Asia–Pacific region in 2005, with their respective
market shares. The list includes a number of new
commodities, such as fresh fruit, along with high–
technology manufactures, including telecommunica-
tions equipment and data–processing machinery.
Figure V.4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STRUCTURE
OF TRADE TOWARDS CERTAIN MARKETS, 2005
(Percentages)
Source:Economic commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on
the basis of official data from the statistical database on merchandise
trade (COMTRADE).
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The presence of a number of Latin American and
Caribbean countries should also be noted among the
main suppliers of these 30 products. ASEAN (5)+3
obtained more than 40% of its total imports of refined
copper from Chile in 2005; in that year over 64% of
Asia–Pacific imports of oilseed products came from
Brazil and Argentina, and more than 46% of the coffee
imported by this region was supplied by Brazil,
Colombia and Guatemala. Nonetheless, despite the
region's high concentration in a few products, ASEAN
(5)+3 has achieved a high level of diversification of
supply sources, sufficient to prevent Latin America
and the Caribbean having strong bargaining power
with respect to these products. There is significant
competition with several developed economies, such
as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States, and with neighbouring developing Asian
countries, such as China, Indonesia, the Republic of
Korea, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand, among
others, in mining, agriculture, fishery and forestry
products, where Latin America and the Caribbean
traditionally enjoy comparative advantages.
This shows that the challenge facing the Latin
American and Caribbean region is to exploit the
comparative advantages it enjoys from its natural
resource endowments, on a more efficient and
coordinated basis, and attempt to move up the value
chains that may arise around them. In view of these
challenges, efforts should be made to attract Asian
investment into those value chains and stimulate IIT
with that region.
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(c) Low level of intra–industry trade
between Latin America and the
Caribbean and Asia
The level of IIT in Asia contrasts starkly with
the very low level prevailing between Latin America
and the Caribbean and Asia. If one compares the IIT
coefficients of Latin America and the Caribbean with
those of other regions of the world (United States,
European Union and even East Asia), the amount of
this type of trade with Asia is very small (see figure
V.5). Latin America and the Caribbean shows a high
index of intra–industry trade with the MERCOSUR
countries (whether or not including Brazil) and, to
much smaller extent, with the Andean Community and
Chile. This type of trade has increased considerably in
the case of Mexico, especially with the United States,
as a result of the maquila trade. Apart from Mexico, IIT
with Asia is almost non–existent, and this is one of the
main reasons for the relative stagnation of bi–regional
trade generally.
Figure V.5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TREND OF THE INTRA–INDUSTRY TRADE INDEX
1984–1985, 1994–1995 AND 2004–2005
(Percentages)
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database
(COMTRADE).
a Asia includes China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea.
b Figures for Mexico which cover 1994–1995 and 2004–2005 only.
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The following table gives an overview of trade
weighted average tariffs as applied to imports by the
leading countries of Asia and India. Although the
average tariff applied to all products by these 10
countries was around 8%, the average on agricultural
products was above 23%, while the average on
industrial products was 6%. These figures help to
explain the structuring of production systems in Asia,
since the tariff system is clearly biased towards
protecting agricultural products, and there is an
apparent lowering of tariffs on industrial products. In
this regard, of the 10 countries considered here, only
the Philippines would be the exception, since the
average of its industrial tariffs is almost twice that
levied on agricultural products. Nonetheless, the highest
average tariff on industrial products is actually applied
by Thailand and not the Philippines (see table V.5).
After Singapore, which has a free market, the
country with the lowest average tariffs is Japan,
followed by Indonesia and Malaysia; the latter applies
an average tariff of over 26% on plastic and plastic
products, rubber and rubber products, the highest of
the group for these articles. 
In Asia, the highest tariffs are applied to agricultural
products and a number of natural–resource–based
manufactured goods —precisely the product lines in
which the Latin American and Caribbean region has
most comparative advantages. The challenge facing
the region is to engage in the Asian production and
distribution scheme with exports that face the highest
levels of protection. From that standpoint, future
negotiations between Latin American and Caribbean
countries and Asian countries will be complex, and to
be able to conduct them successfully the region will
need to offer additional new attractions. The priorities
of the ASEAN economies are negotiations with China,
Japan and the Republic of Korea. Competing even on
a minor scale would need broader and unified markets
with similar standards and disciplines. Only in this way
would it be possible to attract trade and investment
interest from the ASEAN countries with respect to the
business opportunities that arise in the region. In other
words, to accept the challenge of participating in
“Factory Asia”, Latin America and the Caribbean
need to develop their own “Industry America”, focus
on incorporating knowledge into their exports, and
develop regional negotiation schemes offering greater
access advantages than would arise from a strictly
bilateral negotiation process. 
Advantages such as skilled labour, proximity to
lower–cost energy sources, abundance of natural
resources and appropriate industrial development
and innovation policies can help Latin America and
the Caribbean to participate more intensively in Asian
production chains. Nonetheless, all this assumes
making faster progress in export diversification,
product and process innovation, and promotion of IIT
between Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
2. Tariffs in Asia: a headache for Latin America
and the Caribbean?
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Table V.5
AVERAGE TARIFFS APPLIED TO PRODUCT GROUPS IN ASIA,
WEIGHTED BY TRADE VALUE, 2006a
(Ad valorem percentage rates)
Rep.
Japan China of Philippines Thailand Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Viet Nam India
Korea
Average tariff applied to all products 1.12 4.27 6.89 11.89 35.77 3.64 0 3.57 6.78 9.32
Average tariff applied to agricultural products 2.61 19.57 31.11 6.86 58.66 2.48 0.04 10.73 69.07 30.29
Average tariff applied to industrial products 1.09 4.19 6.14 12.85 13.71 3.67 0 3.54 6.46 9.21
1 Live animals; Animal products 6.47 6.69 19.24 5.85 30.00 1.50 0 1.67 6.37 30.25
2 Vegetable products 2.21 12.58 66.33 11.40 10.14 3.22 0 5.88 5.20 25.09
3 Animal or vegetable fats and oils 23.22 13.35 9.00 8.27 9.25 2.55 0 1.11 20.07 72.67
4 Prepared foodstuffs; Beverages, spirits and
vinegar; Tobacco and manufactured
tobacco substitutes 0.77 24.92 31.52 11.80 59.67 2.61 0.06 14.66 98.76 30.42
5 Mineral products 34.74 0.57 3.93 4.73 4.08 1.78 0 0.49 3.76 3.40
6 Products of the chemical or allied industries 0.24 11.25 6.76 3.29 5.52 1.79 0 3.75 6.05 14.78
7 Plastics and articles thereof; Rubber and
articles thereof 0.24 7.73 7.74 9.72 10.82 26.11 0 12.86 24.17 14.59
8 Raw hides and skins, and articles thereof; 
Travel goods 10.03 12.22 7.94 6.89 5.00 3.01 0 11.10 36.47 14.25
9 Wood and articles of wood; Wood charcoal;
Cork and articles of cork 1.08 3.33 6.93 7.18 5.92 11.39 0 4.54 12.13 12.06
10 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic
material; Recovered (waste and scrap) paper
or paperboard; Paper and paperboard and
articles thereof 0.02 3.73 0 5.60 9.66 1.21 0 3.73 15.66 12.97
11 Textiles and textile articles 7.14 14.24 12.33 10.02 34.94 17.43 0 13.97 43.92 15.19
12 Footwear, Headgear, umbrellas,
sun umbrellas, etc. 14.86 16.67 11.99 13.21 39.14 16.63 0 12.13 47.02 14.78
13 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos,
mica or similar materials; Ceramic products;
Glass and glassware 0.48 13.15 7.79 6.37 28.04 4.71 0 5.04 45.91 14.81
14 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or
semi–precious stones, precious metals, metals
clad with precious metal, and articles thereof;
Imitation jewellery; Coin 0 0.03 2.54 2.89 0 0.01 0 4.52 1.28 14.94
15 Base metals and articles of base metal 0.29 11.47 6.31 4.45 9.94 7.61 0 9.29 20.59 15.62
16 Machinery and mechanical appliances;
Electrical equipment; Parts thereof; Sound
recorders and reproducers, television image and
sound recorders and reproducers, and parts
and accessories of such articles 0 2.98 4.44 2.32 11.70 2.08 0 2.14 4.56 6.32
17 Vehicles, aircraft, vessels and associated
transport equipment 0 11.76 6.57 22.54 0 13.39 0 13.59 22.53 32.81
18 Optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring, checking, precision, medical or
surgical instruments and apparatus; Clocks and
watches; Musical instruments; Parts
and accessories thereof 0.14 5.66 6.44 2.58 5.00 0.30 0 3.92 0.73 9.45
19 Arms and munitions, parts and spares 2.12 12.91 0.26 14.49 0 11.85 0 0.47 1.15 14.94
20 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.37 7.71 2.46 8.62 5.92 7.40 0 11.47 29.55 14.83
21 Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques 0 8.49 0 0 0 0 0 8.42 0 14.94
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the International Trade Centre, Market Access Map
(MAcMap) [database], United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)/World Trade Organization (WTO).
a Data refer to 2006, except India (2005).
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In addition to the importance of the Asia–Pacific region
in worldwide exports of manufactured goods, that
region is also one of the main exporters and importers
of agricultural products. In fact, the Asia–Pacific
region, as a whole, is the second largest agricultural
exporter after the European Union, with an 18% share
of world exports in 2005, compared to the 13% of
Latin America and the Caribbean. As an importer its
share was somewhat larger, close to 21% (see table
V.6). The world's 15 leading exporters of agricultural
products include the following seven Asia–Pacific
countries: China (US$ 29 billion in 2005); Australia
(US$ 21 billion); Thailand (US$ 18 billion); Indonesia
(US$ 14 billion); Malaysia (US$ 13 million); New
Zealand (US$ 13 billion) and India (US$ 10 billion).
The Latin American and Caribbean countries that com-
pete in agricultural exports are: Brazil (US$ 35
billion); Argentina (US$ 19 billion); Mexico (US$ 13
billion) and Chile (US$ 10 billion). The 15 largest
importers of these products in the world include Japan,
China, the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong SAR
and Taiwan Province of China, India and Malaysia, in
order of importance.
The Asia–Pacific region also outweighs Latin
America and the Caribbean in its share of global
exports and imports of fuels and extractive industry
products, with over 14% of global sales and 32% of
global purchases of these products. As an exporter, it
easily surpasses the Latin American share. 
According to WTO data (2006), intra–regional
flows of agricultural products in the Asia–Pacific
region, which totalled US$ 89 billion in 2005,
represented 49% of the total amount imported by the
region in this category. This indicates a significant
level of productive and trade complementarity within
the region, even in non–manufacturing sectors. The
Asia–Pacific region also supplies these products to
Europe and North America, markets to which it
exported a total of US$ 28 billion and US$ 22 billion,
respectively, in 2005. The intra–regional trade index is
also high in the case of extractive products (fuels and
minerals); nearly 37% of the sector's total imports
(US$ 560 billion) came from the region itself.
In view of the high level of intra–regional trade in
natural resources in the Asia–Pacific region, the Latin
American and Caribbean region would have to
compete in that region not only in the areas in which it
has comparative advantages, but also in third markets
of major importance such as the European Union and
the United States. Competitiveness in some countries
of Asia and Oceania will be further strengthened
when the various preferential agreements currently
being negotiated are completed.
3. Competition between Latin America and the Caribbean
and the Asia–Pacific region, in the agricultural and
extractive products sector
Table V.6
THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS
WORLDWIDE, BY REGIONS, 2005
(Percentages)
Regions of the world/product groups Agricultural Fuels and minerals
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Europe 46.5 47.2 23.2 37.0
Asia 18.1 20.8 14.4 32.0
North America 14.5 16.1 8.9 19.4
Africa 3.8 3.8 11.1 1.9
Community of Independent States 3.1 3.4 11.7 1.5
Middle East 1.5 3.7 21.8 1.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 12.5 4.9 8.8 3.7
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Trade
Statistics 2006, Geneva, 2006.
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The establishment of an Asian free–trade area that
includes China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
possibly India also, poses a major challenge for Latin
America and the Caribbean, because integration in
Asia has an intra–regional emphasis, with a larger share
of intra–regional exports in the tariff preferences
scheme. As indicated above, Asian imports from the
Latin American region remain concentrated in primary
products and natural resources, while the composition
of imports to Latin America and the Caribbean from
ASEAN is strongly biased towards product areas
such as information and communication technology,
on which tariffs have fallen substantially in the last
few years.
Accordingly, Latin America and the Caribbean's
disadvantage in Asian markets in these product lines,
given competition from ASEAN, would be eased if
the countries of the region were to sign free–trade
agreements with the ASEAN countries. In the absence
of trade negotiations, the most serious disadvantages
for Latin American and Caribbean countries would be
aggravated in the primary product and commodity–
based manufacturing sectors, where the ASEAN
countries have comparative advantages in terms of
production and where effective tariff rates are high, as
shown in table V.5. The tariffs applied by the ASEAN
countries, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea
remain high on agricultural products, textiles and
apparel, and certain machinery sectors. Thus within the
ASEAN+3 agreement, or the ASEAN agreement with
each of the three countries, or even the China–ASEAN
agreement (see box V.3) or the ASEAN–India
agreement, a reduction in these tariffs would favour
ASEAN members at the expense of Latin American
and Caribbean countries. This would generate trade
diversion which would also make it harder for Latin
American enterprises to participate in Asian value chains.
In terms of the trade and well–being of the Latin
American and Caribbean region, there is little
information on the potential effects of trans–Pacific
free trade agreements either in force or under
negotiation between the two regions. A study that
analyses the effects of the free–trade agreements signed
by Chile with Asia (4) (China, India, Japan and the
Republic of Korea), finds that the trade impact for
Chile is considerable, especially in terms of the
expansion of their exports to China and Japan. The
study also found that trade creation dominates
(Schuschny, Durán and de Miguel, 2007),17 while trade
diversion is very small and only affects Argentina,
Brazil and Peru. These countries have considerable
trade with China and Japan, competing with Chile in
exports of certain natural resources and agribusiness
products. The different export patterns among the other
countries of the region means that there is virtually no
trade diversion.
4. Consequences for Latin America and the Caribbean
of a regional–scope free–trade treaty 
17 The study makes simulations of several hypotheses of trade liberalization using the database and general computable equilibrium model of
the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). All hypotheses take as a reference point a base centred on 2004 (also calibrated by the authors),
either with full employment or with unemployment, as the case may be. The agreements simulated were those of Chile–Japan, Chile–China
and Chile–Asia (4). All cases have assumed both full liberalization and liberalization excluding sensitive products. The free trade agreement
with Japan has also been represented in a dynamic exercise that incorporates capital accumulation.
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The China–ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement was signed in November
2002, and seeks to improve economic
cooperation in trade in goods, services
and investments. The coverage of the
agreement was recently expanded
by the signing of an merchandise
trade agreement between ASEAN
and China which involves effective
tariff savings in goods trade. This
agreement has been applied as from 1
July 2005. The tariff preferences apply
to imports from ASEAN to China and
vice–versa, and the basic elements
are as follows:
Liberalization timetable and product
coverage: as part of the commitment
established in the agreement, tariffs
applicable to nearly 7,000 types of in-
dustrial goods would be reduced by
between 0% and 5% between July
2005 and 2015. The tariffs applicable
to the six most advanced countries
of the group (Brunei Darussalam,
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand) for the
products included on the normal list,
which represent about 400 tariff lines
and 10% of total value imported in
2001, will be eliminated before 2010.
Those applicable to the other four
countries (Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao
People's Democratic Republic and
Viet Nam) will be eliminated before
2015. A deadline of 2018 has been
set for tariff reductions on sensitive
products (such as rice, cement and
automobiles); and tariffs for highly
sensitive products will be reduced
by up to 50%. This round of tariff
liberalization has been preceded by
the application of an “early harvest”
programme for the agriculture sector,
which has been in force since early
2004. With the implementation of
these measures, ASEAN countries
are expected to increase their natural–
resource exports to China and their
imports of manufactured products
from China. Preferences between
the countries participating in this
agreement (China and the six member
countries) in the framework of the
agreement on merchandise trade, are
as follows:
Early harvest program: (i) has
been applied since 1 January 2004;
(ii) only covers selected agricultural
products, included in chapters 1–8 of
the Harmonized System (roughly 600
products defined at the eight– or nine–
digit level); and (iii) does not apply to
most manufacturers established in
China. The preferences between China
and ASEAN in the framework of this
program are as follows:
Recent expansion towards industrial
products and consumer goods: reduc-
tions in tariffs and non–tariff barriers
will be applied to trade in products
contained in HS chapters 9 and 97.
Firms must fulfil certain requirements
to be able to use this scheme.
Rules of origin: in general terms,
the aim is that the “manufacturing
value–added” by China or an ASEAN
country should amount to 40%.
Nonetheless, to obtain certification
requires analysis of the business
model or production chain.
Deadline: implementation should
be completed by 2010.
Scope of application: the agreement
covers not only merchandise trade, but
also trade in services and investments,
although the two latter on a relatively
small scale.
Box V.3
CHINA AND THE FREE–TRADE AGREEMENT WITH ASEAN
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Association of South–East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
ACFTA tariff rate
Most Favoured Nation tariff rates 2005 2007 2009 2010
Up to 20% 20% 12% 5% 0%
Between 15% (inclusive) and 20% 15% 8% 5% 0%
Between 10% (inclusive) and 15% 10% 8% 5% 0%
5%–10% 5% 5% 0% 0%
No more than 5% unchanged 0% 0%
Agreement tariff rate
Most Favoured Nation tariff rates 2005 2006
More than 15% 5% 0%
Between 5% (inclusive) and 15% 0% 0%
Less than 5% 0% 0%
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To promote trade and investment flows between Latin
America and the Caribbean and the Asia–Pacific region
in such a way as to improve competitiveness, the
following constraints need to be addressed: (i) the fact
that trade flows by country and the composition of
traded products are highly concentrated; (ii) the nature
of these flows is almost exclusively inter–industry, and
Asia–Pacific exports mainly manufactured goods
while Latin America and the Caribbean mainly exports
raw materials; and (iii) this characteristic makes it
harder for the region's countries to engage more
effectively in the productive chains of the Asia–Pacific
region, which are increasingly intra–industry. The Latin
American and Caribbean region should therefore
adopt a two–pronged approach: first, more efficient
and coordinated exploitation of natural–resource–based
comparative advantages; and, secondly, greater efforts
to promote industrial development by improving
the corresponding international competitiveness in
manufacturing sectors. 
Concerning the more efficient and coordinated
exploitation of comparative advantages, a number of
recent experiences show that value can be added
to commodity exports and knowledge can also be
incorporated. Although more difficult than in
manufacturing sectors, it is also possible to integrate
commodities into production and marketing chains in
Asia and the Pacific; this calls for a systemic approach
including the production process, trade logistics, sea
and air transport, and the marketing and distribution in
the final consumption market. To the extent that this
is based on alliances with Asian investors, the initial
export of commodities will become a complex of
activities involving goods, services, investments and
financing. It remains for Latin America and the
Caribbean to motivate its enterprises to successfully
link themselves to the success of Asian companies,
engaging with production unit supply chains with
more highly processed inputs and contributing
technology and knowledge. This includes involvement
in those supply chains on the basis of natural–resource–
based products which are more highly processed than
those currently exported to Asia and the Pacific. It is
important to make the most of natural resources by
promoting long–term contracts, investment agreements
and technology partnerships in this sector, and by
establishing strategic clusters between countries, firms
and certain geographical areas within the Asia–Pacific
region. Strategic partnerships are needed that allow for
greater value–added throughout the production and
marketing chain; and technological partnerships need
to be managed for mutual benefit, incorporating
progress in biotechnology and agribusiness, mining,
forestry and fishery production among other things.
All these areas offer considerable room for working
together with Asian allies. The likelihood of this taking
place, however, will depend on whether the countries
of Latin America and the Caribbean can present joint
initiatives to achieve progress in various areas with
public– and private–sector actors in Asia. Only when
the region’s producers can attain higher levels of
productivity and efficiency will there be opportunities
to integrate into value chains, not only in Asia but
also in Europe and North America. In this case, Asian
cooperation will be needed, in the shape of investments
and the construction of technical and technological
capacity in areas which can improve efficiency
in exports and the incorporation of knowledge in
raw materials.
As for the intensification of efforts to promote
industrial development, it is important to support
intra–industry trade between Latin America and the
Caribbean and Asia and the Pacific. Although it has
grown, it is still at an incipient stage, particularly
in medium– and high–technology sectors. If such
manufacturing activities are to become high value–
added ones, policies must be promoted to support
conversion to value–added exports with knowledge
incorporated, the benefits of which are reflected in the
rest of the economy through the creation of forward
and backward linkages. The industries must improve
the productivity and competitiveness of local producers
of inputs and components, and there must also be
a pro–innovation approach on the part of the region’s
governments, with a view to competing with Asian
products in high–quality markets.
In both cases there is an urgent need for the
countries of the region to strengthen trade links, seek
greater opportunities for productive complementarity
opportunities with Asia and the Pacific and enter into
E. Conclusions and recommendations
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trade agreements and trade and investment alliances,
which would offer new access to that region’s markets
and promote integration into Asian production and
export chains. The quality and quantity of domestic
products must be improved to match the scales of
Asian demand, and appropriate institutions must be
set up to deal with issues of sanitary and phytosanitary
barriers, as well as trade–related techniques.
Until recently, the Asian regional integration
process was characterized by growing intra–regional
trade and was mainly market driven. Today, this de
facto integration process is being accompanied by de
jure integration. To intensify the production and trade
links induced by the first type of integration, these
need to be complemented by free trade agreements
of a different type, together with another type of
economic and technological cooperation. Nonetheless,
there is also growing concern about the presumption
that the benefits arising from East and South–East
Asia's vigorous growth are not being felt to the full
by non–Asian countries. This is because an informal
and formal trade bloc is forming around those areas,
forging an increasingly broad and more complementary
grouping in which development is disseminated in
concentric circles, thanks to intra–regional FDI. It
is thus becoming increasingly important to establish
closer trade and business links with the Asia–Pacific
countries, China in particular. 
The de jure economic integration progress in
the Asia–Pacific region has not been uniform, but has
followed various channels with different speeds of
implementation. The diversity of sizes and development
levels among the Asian countries is the main obstacle
to establishing the long–desired Asian free market.
This chapter's analysis of the proliferation of trade
agreements shows that East and South–East Asia are in
a second stage of economic integration and are aiming
to achieve greater synergy between de facto and de
jure integration. For that reason, other regions of the
world are interested in taking advantage of this
favourable situation, while also defending their own
interests. Nonetheless, the current process of economic
integration in East Asia, based on growing commercial
and investment linkages, thus far promoted by
agreements, would put Latin America and the Caribbean
at a clear disadvantage. The countries of the region
urgently need to adopt a strategy for engaging with
the Asia–Pacific region, including inter–regional
agreements between the two. 
Undeniably, taking full advantage of the opportunities
offered by such agreements will require, on the
domestic level, more determined advances to face
the challenges of competitiveness, technological
innovation and export diversification. Otherwise,
efforts to diversify markets and improve access to the
Asian market would be limited to consolidating
commodity–based export specialization, vulnerable to
the business cycle and involving the incorporation of
little technology.
The effects for Latin America and the Caribbean
of the proliferation of trade agreements in the Asia–
Pacific region are hard to forecast, however, and
will depend largely on the different settings of
liberalization in the Asia–Pacific countries, the
Asia–Pacific free trade treaty in the APEC framework,
ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6, and even possible
combinations between the countries of Asia, Oceania
and trans–Pacific agreements some of which involve
certain Latin American countries. The various forecasts
tend to confirm the assumption that the economic
effects of a regional–scope Asian free–trade agreement
would grow with its area of coverage. Thus, a free–
trade agreement in East and South–East Asia would
generate more economic benefits for its members than
one between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Moreover, the magnitude of the economic effects
would vary from one member to another and, in
general, would tend to be greater among countries
that are more trade reliant or have greater import
protection. In any event, the Governments of Latin
America urgently need to analyse the available
options and take the corresponding decisions swiftly,
effectively and on a coordinated basis. 
The reduction of tariffs and other barriers being
undertaken within the various types of free–trade
agreements in the Asia–Pacific region, not only with
respect to industrial products but also agricultural
goods, could have significant consequences for the
future of Latin American trade with the Asian region. It
is therefore increasingly important for Latin America
and the Caribbean to engage more effectively in the
production and business networks that are being
formed in the Asia–Pacific region, the hub of which is
China. The recent trend toward the consolidation of
trade relations through the signing of trans–Pacific
agreements tends to facilitate that engagement,
although it needs to be supported by significant
progress both in export diversification and in regional
integration. Regional integration is not only fully
complementary with more energetic engagement in
Asian markets, but is also a condition for success.
A specific working agenda thus arises for Latin
American Governments, business organizations and
regional banks, to agree upon an integrated set of
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initiatives that encompasses various countries and
stimulates IIT and reciprocal investments between
Asian and Latin American economies.
The countries of the region also urgently need to
make the most of the current dynamism in the Asia–
Pacific region and develop new linkages to move
forward in the innovation and competitiveness area (a
weak link in the Latin American regional experience),
strengthen links between trade and investment, and
consolidate productive and technological linkages. The
Asia–Pacific region offers investments that could
provide complementary financing for major initiatives,
especially in the infrastructure and energy areas. An
interesting challenge is to identify the infrastructure
and energy projects where that Asian investment might
be most needed, to speed up works implementation,
which not only would make it possible to strengthen
the trade facilitation and investments link with Asia
Pacific but also would generate externalities for Latin
America's own regional integration process. It would
thus be advisable to link the strategic partnership with
that region with an updating of regional integration,
to achieve unified markets supporting increasingly
common standards and providing greater legal certainty.
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The relationship between export development and
innovation is not usually analysed; rather, these two
subjects tend to be dealt with separately, possibly
because of the difference in their theoretic or policy
base. However, since the information and communications
technology (ICT) revolution, the creation of knowledge
and its use to strengthen the international integration of
different economies are becoming more and more
important. In this increasingly globalized world, the
ability to invent, design and produce new products and
services is more vital for the future than it was in the
past. Industries and countries that make considerable
investments in innovation may compete in better
conditions in the global market; this generates growth
that is more robust and, apparently, more equitable
than the average, given the strong link between
A study on the competitiveness of Latin American countries, contained in Latin America and
the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2005–2006, states that despite the sound export
performance recorded in the preceding years, these countries had continued to lose ground
on leading markets. Furthermore, export growth did not usher in any substantive improvement
in per capita income or in the quality of life of the population. One of the causes of this
phenomenon was said to reside in the low value added and incorporated knowledge of the
region’s exports, an issue which has to do with the export–based development strategy and
the role of innovation in that strategy.
innovation, improved productivity and the quality of
human resources. 
Thus, the present report includes an analysis of the
linkage between export development and innovation
and its translation into strategies and institution–
building. To illustrate this trend, it examines the
different experiences of countries with varying degrees
of advancement in this area: Australia, Finland,
Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea,
Singapore and Sweden. Of this list, Finland, Ireland,
Republic of Korea and Singapore are recognized as
leading manufacturers and exporters of high–technology
products (see figure VI.1). They are interesting
examples since, until recently, their production
structure, like that of many Latin American countries,
was based on traditional branches or on natural
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resources; however, unlike the Latin American
economies, their production path veered off in a different
direction in just a matter of years. Driven in almost
all cases by the export sector, the growth of these
countries (except Malaysia) has raised per capita
income to a level equivalent to, or higher than, the
average of the Organisation for Economic Co–
operation and Development (OECD) (see table VI.1).
Figure VI.1
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPORT STRUCTURE BY TECHNOLOGICAL CONTENT
(SELECTED COUNTRIES), 1984–1985, 1994–1995, 2004–2006
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United Nations International Commodity Trade Data
Base (COMTRADE).
Table VI.1
GROWTH IN PER CAPITA GDP AND EXPORTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1975–2005
Countries Per capita GDP in 2000 prices Per capita GDP at Exports of goods and Per capita
Annual growth rate constant 2000 prices services at constant prices exports at
(percentages) (dollars) (percentages) constant prices
1975–1990 1990–2005 2005 1975–1990 1990–2005 2005
Australia 1.6 2.3 23 039 5.6 5.2 4 326
Finland 2.6 1.7 25 713 5.2 7.4 17 132
Ireland 3.3 5.4 29 991 8.8 11.7 34 496
Malaysia 4.2 3.9 4 437 10.5 9.9 5 353
New Zealand 0.3 1.9 15 298 4.0 3.8 5 135
Republic of Korea 6.8 4.8 13 210 12.6 13.9 10 814
Singapore 5.7 3.9 25 845 9.2 10.5 69 926
Sweden 1.6 1.7 29 954 4.1 6.8 21 303
Source:For per capita GDP, World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database] http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/; for exports, United Nations
Statistics Division, National Accounts Main Aggregates database [on line] http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selectionbasicFast.asp.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy, 2006 • 2007 Trends 177
Ireland, the Republic of Korea and Singapore
experienced more spectacular export growth in volume
terms with average rates for the past 15 years attaining
double digits. They are followed by Malaysia, which
moved from the status of a natural resource exporter in
the mid–1980s to a stage where in the mid–1990s, 60%
of its total exports were manufactures, with high–
technology products accounting for 40% of that total.
Sweden, whose per capita income is the highest in the
group, shows a higher degree of specialization in the
export of medium–technology exports, although the
increase in exports of high–technology products in the
past decade has been significant. Australia and New
Zealand continued to specialize in the export of
resource–based products and have diversified these
same product chains. It is interesting to note that they
have been able to incorporate value in these resources,
linking exports and innovation. 
The rest of the chapter is divided into two sections.
The first considers the concept of innovation, the
phases of this process and its indicators. The second
examines the role of innovation in international
integration and export development strategies, how
this translates into institution–building and the
importance of establishing effective programmes and
policies. All of this underscores the need for coordination
among the organizations involved, complementarity of
programmes and policies and collaboration between
the public and the private sector. The selected countries
whose experiences are used as examples are all from
outside the region. The conclusions are presented in
the final section.
A. Innovation in the global economy
management and the multiple possibilities that it
generates.2 Nevertheless, it should be recognized that
without basic and applied research and without
technological development, innovation would rapidly
lose strength. 
Different stages may be identified in the development
of the capacity for technological innovation, and
countries may be placed in terms of the stage they are
at (see diagram VI.1).
A company may acquire technology, machinery
or equipment abroad to develop a new product locally
or penetrate a new market, as well as to incorporate an
already established process. If this leads to an increase
in the business or industry’s competitiveness and
profitability, it is an innovation. However, companies
that rely on the incorporation of existing technology
are usually at a disadvantage in the global market
compared with companies that are capable of
developing technology for themselves.
Currently, innovation is conceived as a social process
in which different stakeholders participate and which
involves different levels of competition, although the
focus is on the business company. This is so, because
innovation is not just limited to the creation of scientific
projects, but implies adding commercial value to
the successful exploitation of new knowledge and
technological developments. Innovation can refer to
the sphere of the company, the industry or the economy
as a whole and, as Schumpeter pointed out at an early
stage, it can be related to the manufacture of new
products, the provision of services, the development of
processes or the domain of new markets.1 It may also
be expressed in new business, marketing or logistical
models or in new formulas for market conquest,
processes that are vital for export development. The
conception of innovation is much broader than that
linked only to technological development and scientific
research, since it also has to do with business
1 See Schumpeter (1934).
2 For the incorporation of new elements into the traditional definition of innovation, see OECD (1997) and (2005).
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A country may remain in this phase for a period,
but if it wishes to improve its competitiveness and gain
a foothold in the global market, it must pass through
the following phases.3 Technology may be acquired by
purchasing machinery and equipment, by purchasing
licences or through investment by a transnational
corporation in a new plant that manufactures a product
that did not exist before. Several countries have made
tremendous strides in terms of diversification and
export development, thanks to this last type of innovation.
The prime example is Ireland, which became a
platform for entry into the European market following
the rapid pace of transnational investments in the
1980s and early 1990s. The same is now occurring in
Asia with Malaysia and Singapore. 
Time is of the essence in overcoming the imitation
phase; companies eventually incorporate knowledge
for improving and distinguishing their products and
services and the phase of creative imitation starts.
Thus, in the innovative process, on–the–job learning is
irreplaceable. This activity is linked to research and
development (R&D) and may take place within the
firm itself or with the collaboration of other companies,
universities, centres of excellence or institutes of
technology. Among the countries studied, this phase
prevails currently in various sectors in Ireland and
Singapore, in various branches of agribusiness,
manufacture and services in Australia, and in
activities relating to agribusiness in New Zealand (see
diagram VI.2).
3 For more in–depth studies on this issue, see Nelson (1993), Lundval (1992), Katz (1998) and Cimoli, Ferraz and Primi (2005).
Diagram VI.1
THE PROCESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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The final phase of development consists in
innovation in the true sense of the term. To achieve this
phase, R&D must be considered as a central process
not only for the company, but also for the country. This
is due to the fact that innovation is not an individual act
and requires not only the broadest possible collaboration
between companies but also a sufficiently wide research
base in order to boost the process. In this regard,
coordination of the companies with R&D centres and
university centres of excellence within and outside the
country is essential; by the same token, financing for
basic science, which is usually provided by the State,
is vital. The closer–knit these knowledge networks,
the greater the potential success of the invention. The
subsequent phase, marketing, encompasses various
stages, so that governments design policies and
incentives that strengthen this dimension. 
These phases are not linear and may coexist within
a country and even within an industry or firm. There
are countries that are technologically at the cutting
edge in one or two sectors and others that are in this
position in most sectors. Among the countries studied,
the Republic of Korea can claim this distinction espe-
cially in the area of electronics, notably in semi–
conductors. Finland and Sweden are at the forefront in
their main export sectors. These countries are considered
leaders in innovations at the global level, even
compared with countries of the European Union, the
United States and Japan. This leadership is demonstrated
by the fact that they rank at the top of the category in
multiple indicators. For example, with respect to their
capabilities in science and technology, OECD places
them in the leading position on account of their
expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP, the
share of this expenditure financed by the companies
and the number of patents registered in the United
States, Japan and Europe per thousand inhabitants
(see table VI.2).
The European Union is preparing a series of
indicators to reflect the capacity for innovation in all its
complexity and in its various dimensions. “Innovation
drivers” are used to measure the structural conditions
that enable a country to develop its innovation
potential; knowledge creation indicators measure
investments in R&D activities; and innovation
indicators and entrepreneurship refer to the company’s
efforts to market the new products, services or
technologies; the applications refer to the value added
of activities linked to the most innovative sectors, and
intellectual property indicators measure the results
of registering patents in the United States, Europe and
Japan and of creating new brands and designs at the
global level. By using these indicators, it is possible to
present graphically the averages of sets of countries, in
this case the members of the European Union, which
are in phases of imitation (trailers), creative imitation
(followers) and innovation (leaders) (see figure VI,2).
In line with these statistics, what differentiates
countries that have a high capacity for innovation from
those that display creative imitation is the magnitude
Diagram VI.2
STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Organisation for Economic Co–operation and Development (OECD), OECD
in Figures 2006–2007 and Main Science and Technology Indicators, Paris, 2006; and Innometrics, "European Innovation Scoreboard 2006. Comparative Analysis
of Innovation Performance", 2006 [online] http://www.proinno-europe.eu/doc/EIS2006_final.pdf.
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of innovations that are patented and marketed.
Countries in the imitation phase show deficiencies
in all indicators. 
This set of indicators also facilitates the generation
of a summary indicator, which presents figures for
almost all of the countries in this study. On the basis of
this indicator, Finland and Sweden again lead the
process at the global level, together with Switzerland,
Japan, Singapore, Israel and the United States (see
figure VI.3).
Table VI.2
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INDICATORS
Country Expenditure on Percentage of Percentage of expenditure Patents registered
R&D /GDP expenditure incurred by high- in the United States,
(percentages) incurred by firms technology industries Europe and Japan 
per 1,000 inhabitants
Australia 1.6 51.2 12.1 0.021
Finland 3.5 70.1 55.2 0.120
Ireland 1.2 64.6 38.2 0.014
Republic of Korea 2.8 76.7 53.0 0.015
New Zealand 1.1 42.5 - -
Sweden 4.0 74.1 51.4 0.089
United States 2.7 70.1 40.3 -
OECD 2.3 67.9 - -
Source:Organisation for Economic Co–operation and Development (OECD), OECD in Figures 2006–2007, Paris, 2006; and Main Science and Technology Indicators,
Paris, December 2006.
Figure VI.2
PERFORMANCE BY PHASE IN THE
INNOVATION PROCESS
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
on the basis of Innometrics, “European Innovation Scoreboard 2006.
Comparative Analysis of Innovation Performance”, 2006 [online]
http://www.proinno-europe.eu/doc/EIS2006_final.pdf.
Figure VI.3
GLOBAL SUMMARY INNOVATION INDEXa
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
on the basis of Innometrics, “European Innovation Scoreboard 2006.
Comparative Analysis of Innovation Performance”, 2006 [online]
http://www.proinno–europe.eu/doc/EIS2006_final.pdf.
a Black bars are used to highlight the figures of the countries selected for
this study.
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In the selected countries, innovation tends to be
conceived as part of the diversification and export
development strategy. This is due to the fact that
countries that are technological leaders and their close
followers are threatened by competition, heightened
essentially by the information and communications
technology (ICT) revolution, trade liberalization and
the reduction in transport costs.
Trade liberalization has enabled countries that
produce at very low cost and which, historically have
been marginalized from world trade, to become
integrated into the global market. Companies that wish
to continue competing on markets where those new
countries are positioned are forced to move up in
the value chain and shift from competing on a low–cost
basis to competing on the basis of new, high–quality
products, in which the role of innovation is vital. 
On the other hand, technology and scientific
knowledge are changing the world at unprecedented
speed. ICTs, nanotechnology, biotechnology and even
new fuels are generating a new wave of innovations
and creating other business opportunities for obtaining
competitive advantages. The winners in this race are
the countries that are usually first, but nothing is
guaranteed, because in today’s world, given the speed
with which knowledge is transmitted, they can easily
be displaced. 
Communications also have an impact on consumers.
Knowledge in real time of what is happening in the rest
of the world rapidly influences tastes; new fashions,
ideas and products emerge and are disseminated almost
instantaneously. Being constantly aware of consumer
demand and of the market niches that open up and
being capable of satisfying demand with new and
better products imply a mastery of the innovation
process and the ability to keep up to date with changes
in international supply and demand.
In recent years, these determinants have weighed
heavily on countries’ strategies for international
integration; this has generated flexibility amid changing
objectives and has placed innovation at the centre
of strategy redefinition. This has led governments
to design mutually inter–linking policies for
competitiveness, export development and innovation
in order to provide comprehensive government
support. In some cases, the strategies have been
spearheaded by leading stakeholders and supported
by governments through policies, instruments and
financing. This phenomenon has occurred at the
national level and also at the regional or sectoral level,
as in the example presented in box VI.1.
B. Innovation and export development
In 2002–2007, the National Food
Industry Advisory Committee, in asso-
ciation with the Government of
Australia, launched the initial stage of
the National Food Industry Strategy
(Australia, Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry, 2002). This
was based on a 23–point action
agenda and its aim is to ensure that
Australia’s food industry will be a
significant player in the global market.
The approach has been to increase
the export opportunities and profitability
of companies by raising investment in
innovation, improving supply chain
practices, increasing efficiency and
competitiveness and skills develop-
ment as well as promoting clean
and safe food through sustainable
environmental management practices.
Programmes have been developed
around four key themes: 
(i) innovation: leveraging Australia's
science and technology, and education
and training by making the country a
recognised centre for innovation in
food product, process and systems
development, anticipating and mee-
ting consumer needs, and attracting
investment; 
(ii) market development: develo-
ping an international food market entry
strategy that increases Australian
exports of food products to enable
companies to optimize profitability,
investment and employment;
Box VI.1
AUSTRALIA: NATIONAL FOOD INDUSTRY STRATEGY
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(iii) business environment: building
a globally competitive business–
operating environment to improve
food industry investment; and 
(iv) environmental sustainability:
ensuring long–term resource availabi-
lity and responsible management of
environment, energy and waste to
support industry growth.
In 2006, commodities and processed
food exports accounted for 11.4% of
total exports from Australia; of that
figure approximately 70% were pro-
cessed goods. The steady growth of
exports was due in part to high
commodity prices. Currently, innova-
tion is the key to profitability and
competitiveness in the food industry.
The real opportunities on the global
market will come from value added
throughout the product chain. This is
why food processing and production is
being promoted through innovation;
the aim is to move from diversification
of commodities to value added in the
sector. To this end, the national strate-
gies include the following programmes
and projects, which are designed to
reduce innovation risk: 
(i) subsidy programmes for inno-
vation in foods for those projects that
envisage commercial results from
R&D relating to products, processes
or technologies; 
(ii) the creation of centres of
excellence to provide the basis for
scientific research and practice,
creating an environment that will
benefit the sector;
(iii) a specialists’ management
programme in food science and
technology;
(iv) the increase in the level of
the labour force and its skills through
capacity–building and skills training.
In 2005, an external consultant
assessed the implementation of this
strategy and the progress of the
programmes (Ridge Partners Consul-
tants and Advisers, 2005). The as-
sessment revealed the following:
(i) the programmes responded to
the needs of the sector;
(ii) government subsidies were
essential when deciding on the imple-
mentation of projects; 
(iii) the programmes effectively
provided benefits in terms of marke-
ting, improvement of the capacity of
enterprises and building networks;
(iv) the participation of small
and medium–sized enterprises was
limited; and 
(v) programme administration was
efficient and effective.
At the end of the period, consulta-
tions were held throughout the country
and it was concluded that a national
strategy was needed. In addition,
strengthening collaboration between
the public and private sectors stood
out as a more acute need when the
initiative was taking shape. The
current objective is to create interna-
tional competitive advantages for
the industry through innovation
throughout the value chain, solve
problems shared by the sectors of
which it is comprised and increase the
returns on the investment. There is a
proposal for promoting the culture of
innovation throughout the sector,
which is facilitated by the successful
results of programmes implemented in
the previous five–year period. Lastly,
the establishment of close coordina-
tion and collaboration between the
sector and the multiple government
entities at the federal and State levels
is considered to be another important
success of the strategy. 
Box VI.1 (concluded)
AUSTRALIA: EXPORTS OF FOOD AND BEVERAGES, RAW MATERIALS AND PROCESSED PRODUCTS, 1996–2006
(In millions of dollars)
Source:South Australian Food Industry ScoreCard team, National Food Industry Scorecard 1996–97 to 2005–06, Adelaide.
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The future outlook for a country seeking to improve its
position on the international market and the need to
adapt to changing conditions leads some countries
which formerly had performed satisfactorily to
reaffirm their strategies and the place occupied by the
different factors of competitiveness and growth. In
most of the countries examined, innovation is considered
to be the key element for future success. However, it is
not just a matter of increasing expenditure on R&D and
maintaining the current design of policies: the latter
must be redefined to match the requirements of the
new strategy. The most important definitions concern
the sectors or activities to which priority will be given. 
Ireland is a case in point: in the 1990s, its exports
of high–technology products increased exponentially,
but it now has to compete with the low wage bill of
Chinese and some Eastern European manufacturers of
computers and other electronic equipment. Undaunted
by these new challenges, the government and
entrepreneurs set up in 2004 a special analytical group
–the Enterprise Strategy Group– to assess the situation
and outlook. This Group’s report and recommendations
were taken into account in the government’s
subsequent programme and policy designs (Enterprise
Strategy Group, 2004 and Martin, 2006). The
recommendations highlighted the need to improve the
capacity to apply technology for producing goods and
services of higher value in the country, that is, to move
up as far as possible in the value chain and evolve
towards the knowledge economy (see box VI.2).
These recommendations led the government to gear its
policies towards market intelligence, innovation and
deepening of the development of business networks,
which, in turn, resulted in a shift in the definition and
priorities of the development agencies.
1. Innovation in the face of future challenges
Ireland’s strategy for export diversifi-
cation was based on attracting foreign
direct investment. Its success was
overwhelming, since more than 1,000
transnational corporations set up
operations in a country of some four
million inhabitants. The Industrial
Development Agency (IDA) of Ireland
was responsible for implementing
programmes and policies to attract
this investment. Nevertheless, inter-
national trade conditions are changing
and affect these platforms and the
government and principal stakeholders
are therefore developing new strate-
gies in anticipation of the future evolution
of trade in their country. Ireland is
losing its market share in sales of
manufactures globally, while, at the
same time, it has a great potential in
high value–added services. This loss
of participation is due to the fact that
some transnational corporations that
produce high technology equipment
have transferred their operations
to Asia. 
Box VI.2
IRELAND: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION
IRELAND: SHARE OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE WORLD MARKET
Source:Enterprise Ireland [online] http://www.enterprise-ireland.com/
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In order to address this situation,
companies have geared their resour-
ces towards the highest part of the
value chain with respect to services
and even the production of high–tech-
nology goods linked to electronics,
life sciences, future foods and the
pharmaceutical industry. This orientation,
which allows the payment of high wages,
combined with high profitability, forces
companies to pursue intense develop-
ment in terms of innovation.
In order to facilitate this reorientation,
the Government of Ireland has
carefully planned a comprehensive
strategy for science, technology and
innovation (Ireland, Department of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment,
2006), through which it will coordinate
the activities of all the public entities
involved.
Transnational corporations receive
tax incentives to prepare R&D activi-
ties through IDA Ireland, but, in addition,
they benefit from programmes imple-
mented by other bodies, such as
Science Foundation Ireland, which
encourages scientific research in key
areas for the economy through the
coordination of businesses, universities
and centres of excellence. Furthermore,
the strategy sets out a commitment
to double the number of graduates
with doctorates and to attract new
generations to education, by ensuring
the necessary infrastructure.
At the same time, Irish companies
cannot afford to fall behind and the
government has, therefore, prepared
a strategy for their internationalization.
According to this new strategy, the
future of Ireland depends on research,
marketing and the production and
sale of products and services with
high value added on the global market.
According to the business develop-
ment organization, Enterprise Ireland,
in order to obtain success in such a
competitive context, there is need for
a new business model, under which
foreign trade will be increasingly
dependent on market knowledge
and innovation. But the government
does not expect this reorientation of
economic activity to be market–led
and, thus, it has proposed a set of
policies. The programmes and policies
are aimed at raising the productivity
and competitiveness of businesses,
boosting trading on the global market
of goods and services, improving ma-
nagement, providing financing and
promoting innovation. 
In terms of exports, government
support helps to provide flexible
solutions to the needs of businesses.
Enterprise Ireland is associated both
with businesses that are already
established and new entities and
helps to identify new opportunities and
to build knowledge and understanding
of markets and marketing capacity.
Box VI.2 (continued)
INNOVATION PROMOTION ENTITIES
Source: Industrial Development Agency (IDA Ireland) [online] http://www.idaireland.com/.
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The Republic of Korea, notwithstanding the very
different context, also serves as an example. Convinced
that science, technology and innovation can play a
decisive role in promoting national competitiveness,
the Government of Korea has been restructuring the
national innovation system since 2004, moving from
a strategy based on imitation towards one based on
innovation. This strategy consists in establishing
systematic cycles of creation and dissemination of
products resulting from R&D, which promote growth,
job creation and an improvement in the quality of
life. This has led the government to address a series
of new approaches in terms of policies geared to the
following objectives: 
i) improving the creative capacity of agents and
promoting greater coordination between government
technological research institutes, businesses and
universities. Basic science will be strengthened
and further support provided to academic institutions,
whose development had been previously weakened.
Reorienting funding for R&D towards socio–
economic demands and overcoming the gap
between supply and demand for technology, by
expanding infrastructure;
ii) promoting innovations at all phases of creation and
industrialization;
iii) promoting knowledge–sharing, an environment of
collaboration and increasing the efficiency of the
national system for innovation. 
Consequently, the government is promoting training
for a large number of professionals in scientific fields,
strengthening the capacity for innovation of small and
medium–sized enterprises (SMEs) and promoting the
marketing of the products of technological innovation.
In order to make this policy of science and technology
effective and efficient, the government has created a
new system of administration to finance, coordinate
and evaluate existing programmes and instruments
(Kee Yol Yu, 2005 and Deok Soon Yim, 2006).
Currently, the Korean Institute of Industrial Technology
This promotion activity forces
Enterprise Ireland to develop and
maintain market contacts, conduct
research and compile information for
clients through its network of offices in
Ireland and throughout the world. It
acts in six areas: business improvement
and productivity specially adapted to
the needs of companies; R&D within
the company; R&D in collaboration
with other companies; research into
marketing; collaboration in R&D at the
international level; and acquisition of
technology. Companies are urged to
focus on potential technological R&D,
promote business incubators, develop
patents and licences and promote
partnerships. 
Box VI.2 (concluded)
ENTERPRISE IRELAND: POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES
Source:Enterprise Ireland [online] http://www.enterprise-ireland.com/.
186 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
(KITECH) provides special support to SMEs in
innovation planning and management, information and
evaluation of technology, training of engineers and
holding of consultancy workshops on the development
of innovation. These are some of the activities for
development and transfer of technology to manufacturing.
There are 12 technological development centres
throughout the country, which encompass the main
industrial sectors. The thematic areas are: future
generation manufacturing systems, innovations in
processes, and advanced products and materials. The
institute has a budget of US$ 187 million and 921
professionals. This technological support is complemented
with the support of the government–run Small and
Medium Business Administration (SMBA, n.d.),
which develops a set of programmes to encourage the
capacity for innovation and entrepreneurship, geared to
boosting new start–ups, thereby providing an effective
financial service geared, among other things, to
improving human resource skills and servicing
micro–enterprises. 
Few countries are better placed than Sweden to
take advantage of the process of globalization and
emergence of the knowledge economy. However, this
has not prevented it from looking towards the future
and analysing the changes that it will need to make
in order to keep on growing and raising the standard
of living of the people. The Ministry of Industry,
Employment and Communication, in conjunction with
the Ministry of Education of Sweden, canvassed the
views of the business sector and the trade–union
movement, as well as representatives of the research
and education community and came up with the
analysis from which the strategy The Innovative
Sweden has been drawn up. This strategy focuses
on four aims: strengthening the knowledge base for
innovation; boosting innovation in trade and industry,
public investment in innovation, and capacity–building
for individuals in the area of innovation. As regards the
second of these focuses, the government recognizes
that competition is exerting increasing pressure in the
business world and that the competitiveness enjoyed
by large firms is not sufficient to survive in this context
(Parker, 1999); survival depends also on SMEs and
the way they interact within integrated production
systems. If Swedish SMEs do not succeed in becoming
competitive, the major transnational corporations will
transfer their operations outside of the country; the
challenge is to avoid this situation and success in
this regard will have an impact in terms of stable
employment and development of the regions. These
companies must compete with the technological
platforms of low–cost countries in terms of quality and
knowledge relating to high–technology products. To
this end, policies are being geared towards: 
– strengthening cooperation between company
networks, higher education institutions and
research institutes;
– developing support for product development
and design;
– developing production technologies and new
production systems;
– encouraging SMEs to invest in R&D, providing
seed capital and other types of financing until risk
capital recognizes that the projects are viable; and 
– promoting the capacity of SMEs to operate
internationally.
These examples show how the Governments of
Ireland, the Republic of Korea and Sweden have
sought to convert scientific and technological research
and educational capacity into an industrial and export
strength in high–technology areas; this has implied
reviewing development strategies and national
innovation systems that support them in order to face
up to new challenges.
Institution–building is an important factor for the
success of policies and a number of different issues
come into play. In this analysis, the focus will be on
elements that have been particularly important for
the success of export development and innovation
policies: (i) coordination between the executing
2. Institution–building
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agencies or entities; (ii) complementarity of the
programmes and targeting of specific sectors; and
(iii) cooperation between the public sector, companies
and academia.
a) Coordination between agencies
Irrespective of the different national institutional
agreements and their varying complexity, coordination
between agencies may be well or poorly implemented.
Clearly, this will depend on whether there is evidence,
at the highest level of government, of the will to link
global strategy with sectoral or regional strategies and
the policies that emerge from them. In the case of
export development, industrial development and
innovation, coordination requires dialogue between
ministries and agencies in each sector. It is interesting
to study the institutions that countries that are
advanced in these practices have built in order to
ensure policy effectiveness. 
Malaysia affords an interesting example. This
country made a giant leap in its international integration,
bringing its exports of manufactures to remarkable
levels thanks to an industrialization strategy based on
proactively attracting foreign direct investment.
Nevertheless, new challenges to its competitiveness
have since emerged: China’s growing competitiveness
internationally and nationally; intense competition for
foreign direct investment (FDI); a major gap between
demand for and supply of skilled workers; a workforce
with little training in information technology; and the
need to build knowledge and experience in terms of the
design and brands of manufactures.
In the light of these challenges, the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry coordinates a set of
policies implemented by three agencies: the Malaysia
External Trade Development Corporation (MATRADE);
the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority
(MIDA), which also seeks to attract foreign investment;
and the Small and Medium Industries Development
Corporation (SMIDEC). Each of these bodies started
out with specific programmes geared to the objectives
and goals defined by the ministry and governed by the
ninth national development plan (Ninth Malaysian
Plan) and the Third Industrial Master Plan, which are
provided with the necessary financial resources. The
ministry is the focal point and holds periodic meetings
with representatives of the three entities. Moreover,
meetings are usually held to discuss new initiatives
with the stakeholders involved. This practice is
consistent with the plans and strategies formulated for
Malaysia’s development. The ministry’s policies are
also coordinated with those of the Ministry of Science,
Technology and Innovation (Ministry of Science,
Technology and Innovation, 2006).
Diagram VI.3
MALAYSIA: THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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These challenges do not differ from those faced by
a country like Singapore, notwithstanding its higher
degree of development. In the 1990s, the economic
development strategy was geared towards the
manufacturing and services sectors. The economic
strategic plan presented in 1991 placed emphasis on
education and human resources in a bid to enhance
the country’s competitiveness. In the operational
programme, the focus was on development of the
services sector, and companies were encouraged to
use Singapore as a regional platform or as the parent
company’s distribution centre. Investments in the
services sector were based on the film industry,
multimedia products, publications, art and entertainment,
textiles, fashion and design in different sectors. The
globalization strategy seeks to transform Singapore
from a production–based economy to one driven by
innovation. The Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (see diagram VI.4) is the entity responsible
for formulating strategies for international integration,
competitiveness, entrepreneurship and development of
the two sectoral pillars of Singapore: high–technology
manufacturing and global services. It has six divisions,
which structure their policies around industrial and
corporate development, international trade, and
innovation. All the divisions work closely with the
agencies, which are autonomous bodies responsible for
programme execution.
Ireland is the third example. The Ministry of
Enterprise, Trade and Employment of this country
is responsible for policies relating to competitiveness,
export development and innovation. Its coordination
and advisory body, Forfás, is in charge of the areas of
enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation.
In other words, Forfás is a multidisciplinary body that
is in charge of coordination, conducting studies and
proposing policies for each of these areas; at the same
time, it acts as advisor to the ministry, providing
a comprehensive vision. In order to be able to fulfil
these functions, it participates on the boards of
directors of the bodies that implement policy. IDA
Ireland, the government body in charge of industrial
development, which is responsible for attracting
foreign investment; Enterprise Ireland, which deals
with development of national industry; and Science
Foundation Ireland, the organization that promotes
scientific and technological research in the areas of
biotechnology and ICT (Forfás, n.d). Forfás was, and
in some cases still is, part of the secretariat of other
State agencies and of ad hoc groups formed at the
Prime Minister’s request. Since it is not an executive
body, it does not take part in analyses or play a role
in the economy in the short term; as such, it is able to
have a longer–term vision which is highly prized when
discussing strategic issues.
Diagram VI.4
SINGAPORE: STRUCTURE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY
AND THE AGENCIES THAT SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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For example, when the government was focusing
on training human resources for the future development
of Ireland, which was to be based on the knowledge
economy, Forfás worked with an ad hoc group of
experts, the Ministry of Education and other agencies
to prepare a vision for appropriate systems of education
and capacity–building to train the human resources for
the economy of the future, helping to design a national
strategy for skills–training (Forfás, 2007) and to
identify future needs. Special emphasis was placed on
ICTs, medical equipment and international marketing
services, which are the production and services areas to
which the country is committed in terms of its niche in
the world market. This example demonstrates that a
country such as Ireland can, first of all, have a vision
of the future, second, steer the work of the different
ministries and agencies in the same direction and,
third, create institutions to ensure that the course taken
is in line with the agreed objective, in order to
strengthen policies and enhance their effectiveness.
b) Complementarity of programmes,
evaluation and orientation towards
specific sectors 
The effectiveness of programmes and policies
depends unequivocally on the efficient coordination of
government ministries and agencies. The task is easier
if there is a strategy that sets goals, deadlines and
priorities and whose execution is actually evaluated. In
the countries examined, there is usually a wide variety
and complementarity of programmes and policies,
although, in some cases, there may be areas of overlap
or duplication. These may be avoided through constant
dialogue with the agencies in question. Such dialogue
is ensured when the existing institutions include
bodies, such as ministerial committees, which are set
up for this purpose and which direct and coordinate the
decisions and policies adopted by the different entities,
when directors that hold decision–making positions
participate on the boards of directors of the other
agencies or provided there is an agency specialized
in policy coordination and other functions. This
type of mechanism exists in all of the countries
under consideration. 
For example, one of Singapore’s strengths is the
fact that its policies have been effectively integrated
and implemented by a number of institutions (see box
VI.3). Integration has been facilitated by a political and
administrative system that depends on a relatively
small group of decision–makers. Singapore is now
exporting some of its experience in this area to other
countries: China, India, Viet Nam and countries of
the Middle East are working with Singapore’s
development agencies on the creation of industrial
estates, airports, the construction of water treatment
plants and capacity–building of civil servants
and teachers. 
The countries under consideration have priorities
that orient the main policies and objectives of
each agency. For example, in Malaysia, one of the
objectives of the Third Industrial Master Plan is to
achieve closer coordination between SMEs and the
production chains led by the transnational corporations,
or their internationalization. The Small and Medium
Industries Development Corporation (SMIDEC) is
the agency responsible for the development of
programmes for promoting the achievement of these
objectives (SMIDEC, 2006) and six programmes
are currently being implemented: the industrial
coordination programme, the global supplier training
programme, the skills generation programmes, the
advisory programme for SMEs, the development of
technological infrastructure and the enterprise
development programme. These encompass a set of
issues for enterprises which must be improved if they
are to become exporters or suppliers for transnationals.
In addition, in the area of innovation, the Strategic
Business Intelligence Centre, a government enterprise
dependent on the Ministry of Science, Technology and
Innovation (SIRIM, 2005), supports the national
industry through multidisciplinary technological
programmes. Its R&D programmes seek to introduce
new know–how which will place companies at the cutting
edge technologically, transforming them into world
players. The programmes provide services especially
designed for SMEs, including strategic planning, business
intelligence, technological development and quality. This
set of actions complements those developed by
SMIDEC giving it comprehensive assistance.4
4 Not all countries choose sectors or stakeholders as the central focus of their strategies. When the economy has become specialized and the main
production sectors are at the leading edge of their field, innovation becomes the focus in order to advance in the knowledge economy, but in
all spheres. Finland opted for this course with its horizontal innovation policy, which is implemented through close cooperation between the
government, businesses and academia. Cooperation is the central element of policy implementation. One of the principal instruments for
consolidation of horizontal connections is network densification, which seeks to create synergies of all kinds among actors. See The Science and
Technology Council of Finland (2006).
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The Singapore Biomedical Sciences
(BMS) initiative was launched in June
2000 to develop the biomedical scien-
ces cluster as one of the key pillars
of Singapore's economy, alongside
electronics, engineering and chemicals.
Three key agencies work in close
coordination to develop the BMS
cluster: the Biomedical Research
Council (BMRC) of the Agency for
Science, Technology and Research
(A*STAR), which funds and supports
scientific research initiatives; the
Biomedical Sciences Group (BMSG),
which comes under the Economic
Development Board (EDB), which
promotes industrial development and
innovation in manufacturing; and
Bio*One Capital, which functions as
an investment arm. These agencies
are responsible for establishing research
infrastructure, supporting the industry,
providing venture capital support and
strengthening manpower capabilities. 
The first phase of development
(2000–2005) of the BMS initiative was
focused on establishing a firm founda-
tion for basic biomedical research in
Singapore. Five research institutes
developed research capacity in the
areas of bioprocesses, chemical synt-
hesis, genomics and proteonomics,
molecular and cell biology, biotechnology
and nanotechnology and computational
biology. The Science and Engineering
Research Council and the Institute of
Chemical and Engineering Sciences
have provided support for training in
four basic sectors: pharmaceuticals,
biotechnology, medical technology and
health services. 
In the following development phase
(2006–2010), the focus is on deepening
the research capabilities of the different
national stakeholders and on establishing
networks abroad, which is fundamental
for translating basic discoveries into
clinical applications geared to improving
human health. 
In order to bring the project to
fruition, the country has in the past few
years attracted an impressive number
of prominent international scientists to
head and develop research in biomedical
sciences. A*STAR of Singapore is
providing financing for young researchers
from all over the world to join the
cluster and contribute with their own
research to its development. 
Singapore’s position at the forefront
of biomedical sciences was validated
when a group of 25 laboratories,
including the most reputable in the
world, set up operations in Biópolis,
the name adopted for the cluster
formed with the investments for the
initial project. It has recently been
announced that Lilly Singapore Centre
will invest US$ 150 million in a centre
for the study of cancer and metabolic
diseases, which will employ 150
researchers. The company Glaxo
SmithKline (GSK) recently invested
US$ 13 million in a new medicinal
chemistry laboratory, geared to dege-
nerative diseases, and the Novartis
Institute for tropical diseases has
expanded its biomedical research
to include dengue, tuberculosis and
malaria. 
International firms coexist and
collaborate with national firms and
research service providers as well as
with Singapore’s seven R&D institutes
in Biópolis, which has a campus that is




SINGAPORE: THE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES CLUSTER
THE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES CLUSTER IN SINGAPORE
Source:Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Since the resources involved are considerable,
governments, in their determination to ensure policy
transparency, have prepared a series of effectiveness
and efficiency indicators for the programmes and
instruments to facilitate their evaluation. A mid–term
evaluation may be carried out in order to correct
the problems and inefficiencies that arise during or
following implementation, with a view to determining
whether the programme should be rescheduled or
eliminated. The consultancy group’s recommendations
are essential for improving programmes. Countries
have adopted these indicators as a systematic and
indispensable practice for ensuring that their management
is effective and transparent. Currently, rather than
measuring the activity in itself, its effect and results
are assessed. These evaluations are done by groups
of external international or national consultants;
they are usually public and generally disseminated
via the Internet.
c) Interaction between the public
and private sectors 
The effectiveness of the programmes and public
policies in the area of competitiveness, export
development and innovation depends to a large
extent on the degree of participation of the different
stakeholders. For some countries, the public/private
sector partnership for strategy implementation is vital
and is usually reflected at the level of the different
policy–making bodies. In Ireland, for example, the
business sector, including the representatives of
transnationals, unions and non–governmental organi-
zations, participates with government representatives
in the National Economic and Social Council (NESC),
which draws up the country’s medium–term strategy.
Representatives of national firms and transnational
corporations also participate on the boards of directors
of the main development agencies, in regional
bodies and in ad hoc consultancy groups set up at
the government’s request. In this regard, there is a high
degree of trust between the public and private sectors
and the will to move forward together to improve the
standard of living of the society.
In other countries, the private sector’s participation
in decision–making is less clear–cut. But even in those
cases, governments are making serious efforts to listen
to the views of entrepreneurs, maintaining links
through regular consultations and meetings. Discussion
groups or groups for implementation of specific
projects are set up from time to time with the participation
of the different stakeholders.
Collaboration between the academic sphere,
companies and government is vital in the area of
innovation and this is recognized in all the countries
under consideration. The Nordic countries attach
special importance to cooperation among the three
basic stakeholders in the national innovation system;
this approach has been disseminated as the triple helix
model. In Finland, this model has proved itself,
not only in big cities, but also in regions where there
are no universities but where businesses do have
needs in areas such as technological development and
modernization; for example, in one region in the south
of the country, a programme for building networks has
been applied. 
The regional government, together with entrepreneurs
and five universities in different regions, devised a
plan for applying information technology, innovation
in management and upgrading of processes and
products through a cooperative planning method.
Groups of researchers set up a new research community
combining many disciplines and universities. The
programme was appraised in 2004 (Alarinta, 2005) and
it was concluded that the network organization for
development of innovation had been rapidly
consolidated. New fields of research, such as ICT,
have been hooked up with traditional sectors (wood,
food and metals), incorporating new value and better
processes in businesses. 
Another example is the development of the
biotechnology industry in New Zealand. The government
recognized its strategic importance, both for its potential
participation in the world market and for the preparation
of new products and the contribution of new knowledge
to the country’s traditional export industries. This
initiative was undertaken with the close collaboration
of the development agency New Zealand Trade &
Enterprise (NZTE), the Ministry of Research, Science
and Technology and the industry. The industry is now
enjoying rapid growth and is participating in projects
internationally. This has given rise to a growing
number of joint trade ventures, in particular with
Australia. This resulted in an expansion in the
quantities of products traded in 2006, the existence of
about a dozen pharmaceuticals at an advanced stage of
clinical development and progress with projects linked
to the agricultural sector, medical equipment, and
industrial biochemical and diagnostic products (LEK
Consulting, 2006).
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Some countries have developed special agencies
to form partnerships between universities and business.
This is the case of collaborative research centres (CRC)
of Australia (Australia, Department of Education,
Science and Training, n.d.). These agencies have been
created from companies and research institutes or
centres which have taken the initiative of moving
forward in an area of innovation geared to marketing.
The participant group may include national and
transnational corporations. In 2006, there were 158
CRCs which allowed the direct coordination between
companies and academia in the different production
sectors in Australia. In the evaluation carried out on
this initiative (Insight Economics Pty Ltda., 2006), the
Innovation has emerged as a central element in the
export development and competition strategy of those
countries that have made leaps towards a stronger
position in the international market. Factors such as
trade liberalization, the fall in transport costs, advances
in ICT, globalization and constant shifts in consumer
demand have a strong impact on the strategy for
international integration, placing innovation at the
heart of this strategy. One way of illustrating this
phenomenon is to look at the way stakeholders,
governments, businesses and the academic sphere
organize in order to achieve coordination between
export development and innovation. 
The analysis focused on the experience of eight
countries: Australia, Finland, Ireland, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Sweden.
Notwithstanding their differences in terms of their
stage of technological development and degree of
export diversification, they have, overall, experienced
significant export expansion in recent decades and
this has been reflected in growth and in a substantial
increase in their per capita income. In all cases,
innovation has been part of the solution to the future
challenges. What these countries show, however, is
that it is not just a matter of increasing spending on
R&D: policies must be redefined to bring them in line
with new requirements. Scientific and technological
research and educational capacity must be transformed
into industrial and export strength; this implies changing
not only the national innovation system but also the
export development agencies and industrial development
or business promotion agencies.
Moreover, in this highly competitive world, a new
business model is needed in which market knowledge
and innovation are crucial for success in external trade.
The experience of these countries is that the market
is not sufficient in itself to push forward this process.
Explicit programmes and active policies geared to
raising the productivity, competitiveness and innovation
of enterprises, and to developing linkages between
enterprises, the academic sphere and government must
be created to promote trade in the world market,
improve management and secure financing.
Institution–building has proven to be a significant
factor for the success of policies. To deal with this very
broad issue, this study has focused on central areas in
which export development ties in with innovation, for
example, coordination between entities, complementarity
following issues emerged: (i) the benefits brought
about by the innovations, which translate into licences
or new companies that prepare the products and
processes that have been developed; (ii) access to
international networks through the participation of
foreign researchers in CRC projects and the participation
of their members in international standard–setting
bodies; (iii) the increase in the skills of researchers
and, above all, the creation of a critical mass of young
researchers who participate in CRC; and (iv) the
benefits of interaction between the industry and the
academic sector, which learn to dialogue with each
other, thereby enhancing the productivity of innovation. 
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of programmes, targeting, appraisal and, lastly, the
interaction of stakeholders. These questions have been
examined using the selected countries as examples
and this has revealed the salient trends and provides
sufficient motivation to study them in greater depth.
The fact that marketing is an indispensable step in
the area of innovation and the fact that the countries
examined are for the most part small economies which
are dependent on foreign trade for their development
mean that innovation and export development strategies
tend to be complementary. Hence the importance of
coordination between development agencies to harmonize
their policies and increase their effectiveness. This
dialogue is ensured provided the existing institutions
include forums designed for this purpose, such as
ministerial committees, which guide and coordinate
the decision– and policy–making of the different
agencies, provided that directors that hold crucial
positions on decision–making bodies of the different
agencies participate in those of other agencies, and
provided that there is an agency that specializes in policy–
coordination, among other possible mechanisms.
This type of agreement may be observed in all the
countries examined.
Countries that are at a more advanced stage of
industrialization tend to have a horizontal strategy,
which to a great extent, is due to the fact that they
have to deal with deeper and more integrated markets,
where sectoral policies are not so effective. This is why
the focus of the programmes is on stakeholders. in
Finland, Ireland, Republic of Korea and Sweden, and
SMEs linked to chains of major national firms and
transnationals are the target of many of the innovation
and export development policies. In other countries
which are still in the process of diversification, such
as Australia, Malaysia and New Zealand, the strategy
also incorporates sector targeting.
Cooperation between the government, companies
and the academic sphere, such as it occurs in the
Nordic countries or in the Economic and Social Council
of Ireland, or also at a lower level through dialogue
between the public and private sectors in the agencies
and through participation on their boards of directors,
is recognized as a fundamental element: it generates
mutual trust among stakeholders, and, at the same
time, creates a collective commitment to the success of
programmes and policies. Lastly, an important element
for the effectiveness of these is evaluation and
transparency. This practice is usually conducted
through national or international consultants that are
external to the agency, and through the systematic
construction of indicators of policy efficacy, which are
related to the effect and actual results and are usually
accessible to the public.
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